Emotional phenomena enter into almost every aspect of our social life, and in themselves, emotions are distinctly social processes (Zajonc, 1998, p. 591).

Emotions are at the heart of social psychology: They are not just, and not even in the first place, subjective feelings, but rather connections to the social world. Emotions constitute who we are, they give direction to our interactions and relationships, they are central to group membership, and they tie us to our culture. What makes emotions social is not just that they occur in social situations, or are elicited by social events. Rather, their very nature is social and cultural.

To fully understand the social nature of emotions, it is important to consider them first, and foremost, as intentions to act (Frijda, 2007; Lazarus, 1991; Zajonc, 1998). Having an emotion means that one has a stance, a relationship with the environment or, put more sharply, a strategy or a goal in the (social) situation (Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009, p. 2; Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990). To take anger as an example: the experience of anger implies an attitude of non-acceptance, an assessment that one has a relatively high level of control over (others in) the situation (Frijda, Kuipers, & Terschure, 1989), and an assumption that others will, or at the very least should, accommodate to your wishes, goals, and values (Stein, Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993). A given emotion may thus be seen as a commitment to a certain way of acting. As such, emotions are highly relevant in the relationships with others (Mesquita, 2010; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005).

In this chapter, we will conceive emotions as motivation to act. Though particular kinds of emotions have been associated with certain classes of behavior, emotional behavior is not fixed. Rather, emotions involve behavioral intentions; the actual behaviors will depend on, and flexibly adjust to, the context (Frijda, 2004). In this chapter, we suggest that emotions do not happen to lead to behavior, but rather are for doing. This suggestion takes emotions out of the subjective realm of feeling and consciousness, and places it squarely in the domain of social relationships (Mesquita, 2010; Parkinson et al., 2005); that is, in the domain of social psychology.

After a short introduction about the nature and development of emotions, we will discuss the various ways in which emotions figure in our social lives. First, we will review evidence about the role of emotions in dyadic relationships. We will then synthesize research suggesting that we often experience and express the emotions that fit the social context, followed by research on emotions that are at odds with the social context in which they occur. Finally, we will discuss research suggesting that emotions are not isolated events but that, rather, they occur in the context of extended interactions, relationships, and even social network, and are influenced by them. In the last section of this chapter, we will discuss
the function of inter-group emotions. Throughout the chapter, we will argue that emotions are an indispensable, but hitherto often ignored, aspect of social psychological processes.

COGNITIVE APPROACHES TO EMOTIONS

There is some debate about the processes that lead up to the emotional action. For purposes of this chapter, it suffices to say that emotional responses are more than knee-jerk reactions, and thus require some representation of the environment that allows for their strategic or appropriate use but that, at the same time, not every instance of emotion requires a conceptual representation of what goes on. There are different views on how exactly the emotional context gets represented.

Appraisal theories of emotions have proposed that emotions start with an assessment of the personal meaning of the situation according to a fixed number of dimensions, such as novelty, valence, goal consistency, coping potential, and norms or values (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). “The idea [is] that appraisals occur sequentially and that the nature of the emotional experience changes with each time a new appraisal is added” (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003, p. 574). Anger would emerge when the situation is appraised as novel, unpleasant, goal inconsistent, someone else’s responsibility, controllable, and against the norms. Appraisal can be, and often is, automatic and non-conscious (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnston, 2001).

Somewhat orthogonal to the concept of appraisal dimensions, and much less elaborated, is the idea that emotions emerge from the assessment that (and how) a situation is relevant to a person’s specific concerns (Frijda, 1986, 2007), including the coping potential (Lazarus, 1991), values, goals, norms (Mesquita & Ellsworth, 2001), and to the self (Arnold, 1960). Anger emerges from a situation that infringes on one’s autonomy, if autonomy is valued (Roizin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). The idea is as old as appraisal theory itself (Arnold, 1960), and connects the person with the situation. It recognizes that appraisals are always made from a certain perspective (Solomon, 2004): that they reflect a person’s active construction of meaning, referencing his or her expectations, social position, and moral understandings.

More recently, it has been proposed that “emotional content has a fundamentally pragmatic dimension, in the sense that the environment is represented in terms of what it affords the emoter in the way of skillful engagement with it” (Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009, p. 2). Some authors conceive of these pragmatic representations as a form of embodied appraisal (Frijda, 2007). Others highlight the temporal dynamics of the representations, emphasizing that these representations develop in response to unfolding transactions in the practical and social world (Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009). In the latter view, representations of the environment unfold in an online fashion, and are scaffolded by events in the environment. Thus, during a marital conflict the anger of each partner develops according to the exchanges of the fight. Emotions, according to this view, are “situated” (see also Mesquita, 2010).

Social cognition figures prominently in all cognitive approaches of emotions –regardless of its representation as evaluative, goal-driven, or situated – but not all social cognition is considered emotion. What then is emotion-specific? While the term emotion does not relate to a natural category (Barrett, 2006), both lay people and psychologists usually speak of emotion to refer to special cases of social cognition. First, we conceive of emotions as judgments that something is sufficiently positive or negative to be relevant to the self. This means that emotions go beyond a positive or negative attitude towards something, but are motivated states: They affect the self and need to be dealt with. For example, an emotion is not merely an assessment that some procedure is unfair, but rather the determination that this procedure needs to be challenged or changed, because it puts you at a disadvantage personally, or because it is unfair to the point of being incompatible with an acceptable state of the world. We speak of emotion when the social cognition is inherently motivating of action. Second, emotions are those motivated states, or “modes of action readiness,” that have “control precedence” (Frijda, 2007; Oatley, 1992): They take priority over other types of behavior. Thus, when the appraisal of unfair treatment motivates a person to do anything in her power to stop the unfair treatment, this is called an emotion. Third, and perhaps best thought of as part of the same control precedence, emotions involve physiological changes that prepare the behavior intended or sought after; the physiological signature of challenge, for instance, to prepare for antagonistic behavior (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000).

Emotions are social engagements

Most emotions take place in the context of relationships (Scherer, Matsumoto, Wallbott, & Kudoh, 1988). This is not coincidental: emotions serve important functions in relationships. According to some, the adaptive advantage of
emotions is precisely that they help to coordinate and regulate relationships (Jankowiak & Fischer, 1992; Oatley, 2004; Oatley, Keltner, & Jenkins, 2006). From the evidence to be discussed next, it is clear that emotions fulfill an important role in our relationships.

Evidence for the social significance of emotions comes from two research traditions. One starts from the idea that emotions are affect programs, and consist of invariant packages of responses that have some adaptive advantage for establishing or maintaining important relationships with others. For instance, passionate sexual love is "experienced as joyful and energizing, it is enacted in courtship, and it includes a biological core, including increased levels of phenylalanine in the brain" (Oatley, et al., 2006, p. 73). It provides a strong motivation to engage in a particular sexual relationship, to the point of causing pain and longing in absence of the other. Embarrassment is characterized by a temporary loss of self-esteem and/or perceived social exposure, and serves to appease the more powerful (Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996); and jealousy, an emotion marked by a drop in self-esteem, and aggressive action tendencies, and serve to defend our valuable close relationships against rivals (DeSteno, Valdesolo, & Bartlett, 2006).

Based on their most frequent social consequences, emotions have been classified into affiliative or socially engaging emotions that strengthen the bond between people, and socially distancing or disengaging emotions that draw clear individual boundaries, emphasize autonomy, and increase interpersonal distance, at least initially (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000; Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006). For instance, shame and gratitude tend to be seen as prototypes of affiliative or socially engaging emotions, because they commonly involve a motivation to be closer to (or, more accepted by) others, whereas anger and pride are exemplars of socially distancing emotions, since their most common consequence is to distinguish or defend the individual from his or her social environment.

Other evidence stems from a more situationist view, and focuses on emotional episodes as they unfold in ways that are responsive both to cultural concepts, norms, and practices, and to the particular affordances and constraints of the direct (social) environment. This means that emotions may vary across social relationships and cultures, an implication that is at odds with the idea of invariant, universal affect programs.

Our goal for the present chapter is not to weigh the evidence for any particular theoretical model, but rather to show that the joint evidence from all these perspectives suggests a central role of emotions in interpersonal relationships. To this end, we will synthesize the evidence that emotions, however conceived, are relationship engagements.

**DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIONS**

Nowhere is it clearer that emotions are social engagements than in the first year of life (cf. Parkinson et al., 2005). The relationship between infants and caregivers revolves around the exchange of emotions. Infants give their caregivers affective messages from the very early beginnings of life. Behaviors like fussing, crying, and smiling communicate to the caregiver that adjustments to the environment need to be made, or conversely, that the interaction is going well (Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; Oatley et al., 2006). This is not to say that infant emotional displays are associated with adult-like emotions: they are not (e.g., Camras, Meng, & Ujie, 2002; Hiatt, Campos, & Emde, 1979). However, caregivers imbue infant displays with emotional meaning by the way they respond. Thus, from a very early age on, expressive emotional behaviors on the part of the infant are at the center of the relationship with the caregiver.

Caregivers’ behavior, on the other hand, can be seen as a way to regulate the babies’ emotions (Holodynski & Friedlémeier, 2006). For example, mothers were found to maintain a baby’s positive state by engaging in mirroring the baby’s positive emotions and ignoring or responding with surprise to a baby’s negative expressions. Caregivers thus either reduce or increase stimulation, such that good-feeling states of the baby are recognized and sustained, and bad-feeling states are taken into account and discontinued (Oatley et al., 2006). At the infant stage, it is easy to see that emotions are distributed processes that belong to the interaction between caregiver and infant, rather than to each of the interactants separately.

The relationship with the caregiver can also provide emotional meaning to objects outside the infant–caregiver relationship, as is the case in social referencing (Hertenstein & Campos, 2004;
Mumme & Fernald, 2003). Children as young as 11–12 months will appraise a novel object by referencing the emotions of a nearby adult, usually the caregiver, and infer from these emotions the significance of the object. Social referencing has been shown to influence both the infants’ expressions and their emotional responses to the novel object. For instance, a caregiver’s disgust expressions increase the chances of infants’ crying, as well as make the infant less likely to touch or approach the new toy. There is also some evidence that social referencing in the case of negative emotion changes the infant’s behavior vis-à-vis the caregiver. Infants tend to stay closer to the mother (Carver & Vaccaro, 2007). Yet again, the infant emotion is inferred in the context of the relationship with the caregiver, and in turn influences the course of this relationship itself.

The relationships with caregivers (and peers) are an important context of emotional development in the years of childhood. During those years emotions are often the object of communication between caregivers and children (Dunn, 2004). Caregivers label, interpret, and evaluate emotions. They do so in two ways. First, caregivers explicitly talk about emotions, communicating rules and beliefs. Furthermore, caregivers’ own emotional responses may lend meaning to their children’s emotions too (Saarni, 2008). One way of looking at caregiver’s (verbal as well as emotional) communications about emotions is that they teach children about the propriety of certain ways of emoting – i.e., certain ways of relational engagement – in particular contexts. Consistent with this interpretation is the finding that parental talk about emotions is an important predictor of a child’s social adroitness (Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991; Harris, 2008). For example, the frequency with which preschool children discuss emotions with caregivers predicts their later ability to understand other people’s feelings.

Parental talk about emotions varies across cultural contexts (Cole, Tamang, & Shrestha, 2006; Miller, Fung, & Mintz, 1996), and reflects cultural ideas and practices about valued and devalued types of relational engagements. Thus, one study compared conversations of American and Taiwanese moms with their 2.5 year olds. Consistent with the American cultural model that emphasizes the importance of high self-esteem and independence, American moms emphasized the child’s independent achievements, and thus invoked happiness and pride. On the other hand, Taiwanese moms drew attention to the child’s transgressions, and how these transgressions had burdened and saddened the mom, thus shaming the child (Cole et al., 2006; Miller et al., 1996). The latter is consistent with the East Asian model of being, in which the individual’s accommodation to the needs of the relationship and the avoidance of norm violations are central. Parents thus draw attention to those types of relational engagement – i.e., those types of emotion – that are most likely to render the child into a well-socialized individual in their culture.

Similarly, Cole and colleagues found different socialization practices in two Nepalese groups, the Tamang and the Brahman (Cole, Bruschi, & Tamang, 2002; Cole et al., 2006). The Tamang – Tibetan Buddhists – value self-effacement and compassionate tolerance. In this group, anger is viewed as destructive to social harmony, whereas shame is seen as a valuable emotion by which individuals subject themselves to the larger group. On the other hand, the Brahman – high caste of Hindus – conceive of anger as a way to establish dominance and competence, assuming it gets properly regulated, whereas shame is seen as a sign of weakness. Consistently, adult responses to anger and shame episodes in 3–5 year olds were very different in these two groups. Tamang caregivers responded to children’s shame with teaching and nurturing, whereas anger was received with teasing and rebuking. Conversely, Brahman adults ignored signs of shame in their children, but gave their angry children attention, teaching them proper ways of expressing anger. Caregivers’ responses to given emotions thus function to enhance and moderate culturally valued emotions, and suppress culturally devalued emotions. In other words, caregivers assist their children in selecting rewarding relational engagements, and suppressing unrewarding ones.

Parents also create the opportunities for their children’s emotions, and they do so in ways that are consistent with the prevalent and valued types of relationship engagements. Research comparing German and Japanese mother’s disciplining of their disobedient children makes this point (Trommsdorff & Kornadt, 2003). German mothers’ way of disciplining tended to incite anger and hurt feelings in their children; both are considered disengaging emotions, in that they reinforce individual boundaries and independence, which are consistent with relationship values in a German context. Japanese mothers’ style of disciplining, on the other hand, induced empathy in their children, thus increasing the harmony and oneness that are valued aspects of the Japanese mother–child relationship.

In sum, emotions in the developing child can be seen as engagements with the relationship with their caregiver. At the infant stage, the caregiver acts on the emotional signals of the baby. Emotions at this stage can thus be readily conceived as distributed processes. At later stages, there is a shift in distribution: babies themselves act in limited ways on their emotional representations of the
situation, and caregivers help to regulate the babies' emotions. The caregiver does so by modeling, encouraging, and affording the emotions of the child in ways that may be thought to enhance functionality of the emotions to the particular social context (Saarni, 2008). In other words, caregivers regulate their baby's emotion with the aim of enhancing the baby's social fit. Cross-cultural differences in caregiver regulation are consistent with differences in the valued types of relationship.

EMOTIONS IN SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

In the adulthood literature, there is also ample evidence for emotions as social engagements. This literature is dominated by a more discrete view of emotions. Particular emotions are seen as commitments to certain kinds of action, which tend to elicit well-described effects in others, and thus to have some predictable social or relational consequences.

Affiliative emotions

Recent work has drawn attention to the affiliative function of gratitude (Algoe, Haidt, & Gable, 2008). It has been proposed that gratitude serves to generate intrinsically motivated kind acts towards the benefactor, and thus would be instrumental towards a communal relationship. Algoe and colleagues (2008) studied gratitude as it helped develop the relationship between little and big sisters of a sorority: little sisters had just joined the sorority, while big sisters had been members of the sorority since the year prior. During little sister week, when big sisters anonymously surprised their little sisters, the gratitude of little sisters was measured. This gratitude was associated with the little sister's appreciation for the relationship with their anonymous big sister. In support of the hypothesis, it was found that, one month later, the little sister’s gratitude predicted the quality of the relationship and the amount of time spent together, as reported by the big sister. Gratitude seemed to stand for a relationship commitment on the part of the little sister that was reciprocated by the big sister.

There is also ample evidence for the affiliative or socially engaging nature of several negative emotions. Embarrassment is a good example. Signs of embarrassment, such as blushing, gaze aversion, and smile controls, have been described as “nonverbal apologies” that “inform others of one’s genuine contrition and desire to avoid rejection” (Miller, 1996, p. 145). This interpretation is supported by studies that show that the level of felt embarrassment diminishes only after others have been informed about it. For instance, the embarrassment of respondents who sang out of tune in the presence of an experimenter diminished to the level of a non-embarrassed control group when they thought the experimenter had either seen their ratings of embarrassment or had seen them blushing, but not when they thought their embarrassment had remained hidden from the experimenter (Leary, Landel, & Patton, 1996). “Knowing that their audience was aware of their embarrassment seemed to reduce the severity of their predicament, diminishing the embarrassment they felt. Meanwhile those who had never made their embarrassment plain, seemed to remain motivated to express it” (Miller, 1996, p. 153).

That embarrassment is a social regulator can also be inferred from the finding that anti-social behavior is related to low levels of embarrassment. Specifically, boys judged by their teachers to be “externalizers,” and thus to display anti-social behavior, were found to have fewer facial expressions of embarrassment and fear than a well-adjusted comparison group during a standardized test situation (Keltner, Kring, & Bonnano, 1999). The researchers suggest that the relative absence of embarrassment means that the externalizing boys were less concerned about rejection.

Embarrassment tends to be interpreted as intended: namely, as a sign of appeasement (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). Several studies suggest that a person is liked better when he or she shows embarrassment than not. Participants who watched videotapes of a person dislodging a large stack of toilet paper liked this person better when he had responded with embarrassment, regardless of whether he restacked the toilet paper or walked away from the mess (Semin & Manstead, 1982). Similarly, people responding with embarrassment to negative feedback about their task performance are better liked than people who respond defiantly (Edelmann, 1982). Moreover, participants judged individuals to be more trustworthy, friendlier, and more likeable when they were described to blush after breaking a valuable in a shop than when they were not (de Jong, 1999). Finally, in studies about teasing, displays of embarrassment on the part of the victims evoked positive emotions in their teasing partners, whether fraternity members or romantic partners, as well as in observers (Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998). The effects of embarrassment on others, however, may go beyond increased liking. Participants bought more condoms after a presentation aimed to increase condom use when the presenter acted embarrassed than when he/she was confident and unembarrassed; perhaps because they liked the embarrassed presenter better, though this was not reported by the authors (Keltner & Stoey, 1996, as cited in Keltner & Busswell, 1997). Together, the
evidence suggests that embarrassment serves the purpose of correcting a breach in social norms that could otherwise have led to social rejection.

While embarrassment is important in restoring and maintaining even not so close relationships, guilt appears to be significant in the restoring and maintenance of close and communal relationships (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). It has been hypothesized that guilt emerges when there is a threat of social exclusion or rejection by a significant other. One circumstance for guilt is the individuals' own perception that they have behaved badly towards their partner: for example, by hurting them or causing loss or distress. Indeed, in a self-report study (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995), respondents who reported feeling guilty about harming another person held the other in greater esteem than respondents who did not feel guilty. Moreover, fewer guilty than non-guilty respondents reported that they had anticipated the outcome, that their actions were justified, and that the victim helped to provoke their behavior. In other words, guilt feelings were associated with a greater appreciation of the relationship as well as with more self-blame for what happened. Guilt appears to motivate corrective behavior: it increases communal behaviors such as mutual concern and positive treatment, while at the same time reducing the chance of transgressions (Baumeister et al., 1994). Indeed, in the same self-report study quoted above (Baumeister et al., 1995), respondents with guilt feelings reported more often that they had learned a lesson, changed their behavior, and gave apologies after they had harmed another person than respondents who did not feel guilty.

Consistently, experimental research has shown that guilt inductions increase cooperative behavior, especially in those who are uncooperative to begin with. Thus, those respondents who are more liable to self-blame show corrective behavior after guilt induction. In one study, participants cooperated more in a bargaining game after they had been primed with guilt (by having to write about an episode in which they had felt really guilty) than before. Moreover, respondents primed with guilt cooperated more than those who had described a typical day (Keetelaar & Au, 2003). Finally, the guilt prime had the greatest effects on participants who had behaved uncooperatively in the first part of the game. Similarly, respondents primed with guilt (by remembering a time they cheated on their romantic partner), were more likely to cooperate in a ten-coin give-some dilemma game with another participant than respondents in the control condition (De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007). Again, guilt had the largest effects on those who were least cooperative to begin with: pro-selves, distinguished on the basis of their low default levels of cooperation, were more likely to show their commitment to the relationship after they were primed with guilt than in the control condition. Differences in level of cooperation between the guilt and the control conditions did not reach significance for the pro-social type participants, due to a ceiling effect.

Guilt also predicted cooperation in an ultimatum game, when feelings of guilt were measured instead of manipulated (Keetelaar & Au, 2003). Participants who had made selfish offers in the first negotiation game, and subsequently reported to feel guilty, made more generous offers in a second round of the game. Participants who had made selfish offers, but had not felt guilty, did not change their negotiation strategy during the second game session.

A final example of an affiliative emotion that we discuss is jealousy. As an affiliative emotion, jealousy has its appearance working against it: it is linked with aggression. Jealousy may be a last-resort emotion under conditions where social exclusion threatens to become, or even has become, a reality and when self-esteem is seriously threatened (DeSteno, Valdesolo, & Bartlett, 2006). After a jealousy induction, when a rival’s appearance put an abrupt end to a flattering and successful working relationship with a partner, participants’ self-esteem, as measured both on explicit and implicit self-esteem measures, dropped considerably. In a control scenario, where the initial partner excused himself because he needed to make another appointment, the self-esteem of the respondents remained unaffected. Moreover, in a second study with the same jealousy manipulation, the participants tended to add more hot sauce to the taste samples of both the partner and the rival, even though they knew that neither one of them liked their food spicy (DeSteno et al., 2006). The amount of hot sauce added, considered a measure of interpersonal aggression, was mediated by the reduction in participants’ self-esteem. Path analysis confirmed that the participants’ self-esteem was lowered after their partner chose to work with the rival, which then increased the intensity of their jealousy, which, in turn, led to higher aggression towards both partner and rival.

To our knowledge, there are no studies of the effects of jealous behavior on either the rivals or the partners. We would assume that, at least some of the time, rivals are scared away and partners reminded that the jealous person needs to be taken into consideration. And if this is not the case, then at least the prospect of making one’s partner jealous, with the entailing consequences of this person’s behavior, may sometimes be instrumental in keeping an existing relationship together. It should be noted that the dichotomy between affiliative
and assertive emotions is of limited use in the case of jealousy emotions.

**Assertive emotions**

Anger is a prime example of an assertive or socially disengaging emotion. In emotional prototype studies, anger, both in self and in others, is associated with verbally attacking the cause of anger, yelling and screaming (Shaver, Schwartz, Kinson, & O'Connor, 1987). In a study on emotion scripts, married couples reported worrying and brooding as part of their anger episodes (Chow, Tiedens, & Govan, 2008; Fitness, 1996); within romantic relationships these behaviors may be considered disengaging as well. Finally, participants who were made angry in a Cyberball game were more likely to aggress towards their supposed teammates (by giving them the least attractive snack), and this aggression was mediated by the level of anger reported by the respondents (Chow et al., 2008).

That anger has an assertive function in relationships – making claims for status, power, or other means – has been largely inferred from its effects on other people’s behavior. People subjected to anger yield, apologize or submit to the angry person (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). In a series of studies, Tiedens (2001) showed that targets expressing anger were confered with higher status than those expressing sadness, fear, or guilt. In a first study, students watched a video clip of former American President Bill Clinton discussing a sex scandal in which he was purportedly involved. In one condition the clip showed an angry Clinton. In the other condition the President appeared fearful and guilty. Participants who had watched the angry clip were more convinced that Clinton should stay in power than those who saw the fearful, guilty clip. Similar results were obtained showing respondents a fictitious politician who talked about terrorism in either an angry or a sad way. Participants who saw the politician in anger were more likely to vote for him and considered the politician a better leader than participants who saw the same fictitious politician displaying sadness. Moreover, the link between emotion expression and status conferral was mediated by the perceived competence of the politician; the angry politician was rated as more competent than the sad one and, in turn, increased competence led to higher status attribution.

In a final study (Tiedens, 2001, Study 4), the effects of anger and sadness on status attribution were assessed in the context of a job interview. Students of business administration viewed a clip of an applicant reporting a situation in which things had not gone well at his previous job. In one condition the clip ended with the applicant reporting that he felt angry about it; in the other with the applicant saying he felt sad and guilty. Participants offered the job applicant both a high-status position and a better salary when he had expressed anger than when he seemed sad and guilty. Once again, competence ratings fully mediated the emotion-status conferral relationship.

That anger induces yielding on the part of the other person has also been shown by negotiation studies (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). In these studies, participants take part in a computer-simulated negotiation. The computer was programmed to send to the participant messages that expressed anger in one condition, and that were happy and neutral in the other two. Participants whose opponent expressed anger lowered their demands and made larger concessions over time, compared to participants in the other two conditions. Participants in this study thus honored the greater entitlement expressed by the angry negotiators.

When the claim of anger is considered both justified and inescapable, anger brings about an improvement of position. But what happens when the angry person’s claim is neither justifiable nor inescapable? In a series of studies by Van Dijk, van Kleef, Steinel, and van Beest (2008), respondents played a computer-mediated ultimatum game with another negotiator (in reality, the computer) who either expressed anger or happiness. Respondents were the allocator in the game, deciding about the distribution of the available chips between themselves and the other person. In the default condition, respondents offered more chips to the happy person, but the anger advantage faded or disappeared when either (a) the game was set up in a way that gave the negotiating partner less power (the results did not change that much whether the offer was accepted or declined), or (b) the participants got the power to misinform the negotiating partner such that the offer seemed more generous than it really was. Thus, anger seems to be effective only if the claims of the angry person are not negotiable. Respondents will use room for negotiating the anger claim, if there is any. In fact, anger backfired in some cases. When the respondents knew that the chips had twice the value to them than to the bargainer, but they thought the bargainer to be unaware of this fact, participants offered fewer chips to the angry bargainer than to the happy one. This can only be explained as either punishment of the angry bargainer or reward to the happy one. Anger effects are thus dependent on the context in which anger is expressed. Anger of people with power is met with the conferral of status and goods. However, anger that can be challenged, will be, if the circumstances allow it.
**In sum**, emotions may be considered relationship engagements to which others respond. They are strategic bids for certain positions in the social world: affiliative emotions make intimacy bids and socially distancing emotions make status bids. Emotions may make an appeal on others to conform to the strategic bid, to accept the relationship alignment, or to welcome or reject the changed (or alternatively, sustained) relationship engagement. In many cases these bids are accepted, but there are exceptions.

**EMOTIONS IN CONTEXT**

*Emotions that fit the context*

If emotions are moves in interactions or strategic bids, one may expect that the prevalence of a given emotion is contingent on its fit with the prevalent relationship goals in that context. In other words, if emoting is largely strategic, then it should be functional to the sociocultural environment in which it occurs. There is much evidence that this is in fact the case. Examples of this principle can be found at the level of social roles as well as the level of culture.

For example, low- and high-status contexts are associated with different rates of emotions. In one study (Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000), business students from a mid Western university read a vignette in which a boss and an employee formed a sales team that failed in their mission, and did not reach the customer on time with the product. Responsibility for this bad outcome could not be inferred from the description. Respondents inferred that the level of anger was higher for the boss and the levels of sadness and guilt were higher for the employee. Thus, the emotion that expressed rightfulness and power was associated with the boss; the emotions of powerlessness and regret with the employee. Status roles render certain emotions more appropriate, and therefore more likely. Interestingly, when emotions rather than status roles were given in the same vignettes, respondents recognized the boss in the angry person, and the employee in the sad or guilty person. Emoting is thus engaging in status roles, and from the status roles we can predict which emotions are likely to be experienced. Emotions are functional to these status roles.

The most prevalent emotions in given cultural contexts also appear to be the ones that are consistent with the culturally preferred relationship arrangements (Kitayama et al., 2006a; Mesquita & Leu, 2007). For example, Kitayama and his colleagues found that socially engaging emotions, such as friendly feelings or shame, were more prevalent in the Japanese interdependent than the American independent cultural context; the reverse was true for socially disengaging emotions, such as pride and anger. Engaging emotions underline and reinforce the relatedness between people, and thus fit the interdependent model. This is obviously the case with friendly feeling, but also an emotion of shame signals the acknowledgement of social rules as well as the preparedness to submit to those rules. Socially disengaging emotions tend to signal and contribute to the boundedness and independence of an individual, and thus fit the goals in independent contexts.

Data from several studies converged. In one experience sampling study, both positive and negative engaged emotions were more frequent than disengaged emotions in Japanese contexts, whereas the reverse was true in independent European American contexts (Kitayama et al., 2006). In these studies, Japanese and European-American students rated engaged as well as disengaged emotions subsequently in a daily experience sampling study, and in response to 22 very diverse emotional events. In these studies, the largest differences appeared for the disengaged emotions. Whereas Japanese and European American students similarly appraised situations with regard to their implications for relational engagement, European American students reported significantly higher levels of disengaged emotions for both the positive and the negative situations. Thus, the combined work on power and cultural contexts suggests that emotions that have the greatest strategic benefits in the context are those most likely to occur: in other words, the reinforcement structure of the context predicts the likelihood of an emotion occurring. A finding in the same study by Kitayama and colleagues corroborates this idea. Not only were disengaged emotions relatively more frequent in the US samples, and engaged emotions more frequent in the Japanese samples, but also self-reported well-being was best predicted by the culturally valued emotions disengaged in the US and engaged in Japan. Thus, the most frequent emotions may have been the most rewarding, if rewards can be assumed to translate into well-being.

In sum, the studies discussed here suggest that contextualized relationship arrangements may account for the types of emotions that occur. The contextualized norms, habits, or reward structures affect which emotions occur most frequently. Note that these features of the context help us understand the regularities of an individual’s emotional life. Thus, what emotions a person is likely to experience can be inferred from the contexts in which his/her emotional life is embedded.
Emotions that do not fit with the context

If emotions can be right within a context, they can be at odds with it too. Context may be defined by culture, power differential, or gender roles. Whether emotions represent successful and legitimate bids, or rather will be challenged or rejected, depends on whether they are judged acceptable given the context.

Gender contexts affect the legitimacy of a number of different emotions. For instance, Brescoll and Uhlmann (2008) found that anger did not elicit the same status conferred when expressed by women as by men. They replicated an earlier study by Tiedens (2001; discussed above), in which respondents viewed a recording of a job applicant who was either angry or sad telling about a mishap that happened at his previous job. Whereas the job applicant in the initial study by Tiedens had been a man, Brescoll and Uhlman replicated the study using both male and female job applicants. For the male job applicants, they replicated the Tiedens’ results: respondents conferred more status to angry than to sad male applicants, by offering them better jobs. However, the picture was reversed when the job applicant was a woman: respondents conferred less power on angry than on sad women. (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008). Furthermore, participants explained anger in a woman by making negative, internal attributions (“She is not in control”), but they justified anger in men by referring to external circumstances. Thus, women do not gain from being angry, while angry men make successful claims to status. Hence, gender is a constituting context for the interactive meaning of anger. It seems that women in this case did better assuming an emotion that is more consistent with their less agentic stereotype (Best & Williams, 1997).

Stereotypical emotions may not always be the best strategy for women, however. A study by Lewis (2000) suggested that women in stereotypical roles may be judged more positively when their emotions are inconsistent with the female stereotype: i.e., when they do not show emotions. Participants watched videotaped scenarios with a person expressing anger, sadness (by crying), or no emotion at all, and rated this person’s leadership effectiveness. Emotions affected perceived leadership efficiency differently in men than in women. Men who were either angry or neutral were perceived as more effective than men who were sad. Women, on the other hand, were considered most effective when they showed no emotion at all. The default judgment of men as effective leaders is only challenged when they show an emotion that is typically associated with low status and low assertiveness. On the other hand, women, who tend to be stereotyped as emotional, are considered less effective as leaders (cf. Eagly & Karau, 2002) unless they behave in a non-stereotypical way and do not express emotions. In that case, they are exempt from the bad stereotype about their leadership qualities. Thus, what emotions mean for the perception by others is not only dependent on the type of engagement they represent but also on the meaning of this engagement for a person with this specific identity.

Not only the effect of assertive emotions but also that of affiliative emotions may depend on gender. Crying is more prevalent in women than in men, consistent with gender schemas that prescribe strength and independence for men, and emotional expressiveness and connectedness for women (Vingerhoets & Scheirs, 2000). Furthermore, there is some evidence that crying is judged to be more legitimate for women than for men: crying men are helped and comforted less often than crying women (Hendriks, Nelson, Cornelius, & Vingerhoets, 2008).

The status of the relationship may also serve as the context by which the legitimacy of emotions is judged. The impact of guilt, for instance, was suggested to be contingent on the mutual dependence of the dyadic partners. When both partners are committed to the relationship, guilt may operate as an influencing technique for the less powerful person (Baumeister et al., 1994) who invokes it when the outcomes of the relationship are unequally distributed. Guilt induction motivates corrective behavior, such as apologizing or making reparations or amends, but this seems only the case to the extent that the relationship in question is indispensable for the person made to feel guilty. Guilt is more likely to have a negative effect on the relationship in case the guilty partner does not reciprocate the relationship. For example, recipients of unwanted love who feel guilty about it tended to avoid the would-be lover (Baumeister & Wotman, 1992).

Similarly, sadness can be seen as a bid for sympathy and help in others (Bonnano, Goorin, & Coifman, 2008; Kellner & Kring, 1998). However, without mutual commitment to the relationship, sadness does not make an effective appeal. When randomly created same-sex dyads were made to listen to each others’ reports of pain and suffering, those low on power (as measured by the Sense of Power scale) reciprocated with distress and compassion, while distress levels of high-power listeners (measured on the same scale) were unrelated to their partners’ sadness levels (Van Kleef, Oveis, van der Løwe, LuoKogan, Goetz, & Keltner, 2008). This may be a specific case of the finding that people in high-status positions generally fail to appreciate the mental life of those lower in status (Fiske, 2010).
The meaning of emotional engagements may also vary according to cultural differences in the meanings of certain relationship arrangements. This is clear for shame, an emotion that may be seen as aligning oneself with the social rules and expectations. Whether this act is condoned by others seems to depend on the specific cultural models (Mesquita & Karasawa, 2004). Shame in East Asian cultures tends to be a desirable emotion, as it is consistent with interdependent goals of accommodating to others. It fits the values and practices of modesty and self-criticism that are prevalent in East Asian cultures. On the other hand, shame in Western contexts is an uneasy, painful, and often invisible (Scheff, 1988) emotion. It signals that one has failed to achieve the central tasks of an independent self: namely, self-esteem and positive independence.

In some cultures, emotions are more literally taken as bids that can be negotiated if unreasonable. Shame and anger were described as the currency for power negotiations among the Kaluli in Papua New Guinea (Schieffelin, 1983). In the Kaluli cultural model, nearly every reason to be angered, “any loss, wrong, injury, insult, or disappointment, is interpreted in the scheme of reciprocity.... A person who is angry is in some sense owed something: He has a legitimate expectation that he is due redress…” (pp. 186–187). Legitimacy can be challenged by shaming the angry person, implying he is over-asking. Shaming is basically undermining the legitimacy of the appeal that anger makes. Shame is “a situation, or a state of powerlessness and rejection. The legitimacy of one’s basic posture of assertion or appeal has been removed.” But shaming requires an assessment of power: “A person does not try to shame another if he does not think he can dominate the situation. If one tries to shame a stronger opponent without proper social support, his opponent may become provoked, override shame, and dominate him by intimidation” (p. 190). Thus, the legitimacy of anger in a Kaluli context also seems dependent on social power of the person who is angry.

Lest we give the impression that only the strategic bids or relational engagements associated with negative emotions are negotiated, we will give an example of a positive emotion negotiating in the context of intimate relationships. Gratitude, for instance, can be seen as the currency of many intimate relationships, and thus plays an important role in the negotiation of what is valued in a relationship (Fields, Copp, & Kleinman, 2006). Hochshild (1989, in Fields et al., 2006) found that, as gender culture shifted, with more women participating in the labor market, the marital baseline against which women measured, received, and appreciated gifts, shifted as well, but often men did not follow suit. Women tended to consider their pay checks as gifts, but men would find their wives’ financial success shaming. Consequently, women were expecting that men would do their fair share in the household (their spouses folding the laundry was not considered a gift), whereas men would see washing the dishes as a gift. Gratitude or the abstinence from it can thus be considered moves in the relationship that are subject to evaluation and negotiation. Emotions may thus be seen as bids in the negotiation for certain social positions (closeness, dominance); bids that may be acceptable to others in some but not in all contexts.

EMOTIONAL EPISODES: ONGOING INTERACTIONS, SOCIAL SHARING, AND CONVERGENCE OF EMOTIONS

Much of the adult literature is based on experimental research in which a one-time occurrence elicits an emotion, which is measured by a one-time subjective self-report. Moreover, the behavioral response is often channeled to fit a one-time, quantifiable response, such as choosing an unattractive snack, cooperating in a dilemma game, or adding hot sauce. While this type of research has greatly helped our understanding of the social nature of emotions, moving it away from conceptions of emotions as flight-or-fight responses to bears in the woods, it has also skewed the view of emotions towards discrete occurrences. The picture of emotions that emerges from the body of experimental research is of a bounded phenomenon with a clear beginning and end.

In real interactions, emotions appear to be more fluid, ongoing, and “attuned to unfolding transactions with the practical and social world” (Parkinson, 2008, p. 24). This conceptualization of emotions as based in social interaction draws attention to the dynamics of emotions in context and, more importantly, it renders the connection between different instances of emoting more transparent.

In the following, we highlight the importance of studying larger emotional episodes by briefly discussing research that focuses on ongoing interactions, on the social sharing of emotions, and on emotional convergence.

Ongoing emotional interactions

There are not many studies that are attuned to the question of emotions in context, but research on marital dispute provides an interesting exception. Several of these studies have established meaningful couple patterns of emoting (Gottman, Swanson,
& Murray, 1999). One study found, for instance, that some couples’ emotional patterns consist of reciprocal negative emotions (contempt, anger), with one spouse’s negative emotions predicting the other’s on the next interaction turn (even when controlling for the first spouse’s own emotions on previous turns). Other couples’ dynamics did not show the same reciprocity, because one of the spouses would have a “negativity threshold,” meaning that the hostility of the other partner had to be much more pronounced in order for the first partner to respond in kind on the next turn (Gottman et al., 1999). The negativity threshold was predicted not only by the partner’s hostility on the previous turn but also by hostility earlier in the interaction. One partner’s negative emotions during the first half of the discussion predicted a higher negativity threshold in the other partner during the latter half. One possible interpretation is that those who received too many messages of disapproval from their spouses stopped engaging in the relationship. This interpretation fits with the finding that a negativity threshold predicted failure of the marriage 1 year later.

The important point here is that emotions of the spouses mutually afford or constrain each other, as it may be, even in the course of one single interaction. One can only imagine how emotional patterns of partners afford each other in the course of a long-term relationship. In fact, the power of emotions in a relationship is impressively illustrated by another finding from the marital conflict literature (Gottman & Levenson, 2000). The emotions of couples who were invited to the lab to discuss an issue of conflict predicted the chances of divorce reliably 14 years later. Comparing couples headed for divorce and stable couples, those headed for divorce had a much lower positive to negative emotions ratio. Both volatile couples who have lots of positive and lots of negative emotions and harmonious couples who are neither positive nor express very many negative emotions can be successful, as long as the positive emotions outweigh the negative emotions by far. Other good predictors of divorce are “the four horsemen of the apocalypse”: emotions that deny the validity of the other person’s perspective – being critical of the person, not wanting to really listen to what the other has to say, contempt, and stonewalling (= listener withdrawal) during a discussion in the lab all predicted divorce 7 years later. The in-between processes mediating expression of these emotions and dissolution of the relationship are unknown, but these findings suggest an important, erosive role for these emotions in the relationship that merits further study.

On the positive end of the spectrum, Algoe and colleagues did an experience sampling study that followed the effects of gratitude in romantic relationships (Algoe, Gable, & Maisel, 2010). Gratitude was found to function as a “booster shot.” In the study, both partners of heterosexual couples were asked to keep a daily diary on (a) their own and received thoughtful actions, (b) their emotional reactions (e.g., gratitude) towards their partner’s actions, and (c) their relationship satisfaction. Thoughtful actions of the partner predicted the experience of gratitude, which in turn led to higher relationship satisfaction for both partners the following day. This means that one partner’s experience of gratitude not only led the grateful partner to feel more relationally connected, but that it did the same for the partner who had initially acted thoughtfully. Gratitude for “the little things” appears to play an important role in affording relationship growth, and it does so not only for newly formed dyads but also in established relationships on a day-to-day basis.

The mutual constitution of emotions in interactions can also be studied between people who are unfamiliar at the start of the interaction. An example comes from research with undergraduates who were selected to be either very high or very low on social anxiety (Heerey & Kring, 2007). Non-anxious respondents were either paired with non-anxious peers, or alternatively, with socially anxious counterparts. Each pair was instructed to “get to know” each other. Highly anxious participants engaged in more self-talk, asked fewer questions, reciprocated genuine smiles more often with polite smiles and less often with pleasant genuine smiles, and sought more reassurance than the non-anxious participants in either type of dyad. Central to the current argument is that this emotional behavior constituted the emotions of the non-anxious participants who were paired with anxious conversation partners. These non-anxious participants were the only group who did not report an increase in positive affect as a result of the interaction. Moreover, they offered more empathy and support to their conversation partners than any other group in the study. Finally, both interaction partners in the socially anxious/non-anxious pair perceived lower quality of interaction, and fidgeted more than the partners of non-anxious pairs. Fidgeting tended to be started by the socially anxious partner, and seemed to be transmitted across interaction partners. Again, the study illustrates how emotions are meaningfully described as an interactive pattern. Moreover, describing emotions this way renders it much more transparent how the emotions of one (i.e. non-anxious) partner in the interaction are constituted by the emotions of the other (i.e. the anxious person) – and perhaps vice versa as well.

In sum, mapping the dynamics of emotions in interaction yields insights not provided by the
description of individual emotions only. It shows effectively how emotions are in fact relational processes that are distributed across different partners (cf. Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009). In the above examples, the emotions of one partner could be seen as moves in the interaction to which the other person responded. Moreover, the study of emotions in interaction shows “dynamic coupling” of emotions “to an environment which both influences and is influenced by the unfolding of the emotion” (p. 2). Adopting a contextualized perspective on emotion thus enhances our insight into why and when emoting occurs. It renders transparent the connections between the emotions of different interactants, as well as the connections between those emotions and the interaction or relationship in which they occur.

**Social sharing**

Most emotional episodes, whether positive or negative, are shared with others who were not part of the emotional situation themselves. This phenomenon has been repeatedly demonstrated, tends to happen soon after the emotion event has taken place, and holds across age and gender. Moreover, the more intense the emotional episode, the more likely it is that it will be shared (see Rimé, Mesquita, Philippot, & Boca, 1991; Rimé, Philippot, Boca, & Mesquita, 1992). This systematic tendency to emotion sharing should imply that individuals gain from it. Indeed, some authors have found that discussing emotion events facilitates cognitive-emotional processes of adjustment to stressors by reducing intrusive thoughts (Lepore, Ragan, & Jones, 2000). However, others have found that sharing may not lead to an immediate emotional recovery or a decrease in the intensity of the emotion (cf. Wetzer, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2007).

If self-disclosure of emotion does not persistently lead to immediate benefits in terms of emotion regulation, then, why do people systematically engage in this behavior? The most important reason for sharing seems to be a social one: to gain acceptance for one’s emotional stance, to reintegrate after important emotional events. Rimé, Páez, Basabe, and Martínez (2010) propose that “sharing an emotional experience often leads to the completion of a variety of social needs such as need for relatedness, for enhancement of interpersonal relationships and for social integration” (p. 1031). In a longitudinal study on people who had been exposed to the terrorist attacks carried out on March 11, 2004 in Madrid, Spain, these authors measured, among other variables, frequency of social sharing, intensity of the emotions experienced, perceived social support, loneliness, and post-traumatic growth. Data on these measures were collected from 644 respondents during two or three measurement times (1, 3, and 8 weeks after the event). The impact of the event on respondents’ emotions appeared to be severe, and social sharing a week after the event was extremely high (98.9% of the respondents reported self-disclosure). Moreover, the authors’ prediction about obtaining important psychosocial benefits from sharing was fully supported. Social sharing was positively related to and predicted perceived social support and post-traumatic growth, while it was negatively linked to loneliness.

Emotion sharing is first of all a social behavior and, as such, this phenomenon cannot be fully grasped by approaching it as happening within the individual. Social sharing happens between people, and has effects not only on the sharer but also on the people with whom the emotion is shared. Participants who had been induced to feel anger in a bogus cooperation game evaluated the other person differently, depending on the reactions of a third party (the experimenter) with whom they shared their experience (Wetzer, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2007). Moreover, the experimenter himself was evaluated more positively when confirming the participant’s feelings than when de-dramatizing. The authors stress the social nature of self-disclosure of emotions by pointing at the consequences of this behavior on evaluation of the self and of the interaction partner.

Social sharing of emotion also has a more direct impact on the receiver of the emotion information. Christophe and Rimé (1997) tested in two studies the propositions that being exposed to disclosure of emotion is emotion-inducing and that the listener subsequently shares with other persons the emotional episode heard. One hundred and thirty-four participants were asked to retrieve from memory a recent episode of someone sharing with them a personal emotion experience. They were then asked to rate their emotional reaction to the sharing situation, and to what extent, if any, they later shared the emotional episode they heard with others. Participants were then divided into three groups on the basis of their ratings of emotion intensity elicited of the shared episode (low, medium, high). Sixty-six percent of the respondents reported to have shared the episode with third parties, and people whose emotional reaction had been high, talked about it later more recurrently and with more different people than participants with low or medium emotion reactions. In a second study, participants were handed a list comprising 20 emotional life events. Three different types of lists were available, containing low-, moderate-, or high-intensity events. Participants received only one of these lists and were asked to recall a situation in which someone
had socially shared with them an emotional episode resembling one of those included in the list. Participants were then asked to report how upset they had been when listening to the shared episode, how they reacted non-verbally and verbally, and to what extent, if any, they had subsequently shared the episode with other people. Subjects in the low-intensity condition had been significantly less emotionally aroused than those in higher-intensity conditions. Also, they engaged less in vocalizing and more in non-verbal comforting when in the high-intensity condition than in the lower ones. Finally, 78.5% of the respondents reported to have shared the emotion episode heard with a third party, and participants in the high-intensity condition reported to have shared more often and with more people than those in lower-intensity conditions.

Curci and Bellelli (2004) replicated these results both with a similar recall procedure and with a diary study in which people were asked to report a socially shared episode as soon as it had taken place and, three weeks later, they answered questions about secondary social sharing. Christophe and Rimé (1997) propose that this secondary social sharing might have both personal and interpersonal advantages. For instance, people would need to verbalize the emotional episode heard in order to free attentional channels from the mental images representing it. On the other hand, interpersonal motives may play a substantial role in secondary emotion sharing by enhancing the person’s social visibility and social integration. Also, secondary social sharing can add to collective interests by spreading emotional knowledge within a community and constantly updating and redefining emotion scripts and prototypes.

Hence, social sharing of emotion represents one of the most evident ways in which emotions function as a link between individuals and their environment.

**Emotional convergence**

Emotions of the members of dyads and groups converge over time. This is another illustration that the emotional processes of interest exceed the boundaries of the individual person.

A first demonstration of emotional convergence came from a study by Zajonc and his colleagues showing that married couples looked more alike after 25 years of marriage than they did at their first anniversary (Zajonc, Adelmann, Murphy, & Niedenthal, 1987). Relationship closeness and marriage satisfaction predicted how much better the couples were recognized after 25 years than after just one by students who were asked to match the faces. The authors postulated imitation as the underlying process. Relationship closeness might lead to empathy, and to the mimicking of emotions. Twenty-five years of mimicking one’s partner, and thus using similar facial muscles, would account for the resemblance between partners’ faces.

Not only partners start looking alike emotionally, so do roommates in college, dating couples, group members, and individuals within cultures (Anderson & Keltner, 2004; Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003; Kim, Mesquita, & Gomez, 2008; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). In all cases, people who belong together become more emotionally similar over time, or are so at the time of measurement.

Anderson and colleagues (Anderson et al., 2003) reported two experimental studies in which the emotions of roommates and romantic couples were measured at the beginning of the academic year, and then 6 or 9 months later in the year. Emotions were measured both by self-reports and facial coding, and were elicited in a number of different ways (conversations about topics with different valence, watching emotion-eliciting movies). In all cases, convergence of emotions was higher at the second measurement point than at the first. Emotional convergence was related to relationship satisfaction and liking of the partner/roommate, and this was true even when controlling for personality similarities. A third study showed that after 7 months of sharing a room the emotions of roommates were more similar to each other than to randomly chosen other students, even when roommates separately watched emotion-eliciting movies so as to prevent contagion. Thus, living together may lead to similarity in emotional reactivity and, whatever the mechanism, it develops in a relatively short time.

In two different studies, Smith and colleagues (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007) showed that members of in-groups converge on group-level emotions. In these studies, respondents were asked to rate their own emotions, as well as their emotions as a group member (e.g., American, Democrat, or Republican) on 12 emotion scales (e.g., anger, happiness). The scores on those 12 scales constituted their emotion profile. Group emotions had significantly different profiles than individual emotions. Furthermore, an individual’s group emotion (e.g., happiness as an American) was predicted by the average group member’s group emotion (e.g., the level of happiness averaged across all Americans), when controlling for the individual emotion (e.g., happiness reported by the individual). Thus, emotions of group members converged.

Consistently, there is some evidence for emotional convergence in immigrants as well. In two studies, De Leersnyder and colleagues measured...
the fit between immigrants’ emotions with the emotional patterns of the host country (De Leersnyder, Mesquita, & Kim, 2011). In the first study, the emotional fit of Korean immigrants in the United States was examined, and in the second study, the emotional fit of first- and second-generation Turkish immigrants with Belgian mainstream emotional responses was considered. Respondents in both studies reported emotional events from their own life that varied along the dimensions of valence and social engagement. They subsequently reported how they had felt by rating 30 different emotion scales. Individual emotion profiles were calculated for each type of situation. Individual profiles were then compared with the average host country profile (inferred from the European American responses in the first, and the Belgian responses in the second study). The results were consistent with the findings on in-group convergence. In the first study, Americans’ emotion profiles were more similar to the American average emotion profile than were Koreans’ emotion profiles. In the second study, Belgian emotion profiles were more similar to the Belgian emotion profile than were both first- and second-generation Turkish emotion profiles. Moreover, immigrants who had spent more years in the host country, as well as those with the highest number of interactions with people from the host culture, were more similar to the average host culture emotion profile than those who had had less contact with the host culture. Presumably, interactions with people from another culture affect one’s own emotions.

Convergence of emotions has been established, therefore, for roommates, couples, in-groups, and cultural groups in contact. Convergence is particularly pronounced for those whose connection is a close, happy, or identified one. The mechanism by which convergence emerges is not clear (see Anderson, et al., 2003; Smith, et al., 2007), but we may suggest several reasons (cf. Smith et al., 2007 for similar explanations). First, to the extent that dyads, in-group members, and members of different cultural groups are in each others’ presence, they may mimic each others’ emotions; those most identified, are expected to mimic most (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Semin, 2007). Second, groups may facilitate certain appraisals by sharing social norms. For example, individuals who valued social order reported more anger towards those who valued freedom when they felt supported by others valuing social order as well: perceived shared norms in this case afforded the expression of anger towards out-group members (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Third, emotions may be shared within a group to the extent that similar events become relevant. This explanation has largely remained untested. Regardless of the precise mechanisms underlying convergence, its occurrence makes a case for conceiving of emotions as a process that exceeds the individual mind.

INTERGROUP EMOTIONS

On the eve of the 2008 presidential elections in the United States, when the Democrat Barak Obama was about to win, the New York Times published a graphic display of the emotions of Democrats and Republicans. Excited, proud, victorious, euphoric, and jubilant, as well as anxious, giddy, worried and amazed populated the Democratic landscape of emotions. Clearly, the Democrats felt positive, mostly in control, and not yet legitimately powerful. On the other hand, apprehensive, disappointed, cautious, scared, hijacked, and terrified were important Republican feelings. The Republican emotions were not only negative but also implied that the legitimate power was still with the Republicans. The emotions on each side thus represented the positions and world views. They were not only descriptive of the state of affairs, but also evaluated the world from the perspective of either a Democrat or a Republican. These group emotions were identity enactments: they reflected the identification with that particular group, and in so doing, they adopted that group’s perspective on what is important, what is good, and what is moral.

This is the idea of group emotions: people experience emotions as group members. These so-called group emotions arise when people identify with a social group and respond emotionally to events or objects that impinge on this group (Smith & Mackie, 2008). As described before, intergroup emotions theory (Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004; Smith, 1993) posits that group emotions emerge when individuals appraise situations as relevant to their group concerns. Guilt feelings result from the acknowledgment of having wronged another party. Dutch people reported feeling guilty about their colonial past, even if they had had no personal involvement in the oppression or discrimination. In two studies – one real-life study where people found out about the involvement of their ancestors in Dutch colonization and one experimental study in which the involvement of people’s ancestors was manipulated – it was found that when reading about the negative aspects of the Dutch colonial history, those with high-involvement ancestors reported more guilt feelings than those with low-involvement ancestors.
Similarly, the perception of a collective disadvantage may lead to group-based emotions: in one study, faculty members’ perception of a pay disadvantage compared to the faculty of other universities gave rise to group-based anger, sadness, and fear (Smith, Cronin, & Kessler, 2008).

Just like individual emotions, the emotions people experience as group members may be seen as intentions to act (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Parkinson, et al., 2005). Group emotions are for doing: they prepare for (collective) action. Intergroup anger prepares for approaching the out-group, whereas intergroup fear prepares for avoiding the out-group (Crisp, Heuston, Farr, & Turner, 2007; Mackie, et al., 2000). In support of this, Americans who reported anger several months after the attacks on the World Trade Center were found to be more in support of military retaliation against those responsible for the attack than those Americans who reported to be afraid; the latter were more in support of restrictions on civil liberties (Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004). Likewise, intergroup guilt motivates group members to repair the damage caused to the out-group. In a longitudinal test of the association between collective guilt and reparation attitudes, Brown and colleagues (Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008) found that collective guilt at Time 1 predicted reparation motivations at Time 2 (8 weeks later). Also, in support of this, Dutch people who reported collective guilt over their imperial past were both more likely to apologize and more in favor of making reparations for their collective past (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004).

Not only are group emotions associated with action readiness but also successful implementation of the action readiness puts an end to the emotion or makes it fade, whereas failing to act, or acting unsuccessfully, leaves the intensity of the emotion unchanged, presumably because it fails to change the environmental signal that started the emotion (Maunten, Mackie, & Smith, 2006). Students who were angered by professors writing an insulting editorial in their university’s newspaper became less angry when other students protested and the professors retracted their comments. When the student protest was not met with apologies from the professors, the students became even angrier. In another study by the same authors, intergroup guilt that followed learning about American aggression on another country was diminished after respondents learned that the United States had sent help following the aggression, and increased after respondents had learned that their country carried out renewed attacks. The importance of these findings is that they suggest that intergroup emotions have social consequences: they regulate behavior towards out-groups.

Even if the relationship between group identification and group emotions is not completely straightforward, group emotions are most likely to happen when group identity is particularly salient; i.e., in the case of social comparison, competition, and conflict with other groups. Group feelings often occur in contrast to other groups, and can be seen to contrast with the feelings for other groups. According to one influential framework, coined the Behaviors from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes (or BIAS) framework, the emotions towards in- and out-groups correspond to the relative positioning of these groups on the dimensions of warmth and competence and prepare for action towards these groups (e.g., Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). The dimensions of warmth and competence stem from an evolutionary perspective: in encountering others, one has to decide whether the other has good or bad intentions, and whether the other is able to act upon these intentions. A proper assessment of others’ intentions and abilities leads to a higher chance of survival. Based on social comparison and attributional models of emotions, Cuddy, Fiske and Glick (2007) predict that the relative positioning of groups on these dimensions is associated with specific emotions. With student samples and random US population samples, the authors found that groups high on warmth and competence (e.g., the in-group and reference groups, such as middle class) elicited admiration, groups high on warmth but low on competence (e.g., the elderly) elicited pity, groups low on warmth but high on competence (e.g., the rich) elicited envy, and groups low on warmth and competence (e.g., the poor) elicited contempt. These associations were replicated in an experimental design, in which competence and warmth of the out-group members was manipulated, except for the association between low warmth/low competence and contempt (Caprariello, Cuddy, & Fiske, 2009). Emotions as reported were associated to different types of behavioral dimensions. Cuddy and colleagues (2007) found that admiration was associated with active facilitation (e.g., help) or passive facilitation (e.g., cooperation); pity was associated with active facilitation or passive harm (e.g., neglect); envy was associated with active harm (e.g., attack) or passive facilitation; and contempt was associated with active harm or passive harm. In sum, intergroup behaviors can be predicted from group emotions felt towards the own group and different out-groups.

Group emotions are not shared equally among different group members. Generally, high identifiers are likely to experience more intense – positive and negative – emotions based on their group
memberships as high identifiers reported higher levels of anger towards an out-group than low identifiers (e.g., Smith et al., 2007; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). The evidence for a positive link between levels of group identification and intensity of group-based emotions is, nevertheless, not unequivocal: some studies find no relationship or a negative one. This is especially true for self-critical emotions such as guilt (Iyer & Leach, 2008). Doosje and colleagues (1998) found a negative association between Dutch national identification and guilt related to the nation’s colonization history, especially in the case of ambiguous information about this history. Low identifiers felt guiltier about the nation’s colonization history than high identifiers. For high identifiers, denial and legitimization may have been easier than acknowledging that they had inflicted harm on others, because this acknowledgment would have threatened their positive self-image. Similarly, several studies found support that low identifiers considered an aggressive act by their group as more unfair and less justified than high identifiers (Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006; Maitner et al., 2006). In some cases, high- and low-group identifiers have been even shown to experience different emotions with regard to the same event: after their soccer team had lost, high identifiers felt angry and wanted to oppose soccer fans of the other team, whereas low identifiers rather felt sad and wanted to move away from the other team’s soccer fans (Crisp et al., 2007).

Furthermore, group emotions may themselves affect identification, as is illustrated by the fact that supporters of a losing football team wear fewer college shirts the Monday after the match than those whose teams won over the weekend (Cialdini et al., 1976). Also, experimental evidence suggests that remembering either a happy in-group event or an event that elicited angry feelings towards an out-group increases group identification, whereas remembering an instance of anger towards the in-group or out-group happiness decreases group identification (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). Consistently, experimental induction of anger increased in-group favoritism: angry respondents showed more preference for their in-group relative to the out-group on an Implicit Association Test than either fearful or non-emotional respondents (DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004). Thus, there seems to be a dynamic interplay between emotion and identification, such that identification affects emotions, and emotions identification.

Lest this picture suggests that people’s group emotions are “chronic” (Smith et al., 2007), we should add some caveats. First, group emotions can change depending on the out-group. For instance, when respondents’ student identity was made salient, they felt anger towards the police and respect towards Muslims (Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008). Moreover, people have multiple identities, and dependent on the identity primed, different emotions will emerge. When respondents identified as a student, they felt anger at the police, but when they identified as an American, they felt respect towards the police (Ray et al., 2008). Furthermore, if respondents thought they shared a common identity with victims of negative behaviors, they felt more anger and fear than when they perceived the victims as an out-group. In two studies, participants were told that the goal of the study was to either compare the opinions of students of one university vs students of another university or those of students vs professors. When sharing a common identity with students of another university, students reported more anger when they found out that the study load would be increased for students at the other university (Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001) or when they found out that English would become the language of instruction in the master years of another university (Yzerbyt et al., 2003). In another study, Dumont and colleagues (2003) compared the emotional reactions of Westerners vs Arabs or Europeans vs Americans to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. When sharing a common identity with Americans (i.e., when categorized as Westerners), Dutch and Belgian respondents reported more fear than when not sharing this social identity with Americans (i.e., when categorized as Europeans).

CONCLUSION

Psychological insights about emotions have changed: the central research question is shifting from what emotions are in the abstract, to what they do in concrete social contexts. While the dominant research focus was once on the properties of individual experiences and responses, much current research is centered on the effects of emotions in interactions. Social context, once considered noise in emotion research, has now become the substance of many studies. Emotions are no longer considered merely individual-level, subjective feelings, but rather are viewed as thoroughly social psychological.

Many emotional phenomena can simply not be studied without putting them in the social context in which they occur. It is impossible to understand the sequences of emotions in interactions unless we consider both partners’ emotional responses and the ways they influence each other and follow...
each other up. Likewise, it is impossible to understand the dynamics of group emotions, emotional convergence, or social sharing of emotions, without exceeding the level of the individual. Social context is an essential part of the study of emotion, and the study of emotion an indispensable part of social psychology.

REFERENCES


