
A New Dataset*

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In this article we present a new dataset: the Early Conflict Prevention in Ethnic Crises dataset (ECPEC). It contains data on operational conflict prevention in 67 ethnic crises in the period 1990–98 that vary in terms of both preventive action and crisis outcomes. The new dataset thus allows for the evaluation of the effects of different types of preventive measures and also gives an overview of who takes what measures and in what conflicts. The global overview shows some interesting patterns. Preventive activity in the escalatory phase of ethnic conflict is dominated by verbal attention and facilitation. Coercive measures are rarely employed prior to the outbreak of war. Preventive action is most common in Europe and the Middle East, while crises in Asia tend to receive comparatively little attention. Most of the preventive action is focused on a relatively small number of high profile cases like those in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Major Powers (with the exception of China), neighboring states, the UN, and regional organizations are the most active interveners. To illustrate the usefulness of a large-N dataset on preventive measures, we also present a first analysis of the effects of different types of measures. The findings suggest that diplomatic measures and relief efforts both have conflict dampening effects, while carrots (inducements) increase the likelihood of escalation to war. Other measures show no significant effects in this sample. The findings also show that third parties are more likely to intervene in conflicts that are more prone to escalate to war. This implies that unless we account for the propensity of third parties to intervene in the more difficult cases, we risk underestimating the effects of preventive measures.

KEYWORDS: civil war; conflict prevention; crises; escalation; ethnic conflict; intervention; third party

*We are grateful to the Editor and three anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions that significantly helped us improve the manuscript. Any remaining errors rest with the authors. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 46th Annual International Studies Association Convention, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1–5, 2005. E-mail: magnus.oberg@pcr.uu.se
1. Introduction

Conflict prevention has been high on the agenda in political writings on international conflicts since the early 1990s. It has been seen as a response to the many failures in international reactions that were recorded at the time, the most haunting still being the war in Bosnia (1992–1995) and the genocide in Rwanda (1994). Thus, considerable work was initiated on developing preventive measures and applying them to a number of contexts and situations. It has also drawn the attention of scholars, often writing with a hope of having an impact on improving the success rate of international engagement to reduce violence in conflicts. Furthermore, the scope was rapidly broadened to cover structural and long-term aspects as well. Structural and direct or operational prevention strategies were juxtaposed against each other. This does not necessarily have to be so, but the two types of work require different methodologies, as one is focusing on long-term effects while the other one looks at the immediate impact on the unfolding dynamics of a particular conflict.

The focus of this paper is on short-term operational conflict prevention in the escalatory phases of ethnic conflict, prior to the outbreak of war. This is in contrast to much of the prevention literature which tends to also include measures taken after the outbreak of war or in ongoing armed conflicts.¹

Previous research on operational conflict prevention has been limited by at least two factors. First, it has been limited by the lack of comparable data on preventive measures for a larger number of cases in the escalatory phases of civil conflict. Second, we have not had a clear picture of the universe of relevant cases, and thus no real baseline from which we may evaluate the effects of preventive measures. All of this has restricted our ability to analyze patterns and effects of preventive action. Consequently, research on operational prevention has so far focused mainly on lessons learned in particular cases or comparisons of small numbers of cases.

In this article we present a new dataset: the *Early Conflict Prevention in Ethnic Crises* dataset (ECPEC). It contains data on operational conflict prevention in all ethnic crises for the period 1990–98, including information on over 700 prevention events divided into 12 different categories, and undertaken by 7 types of actors. The new dataset gives us comparable data on operational prevention in 67 ethnic crises that vary in terms of both preventive action and crisis outcomes. The new dataset thus allows for the evaluation of the effects of different types of preventive measures and also gives an overview of who takes what measures and in what conflicts.

In the next section we describe briefly the findings and arguments in previous research on operational conflict prevention. In section 3 we present the typology of conflict prevention measures that underlies the coding of the new dataset, and we describe the data collection methods and sources used to generate the data. In section 4 we present some descriptive findings from the new dataset, giving a first

¹A possible reason for this is that most of the conflict management action is found only after the outbreak of war. As it turns out, comparatively little preventive action takes place in the critical escalatory phase leading up to war.
systematic overview of the patterns of operational prevention in ethnic conflicts during the 1990s. In section 5, to demonstrate the usefulness of the new data we evaluate some of the claims made in previous research about effects of various types of preventive measures.

2. Previous Research

Until now, scholarly approaches to operational conflict prevention have been largely case-based and the significance of particular contexts constitutes an important element of their conclusions (Wallensteen and Möller, 2003). Some have been more structured and generated more general implications (Jentleson, 2000). There are still reasons to express dissatisfaction with this state of the art. Few systematic studies involving larger-N investigations have been made. Most studies have emphasized the conditions of successful preventive actions, rather than the effects of the various measures used. Studies point to the type of threat, its potential for destabilizing a region, and the opportunities for preventive action (Carment and Schnabel, 2003: 3). In effect, these are conditions that make actors perceive imminent dangers (not the least to them) and spur them into action. The preventive measures themselves have rarely been exposed to systematic scrutiny and evaluation.

Jentleson (2000, 2003) has addressed different types of measures, basing himself on a strict comparative study of cases spanning several continents. He finds that a mixture of non-coercive and coercive measures provides for successful conflict prevention (Jentleson, 2003: 35–40). Diplomatic means, the typical non-coercive form of action, needs to be backed up by a credible military threat, he argues, and many with him. For instance, it has been said that a combination of “sticks” and “carrots” actually had an impact on Saddam Hussein’s program on weapons of mass destruction in the mid-1990s (Wallensteen et al., 2005). Thus, there is some scholarly evidence and diplomatic experience in favor of this proposition. Regan (2000) argues that a mixed set of strategies should have the best chance of achieving a successful outcome, as the combined effect of the measures should be able to influence the conflict beyond the ability of either individual strategy. Also, Lund seems to support the mixed-measure strategy. He argues that preventive diplomacy requires a variety of actions in order to address the different aspects of a conflict. He calls this *multifaceted action*. In sum, it is the aggregate impact of actions that influence the outcome of preventive measures. Macedonia is mentioned as an example where the effectiveness of the preventive efforts depended on the aggregated influence of official and nonofficial actions. In contrast, in failed cases of prevention like Rwanda, only one or two instruments were employed (Lund, 1996). Furthermore, preventive diplomatic efforts are more effective when major and/or regional powers and neighboring states agree to support the efforts. Also, the participation of the United States and regional organizations further adds to the efficiency of the preventive measures (Lund, 1996, 2002).

Additionally, lessons learned from the case studies suggest that preventive strategies need to be coordinated, comprehensive, and enduring to ensure success. Mixed strategies appear, for the most part, to be preferable to strategies focusing on only one aspect of conflict. Several case studies suggest that third
party actors should collaborate and draw lessons from their respective area of expertise in order to best suit the situation. Furthermore, it is suggested that the type of third party actor affects the outcome of preventive measures. Again, it seems that whether or not a regional state actor or the UN is preferred to an NGO or a local actor depends on the situation. For example, it is argued that international NGOs and track-two actors are generally not bound to specific national interests, thus their preventive strategies may be better tailored to the needs of a particular conflict. However, many of these actors have specific, narrow mandates dealing with only one specific dimension of the conflict, e.g. democratization and/or human rights. Focusing only on these goals may undermine the goal of conflict prevention. This can—it has been argued—be addressed through close coordination of complementary actors (Havermans, 2002; Lund, 2002; Sriram and Wermester, 2003).

If crises unleash strong dynamics that are difficult to stop moving in the direction of escalation, then preventive actions have to be able to impact on ongoing dynamics, largely driven by the parties themselves and their continued conflictual interaction. Yet we know that not all disputes escalate to war and that there is nothing inevitable in the dispute reaching the level of war. In our sample of 67 serious crises, only about one-third escalated to war. Thus, it is not enough to record that preventive measures were taken and that a particular conflict stopped escalating at a later date. The connection may have more to do with the dynamics of the conflict than the preventive intervention. This is a strong argument in favor of large-N studies, as only then can the impact be readily measured.

3. The ECPEC Data

The Universe of Cases
To describe patterns and evaluate effects we need systematic information on operational prevention for a large set of comparable situations characterized by a heightened risk of war—the equivalent of crisis data for intrastate conflicts. To our knowledge, only one dataset contains the equivalent of crisis data for intrastate conflicts: the Ethnic Challenges to Government Authority Dataset describing all challenges to government authority by ethnic groups 1990–1998, in all 67 cases (Öberg, 2002b)\(^2\). The criteria for inclusion resemble those of datasets on international crises (see e.g. Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1989: 5–6). An “ethnic challenge” is included if it meets two sets of coding criteria. First, the ethnic actor made a public commitment to resort to force if its stated demands are not accommodated, and this commitment was made either by threatening to resort to force unless the government yields on the issue at stake, or by unilaterally beginning to implement demands thereby creating a \textit{fait accompli} that the actor threatens to defend by force if necessary.\(^3\) Second, the public commitment to resort to force is

\(^2\)For a list of all 67 crises see Öberg (2002a: 134–135).

\(^3\)The \textit{actor} referred to in this definition is any organized actor claiming to represent the group. For a discussion of the implications of this conception on measurement issues see Öberg (2002a: Appendix 4.1).
accompanied by actions that demonstrate willingness and ability to engage in armed conflict, indicated by, for example, the acquisition of armaments, armed provocations, clashes with government forces, etc. (Öberg, 2002b: 4–5). Thus, we use the *Ethnic Challenges to Government Authority Dataset* to define the universe of cases for which we collect data on operational prevention.

This means that ECPEC covers short-term operational conflict prevention in the escalatory phases of ethnic conflict, prior to the outbreak of war, but not preventive measures or conflict management efforts taken to limit or manage armed conflict that is already under way. Thus, we restrict our attention to operational prevention in the crisis phase, which is a relatively short but intense period in the lifecycle of most conflicts, lasting slightly less than a year on average (see Öberg, 2002a).

**A Typology of Operational Preventive Measures and Actors**

To collect data on operational prevention we need a typology of operational prevention with which we can identify and categorize preventive measures empirically. Thus, in this section we develop a typology of operational prevention and describe the methods and procedures we used to gather data on operational prevention in the 67 ethnic crises included in the *Ethnic Challenges to Government Authority Dataset*.

Starting out to develop an empirically grounded prevention typology, we soon discovered that the tools of the toolbox approach (as developed by Lund, 1996) and the steps on the prevention ladder (developed by Eliasson, 2004) were not easily translatable into reality. There were many more initiatives actually carried out by a diverse set of actors at more or less the same time, and escalation in the types of preventive measures was more limited than one might have expected. In fact, measures in themselves might be difficult to classify according to a scale, as their ‘severity’ might be in the eyes of the actors and the commentators, rather than in the actions as such. Furthermore, seemingly important events might not be captured by either approach, as they were not necessarily explicit prevention actions. Thus, we had to rethink. Figure 1 presents a new typology that we believe is theoretically intriguing and empirically validated (in terms of actions actually fitting the categories). The events in ECPEC data were coded using this typology, but the data collected also contain more detailed information on who did what to whom, as well as the source(s) of the information. This will allow future users to extract more detail, recode the information according to some other typology, and assess the quality of the data.

The preventive instruments are divided into peaceful and coercive measures. These two categories each have a set of sub-measures as shown in Figure 1.

The first of the peaceful measures is verbal attention, which includes verbal statements with a direct association to the crisis either by reference to the opposing parties or the situation on the ground. This consists of statements expressing a concern, a will to do something about a particular situation, or condemnation/praise of particular actions and actors. This is a type of measure not considered in many studies, although Dixon (1996) has a similar category of public appeals.

The second measure, relief efforts, contains humanitarian aid; the actual delivery of food, clothes, and medicine as well as decisions by statesmen to allocate funds to this cause. The effort must be directly linked to the crisis in question in
order to be included. Again, this is not a measure widely used in the literature but researchers such as Dixon (1996) base its use on the assumption that it may “have the effect of reducing anxieties and tensions” (Dixon 1996: 658).

The third measure, facilitation, encompasses all those activities that support communication and create opportunities for meetings between disputant parties. This category records action such as inviting primary parties to talks, visits, separate or all-party talks, meetings, and negotiations with the participation of a third party. The measure also includes visits and meetings that are part of fact-finding missions. In order to be coded as facilitation, talks, visits, negotiations, etc. must include one or both primary parties and be clearly linked to the crisis in question.

The fourth measure, third party coordination, comprises all attempts by third parties to coordinate their preventive efforts in a particular crisis without the participation of the primary parties. This means meetings, telephone calls, conferences, and the like, where third party actors are meeting to confer on a particular situation and to discuss and coordinate prevention activities.

Then there are proposals by third parties for the solution of (a) the incompatibility or (b) a conflict-related issue. The first can be exemplified with publicly presented ideas of dividing Bosnia into autonomous units. The latter encompasses proposals offering solutions to conflict-related issues, often relating to what we might think of as conflict externalities and/or primary party behavior. Examples include proposals to create safe havens for civilians, to establish humanitarian corridors, or to put forward a ceasefire proposal.

Last among the peaceful measures are decisions concerning (a) the incompatibility or (b) a conflict-related issue. Measures under (a) contain actions such as
arbitration and adjudication of the dispute by third parties, while (b) includes, for instance, decisions by the third parties to set up a mission to monitor human rights, make provisions for the repatriation refugees, and dispatching a top-level mission to support a democratic process.

The first set of coercive measures is *conditioning measures*, including *carrots and sticks*. Conditioning measures are statements by a third party directed at one or both primary parties that stipulate a preferred outcome and make reactions conditional on it being fulfilled. “Disarm and you can take full part in talks” is an example of the first (carrot) and “withdraw troops or face further sanctions” an example of the latter (stick).

Then there is coercive action that constitutes a *threat of Chapter VII measures* and the *implementation of Chapter VII measures*. Chapter VII measures are those measures that fall within UN Charter Chapter VII, that is, “actions with respect to threats to the peace, and breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression” (UN Charter VII). These are actions that are considered necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. According to Chapter VII these may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of various means of communication, the severance of diplomatic relations, and the use of force and military measures. Although these actions refer to the UN, all types of third parties can take such actions in the ECPEC dataset, not only the UN. In the ECPEC dataset, threats of Chapter VII measures include threats of imposing economic sanctions. One example of the implementation of Chapter VII measures is when Pakistan expelled the Afghan envoy as a response to the situation in Afghanistan in 1995, revoking his diplomatic status. Other examples are when economic sanctions are implemented or when the UN authorized the use of force against planes violating the no-fly-zone over Bosnia.

In addition to identifying the measures, we have also coded who is acting as the third party. Previous studies suggest that characteristics of the third party actor affect the outcome of preventive measures and some research suggests that preventive efforts are more effective when major or regional powers and neighboring states agree to support the efforts. The UN, NGOs, and local actors are other types of third parties that have received attention in previous research. The ECPEC data contain information on the exact identity of the actor but we have also categorized them into seven types of third parties: the UN, Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) other than the UN, regional organizations, neighboring countries, major powers (the permanent members of the UN Security Council, P5), prominent persons, and “other actors”, i.e. all other third parties not included in the above-mentioned categories. Note that to be considered a regional organization, the organization must be regional to the conflict country in question. For example, the EU and NATO are regional organizations for European conflict countries but not when intervening in other regions. A third party is coded as an IGO if it (a) is an intergovernmental organization without a specific regional interest, such as the World Bank, or (b) if it is a regional organization that works outside its region, e.g. the EU in Africa or NATO in Afghanistan.

Based on the typology described above, all preventive measures taken during a crisis were coded for all 67 ethnic crises in 1990–1998. This makes it possible to describe the patterns of third party operational conflict prevention for all ethnic
crises in this period—whether the outcome was war or not. It also allows analysis of the impact of preventive measures by comparing cases with varying types or frequencies of preventive measures.

**Data Collection: Methods and Procedures**

The data were collected using a two-step approach. First, the third parties in each crisis were identified. This was done using *Keesing’s Record of World Events* in combination with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) internet database (www.pcr.uu.se/database). This resulted in a list of third parties in each crisis. These names were then used as search items in the news and information service database Factiva, which contains over 8,000 sources, including general news sources such as Reuters, BBC, and Agence France Press, as well local and regional news sources. An automated events data search was used, which is a software program that automatically retrieves all articles within specified parameters, in our case all articles that contain information about the third parties. This generated literally thousands of articles that were read and coded. Using media coverage as the main source of information may mean that these data are biased towards high-level diplomacy by third parties. Efforts by local actors, such as civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGO), are less likely to be covered in any media. Also, whatever “secret” meetings that may take place during the crisis are not captured unless reported during or shortly after the crisis. However, despite these limitations, news reporting is the best information source available for creating a large-N dataset with global coverage. This method has been used within the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) for the last 20 years. As Factiva includes regional and local news sources that are translated into English, it is possible to retrieve local information that would not reach the global news agencies such as Reuters or AP.

4. Patterns of Early Prevention

**What Measures?**

Some patterns are apparent when analyzing the newly compiled dataset on early preventive efforts in ethnic crises. For the 67 crises in 1990–1998, 729 preventive actions were recorded in 32 crises. Thus, in more than half of all crises, no measures were registered.

Some preventive instruments have been used more than others, as shown in Figure 2. The one most commonly applied is *verbal attention*; 338 statements were recorded across all crises, which constitute 46% of the total number of measures taken. In only two of the crises did verbal attention constitute the sole form of prevention efforts (Indonesia vs. Papuans; Pakistan vs. Mohajirs). In contrast, 42 crises received no verbal attention but seven of these 42 were the target of other measures. In the 32 crises where some measure was taken, public statements were made in 25 (78%).

The second most used preventive instrument is *facilitation*, which comprises 27% of the total number. Facilitation is used more frequently in Europe and Africa than in other regions. Crises such as the Hutu challenges in Burundi, Catholics in Northern Ireland, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia, and Kosovo in
Yugoslavia all have a sizeable number of facilitation events and make up 63% of the events registered.

Third party coordination, that is, meetings between third parties without the participation of the warring parties, are the third most commonly used tool for conflict prevention. Close to half (46%) of these types of meetings were held with reference to African crises. For instance, neighboring and other African countries met several times with the independent mediator and former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere to discuss the deteriorating situation in Burundi.

Relief efforts constitute 5% (40) of the total global measures and the great majority (34) were aimed at the Kurdish situation in Iraq. As a group, the P5 was responsible for the majority of these efforts—14 of the 40—again, largely the Kurdish situation in Iraq.

Proposals and decisions by third parties concerning the incompatibility and related issues were used in relatively few cases. An example of a proposal concerning the incompatibility is the Vance-Owen peace plan for a permanent settlement in Bosnia. A proposal about a related conflict issue is to open a “humanitarian corridor” to channel aid in Iraq (Kurds). An instance of a decision regarding the incompatibility is when the European Community (EC) made sure that the Yugoslav troops would return from Croatia in 1991. Finally, examples of decisions concerning conflict-related issues are the decision to form a mission to monitor human rights in Yugoslavia, including Kosovo in 1991, and the decision by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to send a top-level mission to support the democratic process in Angola (vs. the Ovimbundu).

Ninety-three percent of the 729 measures were peaceful, that is, they did not include sticks, carrots, or threats or implementation of Chapter VII measures. Only 51 measures were coercive, of which 27 were taken in Europe, for the most part in the UK (Northern Ireland) and in the former Yugoslavia.
Of the conditioning measures, sticks were used to a larger extent than carrots (20 vs. 10). In Iraq, in the conflict with the Kurds, sticks were used 7 times against Saddam Hussein’s regime. In the Bosnia conflict with the Serbs, sticks were used 6 times against the Bosnian government. The implementation of Chapter VII measures was more common than threats to use Chapter VII—a surprising result, as one might assume that third parties make threats, and even repeat them, before applying the measures. The opposite pattern is found when studying the peaceful measures. The most commonly used measure is verbal attention, followed by facilitation. These are measures without any substantial cost and they do not require the same effort as, for instance, putting together a package with peace proposals.

Where?
It is noteworthy that the number of crises in a specific region does not correlate with the amount of attention the regions receive, as illustrated in Figure 3 A and B. Some regions that experience many crises with a potential for armed conflict receive little attention. Here, Asia stands out. At the other end of the spectrum we find Europe and the Middle East. Crises in Europe make up 24% of the total number but they receive 46% of all international preventive measures. Crises in the Middle East make up only 4% of the total number of ethnic crises but receive 18% of the international measures taken, a marked overrepresentation. In between, we find Africa with 45% of all crises and 31% of the international conflict preventive attempts.

It can also be noted that in Europe a wide range of different types of measures were taken in a large number of crises. In fact, preventive attempts were made in 10 of the 16 (63%) European crises and the whole gambit of preventive measures were used. This can be contrasted to Asia, where only 4 of a total of 16 Asian crises (25%) received third party attention. The Taliban challenge to the Afghan government in 1995 received almost all the attention in Asia. It took 28 of the 31 efforts made in the region. Asia has as many crises as Europe (16) but Europe receives ten times the number of preventive attempts. A similar pattern is found in the Middle East where one case is dominating: the Kurdish challenge in Iraq in 1990–1991. This case makes up 118 of the 129 measures in the region.4

By Whom?
The breadth of different third parties’ engagement is summarized in Figure 4. The breadth of engagement is measured as the number of crises a third party engages in as a proportion of the total number of crises. Major Powers, the P5, take an active part in more than one-third of all crises. Major Powers are also the most active actor, accounting for more than one-third of the measures taken. Not surprisingly, France, UK, Russia, and the USA have been most active in Europe. The USA took action in Northern Ireland and in the Balkans. Russia has been involved in the crises in the Balkans as well as in the countries in the former Soviet Union. All P5 preventive action in the Middle East was directed to the Iraqi crisis with the Kurds. This particular crisis is a case that received the second most Major Power attention with 57 efforts. Only Northern Ireland received 4Note that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict falls outside of the scope of the dataset since it is an ongoing conflict.
more consideration with 63 efforts, making P5 category the most active intermediary in Northern Ireland. All these measures involved the USA and a wide variety of tools were used, ranging from statements and meetings to carrots and sticks. Having more resources at their disposal, Major Powers also distinguish themselves by using conditioning measures (sticks and carrots) and relief efforts to a larger extent than other actors.

It is noteworthy that all Major Powers with the exception of China have been involved in conflict preventive measures. China is absent on the international
conflict prevention arena (at least in this period). Of the Major Powers, only the USA has taken action in Asia. But even US efforts in Asia are confined to a handful of statements and meetings. In Africa, France has been active to protect its former colonial influence and has therefore appeared in situations in Niger, Morocco, and Burundi. Both Russia and the USA have been involved in conflict preventive measures in Angola—a legacy of the Cold War.

Neighboring countries are an active group of intermediaries, often relying on facilitation as a preventive measure. Neighboring countries have been particularly active in making efforts to limit and solve serious situations in neighboring states in Africa, Europe, and Asia. Globally, neighboring countries were active in 31% of all crises (21 of 67 crises).

The UN is another active third party, but perhaps not as active as one might think, considering it is an organization founded to promote peace. The UN has been involved in 24% of all global crises. The organization participated in one-fifth of all measures taken, which is relatively modest in comparison with the Major Powers and neighboring countries. Still, the organization stands out as the most active third party in the regions that may have needed it the most: Africa and Asia, where it accounted for 27% and 58% of all preventive measures taken. The case that received most UN attention is Bosnia (Croats) in 1992–1993. Twenty-one percent of all preventive attempts made by the UN globally were directed at this particular case and all except one of the UN’s European efforts (58 attempts) were made in the former Yugoslavia. The frequent use of verbal

Figure 4. Engagement by Third Actor Measured by Participation in Crises (Percentage of Total Number of Crises)

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attention and facilitation characterizes UN preventive efforts across the globe. The UN has threatened Chapter VII action in only one case: Angola.

On the whole, regional organizations do not stand out as particularly active in operational conflict prevention, but there are great differences between regions. Regional organizations have been active in Africa and Europe, and they have been very active in a handful cases, notably Bosnia, Burundi, and Yugoslavia. In Europe all attempts were made by the European Union (EU), focusing on the Balkans, with some attention also being given to crises in Chechnya and Azerbaijan. In Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was the most active regional organization. It is worth noting that the OAU used the possibility of threatening and implementing Chapter VII-type measures, in the case of Burundi 1996–1998.

International organizations (IGOs), other than the UN, have not been particularly engaged in working towards preventing ethnic crises from escalating. This also includes ‘out-of-area’ action by a regional organization. The exception is the EU, which has taken a relatively high interest in some of the African crises, notably in Burundi, but the EU also attempted to raise awareness of conflicts in Morocco and Angola by verbal attention.

Finally, prominent persons (i.e. actors that represent neither a government nor an organization) have been highly present and actively engaged in the Americas and in Africa. In Africa, one independent mediator—former Tanzanian President Nyerere—has been very active in trying to prevent conflict in Burundi. In the Americas, Desmond Tutu of South Africa engaged in facilitation between the Mohawk Warrior Society and Canada, while Catholic clergy were engaged in preventive efforts in the Chiapas uprising in Mexico.

Overall, the patterns we observe in the ECPEC data suggest that the third parties have different geographical interests. Africa seems to be a region of concern for the UN, as 41% of its preventive attempts targeted African crises. The P5 show a high interest in Europe, both in presence and active engagement: the P5 were present in more than half of the European crises (9 of 16) and 59% of all P5 efforts were taken in this region. IGOs do give the Middle East and Africa greater attention than the other regions. Regional organizations are most active in Europe, followed by Africa.

Finally, we may also note that operational prevention, that is, preventive action taken during a crisis but prior to the outbreak of war, is relatively rare compared with interventions in ongoing armed conflict. In most crises there are no preventive measures taken by third parties, and the bulk of third party

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6Recall that to be considered a regional organization, the organization must be regional to the conflict country in question. For example, the EU is a regional organization for European conflict countries but not when intervening in other regions. NATO is considered a regional actor when engaged in conflict countries within its sphere of interest. Membership is not necessary.

7Recall that a third party is coded as an IGO if it (a) is an international organization without a specific regional interest, such as the World Bank, or (b) is a regional organization that works outside its region, e.g. the EU in Africa.
preventive efforts are focused on a relatively small number of crises. Most outside intervention and conflict management efforts, particularly coercive and forceful interventions, seem to occur only after the outbreak of hostilities. Put differently, much that passes for preventive measures in the literature is perhaps better described as conflict management efforts during ongoing armed conflicts.

Having described the patterns of operational prevention in ethnic conflicts, we now turn to the question of the effects of preventive measures in ethnic crises.

5. Effects of Early Prevention

The ECPEC data on operational conflict prevention in ethnic crises presented above allows us to explore the effects of preventive measures. The purpose of this preliminary analysis is to demonstrate the usefulness of the data. We limit our analysis here to a set of propositions and claims made in the literature. First, preventive diplomacy is a cornerstone in the prevention literature, but there is little agreement as to whether it works (Wallensteen et al., 2005; Jentleson, 2003; Lund, 1996, 2002). Thus, we investigate the effects of diplomatic measures. Second, the effect of sticks (threats/coercion) and carrots (inducements) is another prominent theme in the literature (Wallensteen et al., 2005; Jentleson, 2003; Lund, 1996, 2002). Therefore we make a first attempt at evaluating the effects of sticks and carrots. It has also been argued that preventive diplomacy is more effective if backed up by military threats or other coercive measures (i.e. sticks), and hence we also evaluate the effects of combining preventive diplomacy and sticks, or carrots and sticks. Third, it has been suggested that third party coordination makes prevention more effective (Havermans, 2002; Lund, 2002). Thus, we ask whether third party coordination matters. Finally, we evaluate the claim made by Dixon (1996) that relief efforts have a conflict dampening effect.

To evaluate these claims we use the ECPEC data to construct five categories of preventive measures that correspond to the concepts used in the literature and indicate the presence or absence of such measures in an ethnic crisis (see independent variables below).\(^8\) It should be noted that the ECPEC data is more fine-grained than these five categories and in future studies it may be disaggregated to answer more specific questions about types of measures and/or actors.

In addition to evaluating the effects of various types of preventive measures, the dataset can be used to study the conditions under which third parties intervene to prevent crises from escalating to war. Here, we use this possibility to investigate whether third parties select themselves into crises that are more or less

\(^8\)The distribution of the number of measures of a given type across cases subjected to that particular type of measure is highly skewed. A relatively small number of cases receive a large portion of all the measures taken in a given category. Most cases singled out for attention by third parties receive only one of a few measures of any given kind. Thus using the number of measures of a given kind is not un-problematic and we do not lose much information by using dummy variables. Nevertheless, as a robustness check we also ran our regressions using count variables rather than dummy variables.
prone to escalate to war. If the reasons third parties engage in conflict prevention activities are related to the likelihood of war, then our inferences about the effects of the preventive measures may be biased unless this selection effect is taken into account when analyzing the effects.

Research design
To estimate the effects of preventive measures we use a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model. Using a simultaneous equations model with two equations, we can estimate the probability of a preventive intervention and war while taking into account the possibility that the decision to intervene may be related to the probability of a war outcome. Research on third party mediation in civil conflicts suggests that third parties tend to intervene in conflicts that are more difficult to settle (Svensson, 2007). It seems reasonable to assume that third party prevention efforts follow the same pattern, that is, third parties tend to intervene preventively in conflicts with a higher underlying probability of war. By using a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model, we account for this potential selection effect. The seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model estimates the statistical link between the two equations \( \rho \) as the correlation between the error terms of the two dependent variables. Including \( \rho \) as a parameter in the model permits consistent estimation of the coefficients of the independent variables on the risk of war (see Greene, 2000: 614, 849–51).

The analysis is performed using ECPEC data together with the Ethnic Challenges to Government Authority dataset (Öberg, 2002b). ECPEC describes preventive measures taken in the 67 serious ethnic challenges to government authority from 1990 to 1998 described in the Ethnic Challenges to Government Authority dataset (Öberg, 2002b). The data structure is a cross-section with dyadic observations where the unit of analysis is the ethnic group–government crisis.

Summary statistics for all variables and a correlation matrix for all right-hand-side variables can be found in Appendix 1.

Dependent Variables: Prevention and War
The dependent variable in the first equation is prevention, which is coded 1 if one or more preventive measures were taken and 0 if there was no preventive measure taken in that crisis. The dependent variable in the second equation is war, which takes the value 1 if the outcome of a crisis is war and 0 otherwise. A case is coded as war in the first year that it reaches 6 or higher on the Minorities at Risk rebellion variable and generates at least 25 battle-related deaths according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, or the first year it generates at least 1000 battle-related deaths (Gurr, 1999: 154; Sollenberg, 2001: 21–22). In substantive terms

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9Previous research on mediation selection suggests that third parties intervene to mediate in more difficult cases (Svensson, 2007).

10We use the biprobit command in STATA 8.

11This cut-off point is conceptually more appropriate than the alternatives; higher cut-off points having too restrictive criteria, and lower cut-off points having unclear lower bounds.
this means that a conflict coded as war in the first year in which either (1) the scope of fighting is such that more than 1000 fighters are involved in frequent armed attacks affecting large parts of the group’s territory resulting in at least 25 battle-related fatalities or (2) the intensity of fighting is such that it generates more than 1000 battle-related deaths.

**Independent variables**

To evaluate the propositions outlined above we construct five variables that correspond to concepts used in the literature on conflict prevention. The first variable is *preventive diplomacy* and it includes preventive action such as inviting primary parties to talks, meetings, and negotiations with the participation of a third party; visits and meetings that are part of fact-finding missions; and third party proposals for solutions to the crisis or crisis-related issues. Hence, to construct the *preventive diplomacy* variable we use two categories from the ECPEC typology developed above: facilitation and proposals. *Preventive diplomacy* is coded 1 if there was third party facilitation and/or there were third party proposals for the solution of the incompatibility and/or a conflict-related issue, and 0 otherwise.

The second variable is *sticks* and it involves efforts by the third party to increase the costs of continued disagreement or escalation by the third party threat or use of force or non-violent forms of coercion (e.g. economic sanctions, the freezing of assets, weapons embargos, etc.). Thus, we code *sticks* 1 if there any of the following coercive measures in ECPEC are taken: Stick, Threat of Chapter VII measures, or Implementation of Chapter VII measures, and 0 otherwise.

As noted above, the literature suggests that preventive diplomacy will be more effective when backed up by sticks. This suggests combining *preventive diplomacy* and *sticks* in an interaction term. However, since empirically *sticks* occur only in conjunction with *preventive diplomacy*, there is no need to create an interaction term. We will comment more on this when we present the findings below as it has implications for how we interpret results.

The third variable, *carrots*, is already in the ECPEC data and signifies third party action that creates inducements for the primary parties to de-escalate the crisis. *Carrots* is coded 1 if there was third party action that created inducements for the primary parties to de-escalate the crisis, and 0 otherwise.

The fourth variable, *third party coordination*, is coded 1 if attempts were made by third parties to coordinate their efforts in a particular crisis without the participation of the primary parties, and 0 otherwise.

The fifth variable, *relief efforts*, includes all humanitarian aid directly related to the crisis in question—the actual delivery of food, clothes, and medicine—also includes decisions by statesmen to allocate funds to this cause. *Relief efforts* is coded 1 if there is third party humanitarian aid directly related to the crisis, and 0 otherwise.

**Control Variables**

To have a baseline with which we may compare the effects of preventive measures, we use a model developed by Magnus Öberg (2002a) that explains ethnic crisis outcomes. Thus, to model crisis outcome we use the same set of variables
used by previous research on ethnic crises: the issue at stake in the crisis, group protest demonstrations, protest mobilization, regime type, regime type squared, prior armed conflict, and group proportion of the total population.\textsuperscript{12} To model the likelihood of preventive intervention we also include ethnic kin and the country’s population.

The issue at stake records the extent of the change demanded by the ethnic actor in the crisis. Demands for partial political authority somewhere is coded as low issue at stake (0). In concrete terms this would be demands for cultural rights, regional autonomy, power sharing arrangements in the central government, and the like. Demands for complete (i.e. sovereign) political authority is coded as high issue at stake (1). High stakes are either demands for exclusive control of the central government in an existing state, or separatism or irredentism.\textsuperscript{13}

Group protest demonstrations and regime type are used to control for group discontent. The idea is that protests signal discontent and a willingness to act to improve the situation on behalf of the ethnic actor. Regime type is included because the level of discontent needed to generate protest demonstrations will in part be dependent on the context in which the protests are made. The assumption is that on average, protesting is costlier and riskier in an autocracy than in a democracy, and so at any given level of protest, protesters in an autocracy will on average have higher resolve than their counterparts in a democracy. The Minorities at Risk indicator “protest” is used to construct the protest demonstration variable. Because the Minorities at Risk indicator also measures group mobilization (a measure of group capabilities) it is split into two dummy variables. The first dummy measures protest mobilization and is coded 1 if the Minorities at Risk protest variable takes on the values 1 or 2, and 0 otherwise. The second dummy measures protest demonstrations and is coded 1 if the Minorities at Risk protest variable takes on the value 3 or higher, and 0 otherwise (Gurr, 1999: 149).

Data on regime type is taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000). The Polity IV variable “polity,” which can take on values from –10 for the most autocratic regime to +10 for the most democratic regime, has been used for the variable regime type. To capture the possibly inverted u-shape relationship between regime type and conflict suggested by several recent studies of civil war

\textsuperscript{12}Note that previous research has shown that measures of structural factors, such as political restrictions, economic discrimination, cultural restrictions, and settlement patterns, are not associated with crisis outcomes when we control for the variables included here. The intuition is that the crisis reveals new information about the group’s willingness and ability to go to war. The fact that the ethnic group is challenging the government and the demands it makes (the issue at stake) provide new information about the group’s resolve. When seen against the backdrop of the group’s relative size, its level of mobilization and protest, the conflict history and the level of democracy in the country, this new information provides a more current and (arguably) more accurate approximation of the group’s resolve (see Öberg, 2002a: Ch. 7).

\textsuperscript{13}This cut-off point was chosen because separatism and government are consistently significantly different from the other three categories of issues, but not from each other in terms of their effects on the dependent variable.
(see e.g. Hegre et al., 2001; Muller and Weede, 1990) a squared term of regime type was included and called regime type squared.\textsuperscript{14}

To control for prior armed conflict we use data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Sollenberg, 2001). This variable is coded 0 if there was no conflict and 1 if there was at least a minor armed conflict in the year prior to the onset of the crisis.

We use the group proportion of the total population of the state to control for group capabilities relative to the state. Since ethnic wars are normally fought primarily with light infantry it seems that the pool of possible recruits should proxy the group’s potential capabilities. The group proportion of the total population is measured using Minorities at Risk data (Gurr, 1999: 19–20).

Ethnic kin is coded 1 if the ethnic group in the crisis has kin in a neighboring country numbering at least 100,000 persons or making up at least 1% of the population (Öberg, 2002a: 177). The presence of kin in a neighboring country is expected to increase the likelihood of prevention.

Population is the population of the country in which the crisis is taking place. Data are taken from the Minorities at Risk dataset (Gurr, 1999). Greater population size is expected to reduce the likelihood of prevention.

To ensure proper causal order, all control variables, except regime type, are measured the year prior to the onset of the crisis. Regime type measures are based on Polity IV data, for which changes in polity scores are given exact dates. This allows us to determine in all crises what the correct polity score was immediately prior to the onset of a crisis (i.e. a challenge). If this score was different from the polity score for the year prior to the crisis, the score immediately prior to the onset of the crisis was used.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Findings}

We may begin by noting that of the 35 crises where no measures were taken, 9 (26%) resulted in war. In the 32 crises where preventive measures were taken, 17 (53%) resulted in war. Thus, war is a more frequent outcome in crisis situations where third parties have taken preventive measures to avert the situation. This simple descriptive shows, if anything, that taking preventive measures is no panacea. Yet, as suggested by the statistical analysis presented in Table 1, it does not

\textsuperscript{14}To avoid problems with collinearity between regime type and regime type squared both variables were transformed so to range from 0 (for the most autocratic regime) to 1 (for the most democratic regime) and centered on their mean values, which reduces their intercorrelation from .98 to .22.

exclude the possibility that at least some preventive measures have conflict dampening effects.

In the war equation we find that relief efforts significantly reduce the likelihood of a crisis escalating to war. This lends support to the idea forwarded by Dixon (1996) and others that humanitarian relief efforts during crises may have a dampening effect on the escalatory dynamics by lessening immediate tensions between rival actors.

We also find that preventive diplomacy has a significant conflict dampening effect. This lends support to those who argue that efforts to improve the situation—by facilitating communication, creating opportunities for meetings between disputant parties, mediating, and proposing solutions for dealing with the incompatibility or the conflict issues—have a conflict dampening effect (Jentleson, 2003; Lund, 1996, 2002).

While peaceful means, such as relief efforts and preventive diplomacy, seem to have a conflict dampening effect, coercive measures fare less well. Our results suggest that the use of inducements or carrots significantly increases the risk of war. We can only speculate as to why this is so, but a closer examination of the

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16If we run the same regression analysis using counts of preventive measures instead of dummy variables we obtain similar, but less significant results (as we would expect with highly skewed counts). Preventive diplomacy, having the least skewed count, remains highly significant and negative. All other measures retain the same sign but uncertainty about the effect goes up. Carrots and sticks are significant at the 10% level using one-tailed tests.
cases involved suggests a possible explanation for this finding: carrots may increase the political costs for backing-down or de-escalating. In three quarters of the cases that escalated to war, the carrots were offers of substantial economic rewards in return for laying down arms. It may be that such offers raise the political costs for backing down. If leaders back down or de-escalate in the presence of a promise of economic rewards they may be open to accusations of “selling out” the cause or of “being bought” by foreign powers.

A promise to one of the parties that they may participate in some peace process if they give up the armed struggle (at least for the time being) is another type of carrot that carries potentially high political costs. Such a trade-off may appeal to moderates, but probably not to more extreme factions. The offer of this type of carrot thus has the potential of driving a wedge between moderates and extremists. If the leadership is relatively moderate, it may in principle be inclined to accept the offer, but with more extreme factions waiting in the wings, accepting the offer entails a risk of either being overthrown or seeing the movement split into competing factions. This, it seems, was the situation faced by Sinn Fein and the IRA in Northern Ireland. After much hesitation, they agreed to a truce in return for a place at the negotiation table, only to be challenged by a splinter group, the Real IRA. In this particular case, the Real IRA attempted, but failed, to escalate the conflict, so the conditional inducement did not lead to an escalation to war. Nevertheless, it illustrates another way in which carrots may increase the political costs of de-escalating or backing down.

Contrary to what previous research leads us to expect, sticks have no effect whatsoever in this sample. Many authors have argued that the combination of sticks and preventive diplomacy should be particularly effective (Wallensteen et al., 2005; Jentleson, 2003; Lund, 1996, 2002)—speak softly and carry a big stick, as it were. In our sample, sticks always occur in conjunction with preventive diplomacy. Thus, our findings suggest that the combination of preventive diplomacy and sticks is not particularly effective, and that preventive diplomacy by itself stands a better chance of preventing a crisis from escalating to war. What the effects of sticks-only would be we cannot say.

Several scholars have also suggested that the combination of sticks and carrots (inducements and threats) would have conflict dampening effects (Wallensteen et al., 2005; Jentleson, 2003). Unfortunately, we are unable to test this proposition here. Although this study includes a larger number of crises than any previous study on operational prevention, there is insufficient information to distinguish between the effects of interaction terms and the component variables when these are highly collinear.

Contrary to what has been argued in the literature, we find no support for the idea that third party coordination efforts reduce the likelihood of a crisis escalating to war (Havermans, 2002; Lund, 2002; Sriram and Wermester, 2003).17

The findings in the prevention equation suggest that third parties are more likely to intervene preventively in crises where more is at stake. In concrete terms, third party prevention is more likely when the ethnic group demands

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17Third party coordination is highly correlated with sticks (.73). Dropping either sticks or third party coordination from the analysis does not change the results.
exclusive control of the state, or a separate state, and less likely when the ethnic
group demands a share in government power, regional autonomy, or some other
change in government policy, e.g. political rights, an end to discrimination, lan-
guage rights, and the like. Results also show that preventive intervention is more
likely if the ethnic group has kin in a neighboring country and that preventive
action is significantly less likely in larger (more populous) countries.

Finally, the correlation ($\rho$) between the error terms of the two dependent vari-
ables is strong and significant, that is, we have a significant selection effect. The posi-
tive coefficient on $\rho$ indicates that third parties tend to intervene preventively in
crises that have a higher underlying probability of war. In other words, there are
unobserved factors that make both preventive interventions and war more likely. If
we do not take this selection effect into account we run a real risk of making biased
inferences, underestimating the conflict dampening effects of operational prevention.

6. Summary

The ECPEC data on operational prevention in ethnic conflicts introduced in this
paper give us a global overview of the phenomenon in the 1990s. The picture that
emerges is noteworthy in several respects. Preventive measures beyond verbal
attention and facilitation are rarely employed prior to the outbreak of war, coerc-
itive measures having been used in only a few of the 67 crises examined here.
Compared to interventions in ongoing armed conflict, preventive action taken
during a crisis but prior to the outbreak of war is relatively rare. Most outside
intervention and conflict management efforts, particularly coercive and forceful
interventions, seem to occur only after the outbreak of hostilities. In most crises
there are no preventive measures taken by third parties, and the bulk of third
party preventive efforts are focused on a relatively small number of crises.

The data also show large regional differences in conflict prevention activity. Asia
receives very little attention from international third parties. Here, very few
attempts have been conducted in a small number of crises—only 31 attempts were
made in 4 of the 16 crises. This can be compared to 336 attempts made in 10 of the
16 crisis situations in Europe. Asia and the Middle East each had one crisis that
received almost all the attention: in Asia, the Taliban challenge to the Afghan gov-
ernment and in the Middle East, the Kurdish crisis in Iraq. Africa’s crises make up
45% (30 of the total 67) of the global number of crises, but only 29% of the total
number of attempts made by third parties are directed towards this region.

Different types of actors are active in different regions. In Europe, the P5 are
the single most active third party, both measured in presence and active engage-
ment. The P5 were present in more than half of the European crises (9 of 16).
Furthermore, 54% of the P5’s total global preventive attempts were taken in
Europe. The P5 are also the most visible and active third party in the Middle
East. It is noteworthy that China (a member of the P5) is absent from the interna-
tional conflict prevention arena. Not even in Asia has China made any attempts
to avert the many crises.

In Africa, the UN and regional actors—both neighboring countries and other
African states—have been the most present and actively engaged third parties.
Africa seems to be a region of particular concern for the UN, as 43% of its
preventive efforts were directed to averting escalation in African crises. The UN is also taking some interest in Asia, but to very modest extent. A total of 18 attempts took place in Afghanistan, comprising 58% of the combined global attempts directed towards Asia. Verbal attention and efforts at facilitation are the dominant types of preventive measures, making up more than 73% of the total number.

In addition to giving a first global overview of operational prevention, the ECPEC data make it possible to evaluate the effects of preventive measures in a systematic fashion. We have explored this possibility by evaluating some claims about prevention effects made in the literature. The statistical results presented above show that the effects of conflict prevention measures are not always what we would expect from past research. Our findings suggest that relief efforts and preventive diplomacy have a significant conflict dampening effect, while carrots (inducements) increase the risk of escalation to war. In our sample of 67 ethnic crises, third party coordination and sticks (threats/coercion) show no significant impact on the risk of war. Thus we find that some of the expectations about the effectiveness of coercive preventive measures, in particular, may be overstated. In that sense our results vindicate Stedman’s (1995) argument that the positive effects of conflict preventive measures have been oversold. However, it must be realized that in many instances the odds of successful prevention are likely to be limited—even more so as we find that that third parties tend to intervene preventively in crises that have a higher underlying probability of war. This is an important finding for future research. Researchers failing to take this selection effect into account will tend to underestimate the conflict dampening effects of operational prevention.

Finally, we do not believe that the preliminary findings presented here are in any sense the last word, but we do think they illustrate the usefulness of large-N datasets such as ECPEC in helping us identify what works and what does not work.

**Appendix 1**

*Table 2. Summary Statistics*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
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<td>.28</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Relief efforts</td>
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<td>.07</td>
<td>.26</td>
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<td>.49</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sticks</td>
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<td>.39</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.49</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix

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<th>Carrots</th>
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References


Conflict Management and Peace Science 26(1)


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