

## Armed conflicts, 1946–2013

Lotta Themnér & Peter Wallensteen

*Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University*

Journal of Peace Research  
2014, Vol. 51(4) 541–554  
© The Author(s) 2014  
Reprints and permission:  
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav  
DOI: 10.1177/0022343314542076  
jpr.sagepub.com



### Abstract

In 2013, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) recorded 33 armed conflicts with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths, up by one from 2012. Seven of these were recorded as wars, that is conflicts leading to 1,000 or more battle-related deaths in a calendar year. There have been 144 armed conflicts (47 wars) since 1989 and 254 armed conflicts (114 wars) since 1946. For the past ten years the amount of active armed conflict has fluctuated between 31 and 37. Six peace agreements were signed during the year 2013, two more than in the previous year. For the first time, this article also provides data on trends in battle-related deaths since 1989. These data do not show a clear time-trend. However, there is a particular difficulty in mapping the conflict in Syria, for which no credible battle-related deaths in 2013 can yet be reported.

### Keywords

battle-related deaths, conflict, data, peace agreements, war

### The year 2013: Number and type of conflicts

In 2013, 33 armed conflicts were active in 25 locations worldwide.<sup>1</sup> While this is a slight increase from 2012, when 32 conflicts were recorded, the number remains at a relatively low level, especially compared to the immediate post-Cold War period. In fact, relative to the peak year of 1991, which saw 52 active conflicts, the number is down by as much as almost 37%. Of the reported 33 armed conflicts, seven reached the intensity level of war – conflicts with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths

in a calendar year – one more than in 2012. The lowest number of wars since 1989 (four) was recorded in 2007, suggesting a gradual increase over the past six years. Compared to the peak year of 1990, however, the numbers are down by more than half.

The number of conflict dyads<sup>2</sup> – a measure of fragmentation in an armed conflict – also increased in 2013, going from 40 to 46. There were two active dyads in six conflicts, three active dyads in two conflicts and one conflict – the one in Mali – saw four rebel groups fighting the

<sup>1</sup> An armed conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state. For an intrastate conflict, the location is a country. For an interstate conflict, it is two or more countries. Several countries (notably India and Myanmar) have several separate conflicts going on at the same time, fought over different incompatibilities, which is why the number of conflicts exceeds the number of locations. For in-depth definitions of key concepts, see <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/>.

<sup>2</sup> A dyad is defined as a pair of warring parties. In interstate conflicts, these warring parties are governments of states, whereas in intrastate conflicts, one is the government and the other is a rebel group. If more than one rebel group is active in a conflict, several dyads are recorded. For more information about the dyadic dimension of armed conflict, see Harbom, Melander & Wallensteen (2008). The UCDP Dyadic Dataset can be downloaded from [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp\\_dyadic\\_dataset/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_dyadic_dataset/).

**Corresponding author:**

lotta.themner@pcr.uu.se

government simultaneously.<sup>3</sup> The average number of active dyads in 2013 was 1.39, compared to 1.25 in 2012, which represent a high record seen over a longer time period. The level of fragmentation has not been this high since 2002, and prior to this an equally high figure was only registered four times in the post-1946 period. This may have negative implications for peacemaking, since research has shown that a high number of rebel organizations leads to more intractable conflicts (e.g. Cunningham, 2006; Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). Furthermore, Nilsson (2008) found that peace agreements in conflicts with a higher number of rebel groups are more likely to be followed by post-settlement conflict.

Since the end of World War II, there have been 548 dyads in 254 conflicts active in 155 locations. The annual incidence of conflicts and conflict dyads since 1989 is recorded in Tables I and II. Figure 1 shows the trend in the number of active armed conflicts since 1946.

All conflicts active in 2013 were fought within states, but nine of them – or 27% – were internationalized in the sense that one or more states contributed troops to one or both sides. These conflicts were Afghanistan, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, USA (the conflict between the government and Al-Qaeda) and Yemen. Seen within the entire post-World War II period, 27% is a high proportion, and this continues an increasing trend observed over the past few years (Themnér & Wallensteen, 2013).

### Battle-related deaths: Trends since 1989<sup>4</sup>

UCDP data display a clear overall downward trend in the number of active armed conflicts since the early 1990s.

<sup>3</sup> A comment is warranted on the conflict in Syria, which has been reported to involve as many as 1,200 armed opposition groups (see footnote 7). Since it is rarely reported which group is involved in a given violent incident, coding of events into dyads has been impossible. Reporting might be precise enough to say that the group involved was e.g. Al-Qaeda affiliated. However, in 2013 there were two Al-Qaeda-linked groups active in Syria (Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS). Thus, it is not possible to identify the particular group involved. The solution, used in a handful of cases, such as the conflicts in Kashmir and Punjab, has been to simply code the opposition side as ‘insurgents’, indicating the complexity of the situation.

<sup>4</sup> UCDP is currently in the middle of a geo-coding project, where each battle location is identified by coordinates. This involves scrutinizing additional sources for all conflicts, potentially leading to revisions to the data. The plan is to carry out this process for all conflicts active from 1989 and onwards, and when a continent is completed, a geo-referenced event dataset is released (UCDP GED). As of yet, Africa has been released (Sundberg & Melander, 2013) and Asia is nearing completion. It makes it very likely that the detailed figures presented here will be revised in future versions of the data.

But does this correspond to the trend in the number of people killed in these conflicts? Since the early 2000s, UCDP has collected information on the number of battle-related deaths<sup>5</sup> in all dyads and conflicts, reported first to the Human Security Center (later the Human Security Report Project) to be used in its *Human Security Reports*, and also presented in the UCDP Battle-related Deaths Dataset, covering the period since 1989.<sup>6</sup>

Figure 2 displays the three fatality estimates<sup>7</sup> recorded by UCDP, for the years 1989–2012. The trend line for battle-related deaths is erratic, driven by the intensity of some particularly violent conflicts.

The first peak in fatalities came in 1991, with almost 80,000 battle-related deaths recorded (with a mean number of fatalities per conflict of 1,588). The main drivers behind this high figure were the bloody conflicts fought in Ethiopia at the time. A conflict over government power had been ongoing since the mid-1970s, but escalated over time and by the early 1990s the opposition coalition EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) was gaining the upper hand. At the same time, the incumbent Derg regime was also challenged in a territorial conflict in Eritrea, legally then a province in Ethiopia. The 1991 fighting was fierce and by the end of the year, the separatist EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front) had managed to secure control over 90 percent of the region. These two high intensity conflicts accounted for a vast majority of all fatalities, but the fact that there were as many as 15 wars recorded in that year pushed the figure even higher.

The second peak in 1999 with a little over 80,000 fatalities (on average 2,059 per conflict) was also due to events in the Horn of Africa. In 1998 an interstate conflict over their common border erupted between Eritrea, now an independent state, and Ethiopia and escalated markedly in 1999. The fighting was described as reminiscent of World War I, with soldiers running

<sup>5</sup> For a definition of battle-related deaths, see page 553.

<sup>6</sup> Counting and coding the number of battle-related deaths was an integral part of the work process in UCDP even before beginning to report numbers to the Human Security Center. While these figures were not collected into a dataset, they were used both internally and in reporting on so-called major armed conflicts in the SIPRI Yearbook from 1987 onwards.

<sup>7</sup> UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset includes three different fatality estimates – low, best and high – based on the reliability of reports and the conflicting number of deaths that can be reported for any violent event. The discussion is based on best estimates unless otherwise stated, whereas all three estimates are displayed in Figure 2 and Appendix 1. See p. 553–554 for more information on the different fatality estimates.

Table I. Armed conflicts, battle-related deaths<sup>a</sup> and conflict locations, 1989–2013

Level of conflict	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Minor	31	35	39	38	35	39	33	31	33	28	27	28	29	26	27	26	27	29	31	32	31	26	31	26	26
War	11	15	13	12	10	9	8	10	7	12	12	11	9	6	5	7	5	5	4	5	6	5	6	6	7
BRD low estimate	49,069	74,666	64,562	33,252	37,192	31,863	27,070	27,500	36,555	35,294	77,915	72,956	19,172	15,255	20,637	17,723	11,103	16,827	17,002	26,570	30,316	18,792	21,719	37,148	37,148
BRD best estimate	53,286	79,415	70,362	35,807	38,438	32,929	28,143	27,745	37,061	37,335	80,302	74,440	21,807	17,112	21,163	18,245	11,443	17,912	17,816	27,296	31,872	19,663	22,631	37,992	37,992
BRD high estimate	79,501	96,833	88,043	59,964	56,636	53,485	42,967	33,629	59,442	50,482	102,847	89,096	32,742	27,535	32,554	26,017	14,954	26,672	23,198	35,591	40,367	26,592	30,033	60,352	60,352
All conflicts	42	50	52	50	45	48	41	41	40	40	39	39	38	32	32	33	32	34	35	37	37	31	37	32	33
All dyads	61	67	67	62	57	58	47	51	55	54	50	51	49	45	43	45	39	47	44	48	47	41	51	40	46
All locations	35	37	38	37	32	34	31	31	30	32	31	29	30	24	25	25	23	25	25	28	27	25	30	26	25

<sup>a</sup>Referred to as BRD in the table.

Table II. Armed conflicts by region, 1989–2013

Region	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Europe	2	3	7	7	9	5	5	1	0	2	3	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1
Middle East	4	7	8	7	7	6	6	7	4	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	5	4	4	5	5	6	5	4
Asia	15	21	15	18	15	18	16	18	20	16	15	19	15	12	15	15	16	16	14	15	15	12	13	10	13
Africa	12	13	17	14	11	15	10	12	14	17	16	15	16	15	11	10	7	10	12	13	13	10	15	13	13
Americas	9	6	5	4	3	4	4	3	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	2
All regions	42	50	52	50	45	48	41	41	40	40	39	39	38	32	32	33	32	34	35	37	37	31	37	32	33




Figure 1. Number of armed conflicts by type, 1946–2013.




Figure 2. Battle-related deaths by type of estimate, 1989–2012. A total estimate for battle-related deaths in 2013 is not included since no reliable battle deaths estimate data for Syria could be provided.

across mined no-man's land territories through constant artillery and machine gun fire, resulting in exceptionally high fatality figures. That year, a high number of wars was also recorded (12), further increasing the total number of battle-related deaths.

Since the lowest record of fatalities in the entire period, registered for 2005, the trend shows an uneven increase, both in absolute numbers and in terms of the average fatality toll per conflict. While the trends during the 1990s were largely due to developments in Africa, those during the 2000s were more connected to Asia, where the conflicts turned more deadly as the period progressed. This pattern was mainly due to developments in Central and South Asia, particularly the high intensity conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In the latter conflict, fighting between the government and LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in 2009 – the year when the government succeeded in defeating the rebels after over two decades of fighting – caused more than 10,000 fatalities. This is the highest number for Asia during the entire period.

At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, it was events in the Middle East that raised the number of battle-related deaths. For reasons discussed below, numbers for Syria are extremely problematic and will not be presented for 2013. In addition to the escalation of the Syrian conflict – the main reason behind the marked increase in fatalities in the region – developments in Yemen and Iraq also played their part. In Yemen, the conflict between the government and AQAP (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) escalated significantly between 2010 and 2012, and in Iraq fighting between the regime and ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, alternatively Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) worsened in 2013.

### *The case of Syria*

Violence in Syria continued on a massive scale throughout 2013, pitting the Assad government against a large number of rebel groups and affecting most areas of the country. Among high profile battles, the early March fighting over the town of al-Raqqah in the north deserves a special mention since it was the first provincial capital lost by the government to the rebels. During subsequent months the fortunes of war changed, however, something that became palpably clear with the fall of strategically located al-Qusayr to government troops, heavily assisted by Hezbollah (from Lebanon). Since 2012, the government has made use of air strikes to target locations controlled by the rebels. A notable example of such air campaigns could be seen in Aleppo in the latter half of December 2013, when bombs resulted in great numbers of victims. One of the most well-known events of the year was the chemical attack on suburban Damascus on 21 August. These attacks have been subject to substantial debate and available evidence seems to indicate that the government was responsible.<sup>8</sup> During the year, the opposition's side became increasingly fragmented and reports speak of up to 1,200 armed opposition groups (Lund, 2013), with often complex and fluid relationships. Indeed, the groups are diverse in terms of ideology; some secular and others – such as the originally Iraqi organization ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, alternatively Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) – Islamist extremists.

When coding the 2013 violence in Syria, UCDP came across a series of problems that led to the decision

<sup>8</sup> A special UN mission has documented the use of chemical weapons, without attributing the origins of the attack (United Nations, 2013). Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2013) has concluded that the attacks were carried out by Syrian government forces.

to not include any of its fatality estimates for 2013 in this article. Some issues are specific to Syria and others apply to a small subset of conflicts and require a more in-depth discussion. A major issue when coding has been that violence is on such a massive scale that it is impossible to cover it entirely for any reporters, most independent media and most watchdog organizations. In a situation where daily summaries (when given) indicate between at least 100 and 150 fatalities, no one seems to be able to provide disaggregated information on this, which UCDP coding guidelines require, in order to distinguish between state-based conflict, one-sided violence and non-state conflict. However, an attempt to solve this was made by creating special coding rules for Syria, by which summary figures were recorded in the high estimate for state-based violence.

While this coding rule allows UCDP to include much of the information that was published in news reports, another – probably even bigger – problem is that much of the violence has been under-, or even un-reported. The other sources systematically used by the UCDP are helpful in filling some gaps, but they cannot provide the daily reporting that is the hallmark of news media. Under reporting was especially obvious when other high-profile international events overshadowed developments in Syria – a phenomenon commonly referred to as ‘issue crowding’. For instance, attempts to initiate a negotiation process were made throughout the year, finally resulting in the early 2014 Geneva II talks. During these initiatives, the media frequently chose to report the ups and downs in international diplomacy, only mentioning the ongoing violence in passing and typically at the end of articles. However, issue crowding was only part of the problem; reporting on the number of people killed seems to have declined overall during 2013. Even when there were no competing developments, there were spells of limited reporting. This was most probably a result of so-called ‘issue fatigue’, which is a phenomenon that has been observed by UCDP in a small number of other, high intensity conflicts.<sup>9</sup> Experience suggests that it is usually possible to get better fatality information as time passes and reliable organizations have had a chance to investigate what really happened. A good example of this is the case of one-sided violence in DR Congo in 1996–1997; massive violence took place in the eastern part of the country, but numbers more or less ceased to be reported. Well aware of this, UCDP used figures for

these years cautiously and kept searching for better information. When this became available (mainly through UN’s so-called Mapping Report<sup>10</sup>) numbers were substantially revised. Elements of this could also be seen in Iraq and Afghanistan in earlier periods.

In the few cases where UCDP’s conventional method proved problematic, it was normally possible to supplement this with other sources. However, in the Syrian case, there simply are no available reliable alternatives. While there exist organizations dedicated solely to reporting on the Syrian conflict (e.g. the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and Violations Documentation Centre), it is difficult to determine their neutrality, as they are often perceived to be connected to the opposition side. In fact, the UN stopped updating its numbers in July 2013, explaining in early 2014 that due to the difficulties in verifying and cross-checking information, the organization would no longer provide fatality estimates for Syria (Pizzi, 2014).

#### *Most intense conflicts*

As previously noted, in 2013, seven conflicts reached the level of war, up by one since 2012. Even though the number of wars has seen an uneven increase since the four that were recorded for 2007, the number remains at a low level in the perspective of the post-1946 period (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Syria was most probably the most violent conflict (see above), followed by the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, South Sudan and DR Congo.

Fighting over government power in Afghanistan continued to escalate in 2013, causing over 8,000 battle-related deaths. Violence of this magnitude has only been recorded once before during the post-1989 period – in 1994. During 2013 the NATO-led forces formally handed over security control to Afghan forces, which appears related to an increase in the number of fatalities among Afghan police and soldiers. The draw-down of the international forces continued, and at the end of 2013 the total number of ISAF troops in the country was roughly 87,000, down from 100,000 at the beginning of the year. As previously, the Taliban mainly relied on roadside bombings, suicide bombings and ambushes as their main tactics. The widespread use of improvised explosive devices continued in 2013. Most of the violence was concentrated in the Taliban strongholds in southern and eastern Afghanistan, with provinces such as Helmand,

<sup>9</sup> For more on issue crowding and issue fatigue, see Djerf-Pierre (2012).

<sup>10</sup> United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2010).

Kandahar, Nangarhar and Ghazni bearing the brunt of the fighting.

After four consecutive years of decreasing conflict activity, 2013 saw fighting between the Iraqi government and ISIS intensify once more, especially during the second half of the year. As in previous years, the group carried out large-scale, often coordinated, attacks involving suicide bombers or car bombs and also continued to target Sahwa members (Awakening councils), Sunni tribal militias that sided with the government. At the same time the group expanded, both in terms of its aims and its geographical reach, to also include Syria.

In 2013, the conflict over government power pitted the Pakistani government against two Islamist groups; TTP (Tehrik-i-Taleban Pakistan: Taliban Movement of Pakistan) and Lashkar-e-Islam, with fighting against the former making up the bulk of the violence. Recorded as a war for the sixth year running, a look at the number of battle-related deaths reveals a distinct decline between 2012 and 2013, as the number of fatalities decreased by half. One factor that has been mentioned for the relative lull in fighting was that TTP appeared to have been weakened by US drone strikes reducing the Taliban leadership;<sup>11</sup> another factor referred to was the 'talks about talks' that took place during the year. Although formal negotiations failed to materialize, there were reports asserting that TTP held back its attacks intentionally. It remains unclear whether this was due to a genuine wish to initiate talks, or a strategic choice in order to regroup.

The conflict between the Nigerian government and the Islamist Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (commonly called Boko Haram) escalated markedly in 2013 and was for the first time recorded as a war, with over 1,600 battle-related deaths. When Boko Haram succeeded in establishing its authority over some areas of the Borno state in the country's far north-east, President Goodluck Jonathan imposed a state of emergency in the three north-eastern states and launched a large-scale military offensive. The group was subsequently forced to retreat into semi-arid land on the northern border with Niger, and to the Mandara Mountains along the border with Cameroon, and violence

temporarily declined. However, Boko Haram proved resilient and attacks and killings soon intensified again.

South Sudan has seen consistent conflict since it gained its independence on 9 July 2011. However, compared to developments in late 2013, the first two years of the country's history were relatively calm. What caused the conflict to reach a new level of intensity was the outbreak of fighting between two factions of the ruling SPLM/A (Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army). By mid-December, factions of the Presidential Guard battled one another in the capital Juba; one loyal to the sitting President Salva Kiir and the other to the former Vice-President Riek Machar who had been ousted from his position in July. Fighting rapidly spread from Juba to other areas, being particularly fierce in the states of Bor, Maklakal and Unity. Fighting was largely along ethnic lines, with Salva Kiir's followers mainly coming from South Sudan's largest ethnic group Dinka, and Riek Machar's – taking the name SPLM/A in Opposition – from the second largest group, Nuer. This distinction is far from clearcut, however.

In 2013, the conflict over governmental power in DR Congo escalated and was recorded as a war in UCDP data for the first time since 2000. This increase in conflict intensity was by and large due to developments between the government and M23 (Mouvement du 23-Mars: March 23 Movement), but two additional groups were active during the year: APCLS (Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain: Alliance of the People for a Free and Sovereign Congo) and a small group consisting of followers of Pastor Joseph Mukungubila Mutombo. M23 was defeated in November, after heavy fighting pitting the group against government troops that were supported by the MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) intervention brigade. The latter were able to remove the rebels from Nyiragongo and Rutshuru Territories in North Kivu, areas that had been out of government reach since the late 1990s. Remnants of the group were forced to flee across the border into Uganda, where negotiations were initiated. On 12 December the parties signed separate documents declaring the war to be over.

<sup>11</sup> The USA is not recorded as a secondary warring party in Pakistan since that would require that it supports the Pakistani regime in its incompatibility with TTP. On the contrary, the CIA has stated that the drones are used for targeted strikes against specific Al-Qaeda terrorists. Pakistan does not support the strikes and has warned the USA on several occasions that its actions may endanger relations between the countries.

### *New conflicts*

One new conflict erupted in 2013: Malaysia (Sabah). Following a business deal with a British company in the 19th century, the UK acquired control of Sabah and after World War II handed the territory to what is today Malaysia. Yet, the Sultanate of Sulu has a historical claim

over the area, which originates back in the 17th century. In 2013, a force called Royal Soldiers of Sulu Sultanate arrived by boat in Sabah from the Philippines, which has been a long-time supporter of the Sultan's claim. A three-week standoff followed during which Malaysia tried to convince the Sulu force to leave the area. However, on 1 March shooting began and after a month of clashes almost 70 people had been killed. When the Sultan died in October, the group vowed to continue to claim Sabah but only through diplomatic and legal means.

### *Restarted conflicts*

Two previously registered conflicts were resumed by new actors: DR Congo (Katanga) and India (Bodoland).

The conflict over the status of the Congolese mineral-rich province of Katanga has a long history, dating back to the early 1960s. In 1960, only 11 days after Congo gained its independence, the creation of the State of Katanga was announced and fighting ensued. While the rebels were defeated by 1963, other separatist movements emerged over the years. However, it was not until 2013 that the fighting crossed the 25 battle-related deaths threshold again. This time government forces clashed repeatedly with a group called Kata Katanga, a loose alliance of small groups fighting for the liberation of Katanga.

After a two-year lull in fighting, the conflict over the north-eastern Indian territory referred to as Bodoland resumed in 2013. Four years after the separatist NDFB (National Democratic Front of Bodoland) signed a ceasefire in 2004, one of the group's top leaders – Ranjan Daimary – vowed to continue fighting for independence. His faction subsequently fought the government intermittently through 2009 and 2010. In June 2013 NDFB–RD entered into negotiations with the government, leading to, in November, the signing of an agreement for the suspension of belligerent operations. Ranjan Daimary's decision to negotiate with the Indian state spawned the creation of a further splinter group, NDFB–S, led by Daimary's Lieutenant I K Songbijit. Songbijit's new faction clashed on numerous occasions with Indian security forces in 2013, and this fighting caused 29 fatalities.

Four conflicts were restarted by previously registered actors: Myanmar (Karen), Myanmar (Shan), Mozambique and Uganda.

The status of the Karen territory has been an issue of contention since Burma, now Myanmar, gained its independence. A number of different armed organizations representing the Karen ethnic minority have fought the Myanmar government, the most notable being KNU

(Karen National Union). In late 2011, DKBA 5 (Democratic Karen Buddhist Army Brigade 5), a group that had broken away from KNU in 1994, agreed to a ceasefire with the government and in early 2012, KNU followed suit. Negotiations were held through 2012 and 2013, but in April fighting erupted between government forces and DKBA 5, with both sides determined to control the territory around the Hat Gyi Dam Project. The fighting was brief, but caused a little over 40 fatalities before it ended. The two parties subsequently met in May to discuss methods of preventing further clashes.

Like its Karen counterpart, the territorial conflict over the Shan area in eastern Myanmar has a long history. In late 2011 and early 2012, the government signed ceasefire agreements with the two active rebel groups and these were largely respected through 2012. However, in 2013 the conflict escalated again, with the most intense fighting taking place in the first half of the year. Talks were held between the parties on several occasions, and while they did produce agreements on resettlement of refugees and peacebuilding plans, they failed to end the violence.

The peace and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) processes in Mozambique have often been hailed as successes. Indeed, the 1992 comprehensive peace agreement was able to terminate a 16-year long and extremely bloody conflict, followed by 20, mostly peaceful years. However, the fighting between the government and Renamo resumed in 2013, albeit on a far smaller scale than previously. Tensions between the two parties were reignited as Afonso Dhlakama, long-time leader of Renamo, rejected the legitimacy of the country's political institutions and threatened to restart the conflict. A Renamo military base was subsequently re-established and the last armed remnant of the group – the Renamo Presidential Guard – was remobilized. The background to this was the accusation by Renamo that the Frelimo-run authorities were breaking the 1992 peace agreement through rigging elections, establishing unfair electoral laws and harassing Renamo members. Analysts also point to increasing internal problems within Renamo. The trigger was a police raid on Renamo's party headquarters in early April 2013, after which a series of skirmishes ensued, continuing sporadically throughout the year.

In Uganda, the conflict over government power, involving the two groups ADF (Allied Democratic Forces) and LRA (Lord's Resistance Army), became active once more in 2013. Both groups are based outside Uganda – ADF in DR Congo and LRA in DR Congo, as well as in the Central African Republic (CAR) and the

disputed Kafia Kingi enclave on the border between Sudan and South Sudan – and Kampala is therefore dependent on the assistance of neighboring governments to be able to confront the rebels. Many analysts agreed that ADF displayed improved fighting abilities during the year, as well as increased strength. Its increasingly brazen attacks caused large flows of refugees to cross the border into Uganda. As for LRA, the group appeared to continue to weaken and there were no major attacks on civilians, which has been one of their signature activities over time. The regional task force charged with tracking down and dealing with LRA, AU-RTF (African Union-Regional Task Force) became both more forceful and effective during the year. However, the crises in CAR and South Sudan caused major setbacks for its operations, causing draw-backs in troop deployment and restrictions in its geographical reach.

#### *Conflicts no longer active*

Five conflicts recorded for 2012 were not active in 2013: Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), India (Garoland), Israel (Palestine), Mali (Azawad) and Rwanda.

The conflict between Azerbaijan and the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh has been active intermittently since the ceasefire in 1994. And even though the agreement ended the bloodiest phase of the conflict, the situation along the ad-hoc ceasefire line has remained tense. There have indeed been relatively frequent skirmishes and clashes, causing between ten and 30 battle-related deaths yearly. Consequently, UCDP's inclusion threshold, while met occasionally, was not so in 2013.

The conflict between the Indian government and the separatist rebel group GNLA (Garo National Liberation Army), which erupted in 2012, was not active in 2013. However, the decrease in violence was in fact small; the two sides clashed regularly during the year and at 21, the number of battle-related deaths recorded was just below UCDP's inclusion level.

After a violent period with tit-for-tat attacks between Israel and Hamas, an open-ended ceasefire was agreed on 21 November 2012. The relative calm that ensued continued into 2013 and the conflict was not recorded as active. In July the USA initiated a new round of peace talks between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority, but by the end of the year they had yet to yield substantial results.

With the rebel group FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda: Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) based outside the borders of Rwanda, in eastern DR Congo, the Rwandan government's ability

to carry out attacks has been closely tied to its relationship to the regime in Kinshasa. At some points, Rwanda has been allowed to enter Congolese territory and at other times it has had to rely on Congolese troops to carry out the fighting. This has all been played out in the context of Kigali occasionally accusing Kinshasa of actually supporting FDLR, and the Congolese regime claiming that Rwandan troops are aiding Congolese rebel groups. As a result of these dynamics, Rwanda was forced to withdraw its forces from Congolese territory on 30 August 2012. Subsequently, Rwandan forces were not able to engage FDLR in 2013, and given the breakdown in relations with Kinshasa, neither did the latter. The conflict thus ceased, at least temporarily.

2013 was a violent year in Mali, with fighting taking place between the government and its allies (mainly France, but also an ECOWAS-organized military mission that later in the year handed over to a UN mission) and Islamist rebel groups striving to implement an Islamic state. In UCDP terminology, the conflict was fought over government power. However, the conflict fought over the status of the Azawad area, which had pitted the government against the separatist Touareg rebel group MNLA (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad: National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) in 2012, was not active in 2013. MNLA took the opportunity to re-establish control over parts of northern Mali when the intervening forces pushed the Islamists out of all urban centres, and even though the relationship between the separatist group and the Bamako regime was tense, large-scale fighting did not reappear. Instead, a negotiation process was initiated, but at the end of the year it had failed to yield tangible results.

#### *Peace agreements in 2013*

During the year, six peace agreements were concluded, three in the Philippines, one in the Central African Republic, one in DR Congo and one in the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan.

In the Philippines, negotiations between the government and the rebel group MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) over the status of the Mindanao territory have taken place over several years and a peace agreement was signed in late 2012. The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro resolved a number of things, but at the start of 2013, there were important outstanding issues. Thus, during the year, three annexes were hammered out; one on the creation of a Transition Committee tasked with drafting the Bangsamoro Basic Law and proposing constitutional amendments; one on wealth-sharing; and one on power-sharing.

In the Central African Republic, the year 2013 started with peace talks between the Seleka rebels and the government in Gabon under the auspices of the Economic Community of Central African States. The talks resulted in the signing of the Libreville Agreement on 11 January, providing for transitional and power-sharing measures as well as a ceasefire.

Also in the conflict between the DR Congo government and M23, the year began with peace talks. They resulted in the signing of the 'Agenda for the Dialogue between the Government of the DRC and the M23 on the situation in Eastern Congo' on 16 January. However, as the name indicates, the accord only sets the agenda for future talks and failed to resolve any issues.

In 2012 an armed conflict was fought between South Sudan and Sudan, caused largely by ambiguities pertaining to the two countries' common border, which had yet to be demarcated. After involvement by the African Union, a peace agreement was signed on 27 September 2012, under which the two parties agreed, for instance, to create a demilitarized zone and principles on border demarcation. However, there were a number of matters remaining and hostilities persisted during the rest of the year. In 2013 negotiations continued and on 12 March the 'Implementation Matrix for Agreements between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan' was signed in order to facilitate the coordinated implementation of the 27 September accord. No fighting between the two parties was recorded during the year and the implementation of the accord progressed.

While the number of peace agreements increased from four to six in 2013, the results of the accords were not encouraging. In the Central African Republic, fighting resumed a little over two months after the signing of the Libreville Agreement and Seleka succeeded in ousting the sitting president, seizing power. This, in turn, spawned the outbreak of even fiercer fighting that still continues. In DR Congo the accord signed in January failed to curtail the violence, and fighting intensified during the rest of the year, causing over 1,000 battle-related deaths for the first time since 2000. As for the Philippines, the group involved in the negotiation process remained committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but three other rebel groups continued their armed struggle, one of which was a splinter from MILF that rejected the talks.

External third parties played an important role in all of these processes. African regional organizations were involved in CAR and in Sudan–South Sudan processes. Furthermore, neighbours played a role in DRC (Uganda, Rwanda) as well as in the Philippines (Malaysia). Although the issues of conflict may be seen as internal,

solutions seem to require external mediation capacity and possibly support also in implementation.

## Replication Data

The complete datasets (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, UCDP Dyadic Dataset and UCDP Battle-related Dataset) updated to 2013 are found at <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/>. Older versions of these datasets can also be found at this address (all datasets) and [www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict](http://www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict) (the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset). The tables and figures in this article were created directly from the Excel sheets at the UCDP web page. Detailed descriptions of the individual conflicts are found in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, at <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/> Replication data for this article can be found both at [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/replication\\_datasets/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/replication_datasets/) and [www.prio.no/jpr/datasets](http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets).

## Acknowledgements

Numerous colleagues in Uppsala have contributed to the data collection, notably Marie Allansson, Johan Brosché, Gökhan Ciflikli, Mihai Croicu, Emma Elfversson, Maria Greek, Helena Grusell, Stina Högladh, Therése Pettersson, Susanne Shaftenaar, Christopher Shay, Margareta Sollenberg, Jacob Sommer, Ralph Sundberg and Samuel Taub. A special thanks to Maria Greek for assistance with the section on Syria, and for comments on the first draft by Therése Pettersson, Margareta Sollenberg and Anders Themnér.

## References

- Cunningham, David E (2006) Veto players and civil war duration. *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 875–892.
- Cunningham, David E; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Idean Salehyan (2009) It takes two: A dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcome. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 570–597.
- Djerf-Pierre, Monika (2012) The crowding-out effect. *Journalism Studies* 13(4): 499–516.
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand (2002) Armed Conflict, 1946–2001: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(4): 615–637.
- Harbom, Lotta; Erik Melander & Peter Wallensteen (2008) Dyadic dimensions of armed conflict, 1946–2007. *Journal of Peace Research* 45(5): 697–719.
- HRW (2013) Attacks on Ghouta: Analysis of alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria. Human Rights Watch, 10 September (<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/09/10/attacks-ghouta-0>).

- Lund, Aron (2013) The non-state militant landscape in Syria. *CTC Sentinel* 6(8): 23–28.
- Nilsson, Desirée (2008) Partial peace: Rebel groups inside and outside of civil war settlements. *Journal of Peace Research* 45(4): 479–495.
- Pizzi, Michael (2014) UN abandons death count in Syria, citing inability to verify toll. *Al Jazeera America* 7 January (<http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/1/7/un-aband-ons-deathcountinsyria.html>).
- Sundberg, Ralph & Erik Melander (2013) Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(4): 523–532.
- Themnér, Lotta & Peter Wallensteen (2013) Armed conflicts, 1946–2012. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(4): 509–521.
- United Nations (2013) Report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic on the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013. A/67/997–S/2013/553 ([http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2013\\_553.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_553.pdf)).
- United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2010) Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993–2003 ([http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC\\_MAPPING\\_REPORT\\_FINAL\\_EN.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf)).

## Appendix 1. Armed conflicts active in 2013

This list includes all conflicts that exceeded the minimum threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in 2013 and fulfilled the other criteria for inclusion.<sup>1</sup> The column ‘Year’ shows the latest range of years in which the conflict has been active without interruption. The start year is found in parentheses in the ‘Incompatibility’ column, which indicates when the armed conflict reached 25 battle-related deaths for the first time. If a conflict has been inactive for more than ten years or if there has been a complete change in the opposition side, the start year refers to the onset of the latest phase of the conflict. For more complete information on the conflict and dyad history, see (a) the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and the UCDP Dyadic Dataset at [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp\\_dyadic\\_dataset/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_dyadic_dataset/) and (b) the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s online conflict encyclopedia at <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php>. The column ‘Intensity in 2013’ displays the aggregated conflict intensity in terms of the number of battle-related deaths. Thus, if more than one dyad is active in the conflict, the intensity column records their aggregated intensity. Three fatality estimates are given in the table: low, best and high.<sup>2</sup>

Location	Incompatibility	Opposition organization(s) in 2013	Year	Intensity in 2013		
				Low	Best	High
<b>EUROPE</b>						
Russia	Territory (Caucasus Emirate) (2007)	Forces of the Caucasus Emirate	2007–13	281	316	530
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>						
Iraq	Government (2004)	ISIS (al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham: Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham)	2004–13	1,719	1,870	1,913
Syria	Government (2011)	Syrian insurgents <sup>3</sup>	2011–13	–	–	–
Turkey	Territory (Kurdistan) (1984)	PKK (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan: Kurdistan Workers’ Party)	1984–2013	30	30	67
Yemen	Government <sup>4</sup> (2009)	AQAP (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula)	2009–13	581	582	641

(continued)

<sup>1</sup> Please refer to pages 553–554 for further information regarding definitions.

<sup>2</sup> Please refer to pages 553–554 for a definition of battle-related deaths as well as for further information regarding the three fatality estimates.

<sup>3</sup> A large number of groups have been active. Some of the larger groups in 2013 were Ahrar al-Sham, Farouq Brigades, ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham, Liwa al-Islam, Liwa al-Maqq, Liwa al-Tawhid and Suqour al-Sham.

<sup>4</sup> The government was supported by troops from the USA.

## Appendix 1. (continued)

Location	Incompatibility	Opposition organization(s) in 2013	Year	Intensity in 2013		
				Low	Best	High
<b>ASIA</b>						
Afghanistan	Government <sup>5</sup> (1978)	Taliban, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan	2003–13	7,612	8,048	10,172
India	Territory (Bodoland) (2013)	NDFB-S (National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Songbijit faction)	2013	26	28	28
	Territory (Kashmir) (1989)	Kashmir insurgents <sup>6</sup>	1989–2013	139	145	146
	Government (1990)	CPI–Maoist (Communist Party of India–Maoist)	1996–2013	215	222	235
Malaysia	Territory (Sabah) (2013)	Sultanate of Sulu	2013	68	70	122
Myanmar	Territory (Kachin) (1961)	KIO (Kachin Independence Organization)	2011–13	117	125	143
	Territory (Karen) (1949)	DKBO 5 (Democratic Karen Buddhist Army Brigade 5)	2013	41	41	41
	Territory (Shan) (1996)	RCSS (Restoration Council of Shan States), SSPP (Shan State Progress Party)	2013	80	83	85
Pakistan	Territory (Baluchistan) (2004)	BLA (Baluchistan Liberation Army)	2011–13	45	45	45
	Government (2008)	TTP (Tehrik-i-Taleban Pakistan: Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan), Lashkar-e-Islam (Army of Islam)	2007–13	1,729	1,729	1,758
Philippines	Territory (Mindanao) (1972)	ASG (Abu Sayyaf Group), BIFM (Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement), MNLF–NM (Moro National Liberation Front–Nur Misauri faction)	1993–2013	349	349	414
	Government (1969)	CPP (Communist Party of the Philippines)	1999–2013	165	165	170
Thailand	Territory (Patani) (2003)	Patani insurgents <sup>7</sup>	2003–13	187	189	191
<b>AFRICA</b>						
Algeria	Government (1992)	AQIM (Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb) <sup>8</sup>	1991–2013	145	147	163
Central African Republic	Government <sup>9</sup> (2009)	Seleka (Alliance) <sup>10</sup>	2009–13	102	104	152

(continued)

<sup>5</sup> Supported by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that in 2013 included troops from: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Macedonia (FYR), Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Tonga, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States of America.

<sup>6</sup> A large number of groups have been active. Some of the larger groups in 2013 were Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. BRN-C (Barisan Nasional Revolusi-Coordinate), PULO (Patani United Liberation Organisation) and GMIP (Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani).

<sup>8</sup> Until January 2007, AQIM was known as GSPC (al-Jama'ah al-Salafiyah lil-Da'wah wa'l-Qital: Groupe Salafiste pour la prédication et le combat: Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat).

<sup>9</sup> The government was supported by troops from South Africa.

<sup>10</sup> Seleka was a coalition consisting of CPJP (Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix: Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace), UFDR (Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement: Union of Democratic Forces for Unity) and CPSK (Convention Patriotique pour le Salut du Kodro: Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country), formed in 2012.

## Appendix 1. (continued)

Location	Incompatibility	Opposition organization(s) in 2013	Year	Intensity in 2013		
				Low	Best	High
DR Congo	Territory (Katanga) (2013)	Kata Katanga (Cut of Katanga)	2013	90	94	113
	Government (2012)	APCLS (Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain: Alliance of the People for a Free and Sovereign Congo), Forces of Paul Joseph Mukungubila, M23 (Mouvement du 23-Mars: March 23 Movement) <sup>11</sup>	2012–13	1,358	1,378	1,433
Ethiopia	Territory (Ogaden) (1993)	ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front)	1998–2013	48	48	904
Ethiopia	Territory (Oromiya) (1977)	OLF (Oromo Liberation Front)	1998–2013	25	25	93
Mali	Government <sup>12</sup> (2012)	Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith), AQIM (Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb), MUJAO (Mouvement pour le Tawhîd et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest: Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa), Signed-in-Blood Battalion (al-Mouwakoune Bi-Dima)	2012–13	822	834	990
Mozambique	Government (2013)	Renamo (Resistência nacional Moçambicana; Mozambican National Resistance)	2013	26	28	102
Nigeria	Government <sup>13</sup> (2009)	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad) <sup>14</sup>	2011–13	1,460	1,614	2,078
Somalia	Government <sup>15</sup> (2006)	Al-Shabaab (The Youth)	2006–13	746	926	1,755
South Sudan	Government (2011)	SSDM/A-Cobra Faction (South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army-Cobra faction), SPLM/A In Opposition (Sudan Liberation Army/Movement In Opposition)	2011–13	1,269	1,269	2,419
Sudan	Government (1983)	SRF (Sudanese Revolutionary Army) <sup>16</sup>	1983–2013	475	576	2,506
Uganda	Government <sup>17</sup> (1980)	ADF (Alliance of Democratic Forces), LRA (Lord's Resistance Army)	2013	100	100	118

(continued)

<sup>11</sup> M23 supported by troops from Rwanda.

<sup>12</sup> The government was initially supported by France and the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISOM). On 1 July MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) took over from AFISMA. In all, the countries supporting the Malian government were Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, China, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Liberia, Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Tajikistan, Togo, United Kingdom, United States of America and Yemen.

<sup>13</sup> The government was supported by troops from Chad and Niger.

<sup>14</sup> Previously coded as Boko Haram, which is the name commonly used in news media. However, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad is the group's official name.

<sup>15</sup> The government was supported by troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda.

<sup>16</sup> SRF is a coalition consisting of SPLM/A-North (Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North), SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army), SLM/A-MM (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Minni Minawi) and JEM (Justice and Equality Movement), formed in November 2011.

<sup>17</sup> The government was supported by troops from the Central African Republic, DR Congo and South Sudan.

## Appendix 1. (continued)

Location	Incompatibility	Opposition organization(s) in 2013	Year	Intensity in 2013		
				Low	Best	High
<b>AMERICAS</b>						
Colombia	Government (1964)	ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, National Liberation Army), FARC (Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias colombianas: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)	1964–2013	140	140	183
USA	Government <sup>18</sup> (2001)	Al-Qaeda (The Base)	2001–13	35	38	39

Total number of battle-related deaths in 2013 (excluding Syria): Low: 20,225; Best: 21,358; High: 29,749.

*Definitions*

An armed conflict<sup>19</sup> is defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state.

The incompatibility is the stated (in writing or verbally) generally incompatible positions. A more detailed definition can be found on UCDP's webpage, at <http://www.ucdp.uu.se>.

The conflicts are divided according to type of conflict.<sup>20</sup>

- *Interstate armed conflict* occurs between two or more states.
- *Internationalized internal armed conflict* occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups, with intervention from other states in the form of troops.
- *Internal armed conflict* occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups.

The conflicts are also divided according to their intensity into two categories:

- *Minor armed conflict*: at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year but fewer than 1,000.
- *War*: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a year.

Battle-related deaths are those fatalities that can be related to combat in a conflict dyad. Typically, battle-related deaths occur in what can be described as 'normal' warfare involving the armed forces of the warring parties. This includes traditional battlefield fighting, guerrilla activities (e.g. hit-and-run attacks/ambushes) and all kinds of bombardments of military units, cities and villages, etc. The targets are usually the military itself and its installations, or state institutions and state representatives, but there is often substantial collateral damage in the form of civilians killed in crossfire, indiscriminate bombings, etc. All deaths – military as well as civilian – incurred in such situations are counted as battle-related deaths.

UCDP codes three different fatality estimate – low, best and high – based on the reliability of reports and the conflicting number of deaths that can be reported for any violent event.

- *Low estimate*: The UCDP Low estimate consists of the aggregated low estimates for all battle-related incidents during a year. If different reports provide different estimates and a higher estimate is considered more reliable, the low estimate is also reported if deemed reasonable.
- *Best estimate*: The UCDP Best estimate consist of the aggregated most reliable numbers for all battle-related incidents during a year. If different reports provide different estimates, an examination is made as to which source is most reliable. If no such distinction can be made, UCDP as a rule includes the lower figure given.
- *High estimate*: The UCDP High estimate consists of the aggregated high estimates for all battle-related incidents during a year. If different reports provide different estimates and a lower estimate is considered more or equally reliable, the high estimate is also reported if deemed reasonable. If there are incidents when there is some uncertainty

<sup>18</sup> In 2013, the USA was supported by Afghanistan and Jordan.

<sup>19</sup> UCDP also codes two other categories of organized violence: non-state conflict and one-sided violence. Datasets on these can be downloaded from [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp\\_non-state\\_conflict\\_dataset/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_non-state_conflict_dataset/) and [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp\\_one-sided\\_violence\\_dataset/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_one-sided_violence_dataset/) respectively. Furthermore, narratives on the cases are available at <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/base/search.php>.

<sup>20</sup> UCDP has also coded a fourth type, extrasystemic armed conflict, a conflict that occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory. These conflicts are by definition territorial. The last such conflict ended in 1974.

about which parties have been involved, these are also included in the high estimate.

It is the best estimate of battle-related deaths that determines both whether or not a dyad will be included in the UCDP data (i.e. the best estimate needs to be 25 or higher) and whether the intensity is recorded as minor armed conflict or war.

### Appendix 2. Unclear cases in 2013

Cases that have been completely rejected on the grounds that they definitely do not meet the criteria of armed

conflict are not included in the list below. For the conflicts listed here, the available information suggests the possibility of the cases meeting the criteria of armed conflicts, but there is insufficient information concerning at least one of the three components of the definition: (a) the number of deaths, (b) the identity or level of organization of a party or (c) the type of incompatibility. The list of unclear cases for the entire 1946–2013 period is currently under review, but will be published at <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/> later this year. The unclear aspect may concern an entire conflict or a dyad in a conflict that is included in Appendix 1.

<i>Location/government</i>	<i>Opposition organization</i>	<i>Unclear aspect</i>
China	ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement)	Identity of organization
Egypt	Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis	Incompatibility
Egypt	Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula	Identity of organization, Incompatibility
Iran	Abdullah Azzam Brigades	Incompatibility, Number of deaths
Iran	Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice)	Incompatibility, Number of deaths
Lebanon	Supporters of Ahmad al-Assir	Incompatibility
Tunisia	Islamist organization	Identity of organization, Incompatibility
Yemen	Southern Movement	Level of organization

LOTTA THEMNER (previously Harbom), b. 1975, MA in peace and conflict research (Uppsala University, 2002); project leader, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research; published articles on conflict data in *Journal of Peace Research* and *SIPRI Yearbook* since 2005; editor of *States in Armed Conflict* since 2004.

PETER WALLENSTEEN, b. 1945, PhD (Uppsala University, 1973); Senior Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University (2012–); previously Dag

Hammarskjöld Professor of Peace and Conflict Research (1985–2012) and Richard G Starrman Sr Research Professor of Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame (2006–); director of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Special Program on the International Targeted Sanctions (SPITS); author of *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*, 3rd updated edition (Sage, 2012) and *Peace Research: Theory and Practice* (Routledge, 2011) where Chapter 9 gives the history of UCDP; co-author (with Isak Svensson) of *The Go-Between: Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation* (US Institute of Peace Press, 2010).