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Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor
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THE REVIVAL OF THE PROPAGANDA STATE
US Propaganda at Home and Abroad since 9/11

Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor

Abstract / Events since 11 September 2001 have brought to light debates about the revival of public diplomacy and the role of propaganda in domestic and global communications. This article analyzes American strategies to manipulate information and to ‘manage’ the media against the backdrop of the ongoing war on terrorism and of the conflict in Iraq. It explores the problematic tension between democratic ideals and principles toward openness alongside government and military needs of operational security and to secure public support in a ‘war’ that has been declared on global terrorism. This ongoing tension requires a genuine movement toward more open media and advocacy on the part of global citizens, including the strengthening of independent and non-corporate media, in order to challenge prevailing media that are subject to government and military influence. In a democracy, when things go wrong at home, it becomes much more difficult to project a positive image abroad. The impact of these trends in undermining the messages of public diplomacy overseas helps to explain both the success of US propaganda at home and its failure abroad.

Keywords / censorship / democracy / Great Britain / propaganda / public diplomacy / September 11 / United States

Framing a ‘Global War on Terror’
The so-called ‘lone dissenter’, Representative Barbara Lee (D-Oakland) was the only member of the US Congress to vote against the following resolution passed on 14 September 2001:

That the president is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

The vote was 98–0 in the Senate, 420–1 in the House. Representative Lee’s rationale to vote against this legislation was based on the words of the Very Reverend Nathan Baxter, then Dean of the National Cathedral in Washington, DC, who earlier the same day had led the nation in a National Day of Prayer and Remembrance, and
who warned that ‘we must not become the evil we deplore’ (PBS Online, 2001). Where were the other voices to protect the historic ‘checks and balances’ function of the three branches of the US government? They were, in fact, silent. Congresswoman Lee would later tell reporters that there were many in Congress who secretly encouraged her but who themselves could not imagine challenging the Bush administration or do anything other than issue the executive branch of the government with a blank check to use ‘all means necessary’ to punish the perpetrators of 9/11. Such was the depth of shock at this terrorist ‘propaganda of the deed’ and the start of a process whereby the US began, perhaps unwittingly, to play into the hands of their adversaries.

The dominance of censorship and propaganda is a triumph of authoritarian over democratic values. During times of international crisis like the Cold War or now in the so-called ‘Global War on Terror’, authoritarian values of secrecy, information control and silencing dissent would appear to take precedence over democracy, the First Amendment and a free press. The general trend since 9/11, especially in the US, has been away from openness and toward increasing government secrecy coupled with what can seem a rise in contempt among inner circle policy-makers for a public’s right to know that may override national and homeland security concerns. Every official pronouncement is now framed within the psyche of a nation ‘at war’ – epitomized by the renaming of Newark airport to Liberty International Airport to the commercial marketing of a hot sauce with the phrase ‘burn, bin Laden, burn!!’ – a war in which ‘you are either with us or against us’ and in which ‘there is no neutral ground’.

During any war, we hear many charges of propaganda being produced by the warring parties. In most people’s eyes, propaganda equates to misinformation or disinformation. These are much misunderstood words and they are frequently used erroneously. Nonetheless, during the 20th century, democracies at war have tended toward what was described during the Second World War as a ‘Strategy of Truth’ (Taylor, 1999: 208–48). This does not, of course, mean that the whole truth was told. What it does mean is that democratic governments have tended to wage war in a manner that mainly reflects the way they do business in peacetime, namely by paying due respect to such characteristics of democratic practice as accountability, transparency, protection of minorities, the accommodation of dissenting views and so on. The freedoms that are suspended in wartime tend to relate to matters of national or operational security, although it is too often forgotten that these are anyway restricted in times of peace and that war merely brings these issues into a much sharper focus. But the democratic propaganda model is also a way of establishing the moral high ground, of demonstrating that democracy is a better way of doing politics, and of continuing politics by other means, because democracies rarely – if ever – wage war against other democracies. Democratic enemies are usually non-democracies – a dictatorship or an authoritarian regime that does not conform to international laws or norms. Hence, the ‘enemy’ conducts propaganda, whereas democracies ‘tell the truth’, or at least as much of the truth as can be told to achieve victory while preserving those fundamental democratic values so cherished in normal times.
In 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom threatened to throw this rule-book away and to establish new guidelines for democracies waging war in the 21st century. The issues of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), of Saddam Hussein’s connection to the events of September 11, the ‘Saving Private Jessica’ affair, the selling of the invasion of Iraq as a ‘liberation’ of the Iraqi people from Saddam’s regime – all these themes proved to be highly controversial in the justification for war not only among those four democracies who formed a ‘coalition of the willing’ to actually fight the Saddam regime,¹ but also within those democracies who were regarded as traditional allies of the US but who now refused to join them in combat or even to provide one final UN resolution authorizing a resort to war. Outside of the US, it was arguably the most controversial war of recent history and, for Britain, probably the most divisive conflict since the 1956 Suez crisis. The Blair government stood accused of being Mr Bush’s poodle, of joining the US in a neocolonial war for oil, an unjust and illegal imperialist venture that made connections between 9/11 and Iraq when none existed, and of criminally assisting in the unfinished family business of the American president.

In the US, polls revealed that around 70 percent of Americans believed that Saddam was connected to the events of 9/11 and that popular support for the war – and the president – was overwhelmingly in favor (Kull, 2003). In Britain, by contrast, support rose from a mere 46 percent before the ‘support our boys’ factor kicked in once fighting began on 20 March 2003, but even then it rose to only around 59 percent – far lower than the previous levels of between 70 and 80 percent enjoyed by most post-Second World War warring British governments. In Spain and Italy, whose governments supported the war despite overwhelming popular opposition, the political leadership was taking an enormous gamble – as Mr Aznar was to discover when he was unceremoniously rejected in the 2004 election that was to take place in the immediate aftermath of the Madrid terrorist attacks known as ‘3/11’. France and Germany, the most outspoken in their opposition, were dismissed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as being ‘Old Europe’ (US Department of Defense, 2003). Long forgotten was Le Monde’s declaration on 12 September 2001 that ‘we are all Americans now’ (Colombani, 2001) as unprecedented levels of anti-Americanism rose across the globe and world opinion polarized in a manner certainly not expected of Mr Bush when he declared that ‘you are either with us or against us’ in the war against terrorism (Pew Research Center for the People and Press, 2003).

It was that ‘war’ – the one declared against an abstract concept such as ‘terror’ – which was to muddle the entire issue in the war against Iraq. Outside of the US, people struggled to make a connection between the two. But within the US, the issue was clearer, and the media and public alike harbored few doubts about Iraq being the second ‘battle’ in the war against terrorism, after the first in Afghanistan. This perceptual divide is perhaps the most significant aspect of the entire issue within the field of international communications. Psychologically, many American people perceive themselves to be ‘at war’ whereas very few others share the same perception. Europeans, who are historically more familiar with terrorist attacks, struggle to define the ‘war’ on terror as anything but an ‘American war on terror’ or even to see the conflict as meriting the description of a ‘war’ in the first place.
The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington were the first strikes on continental America since the British razed Washington to the ground in 1812. The insecurity that this new attack generated prompted an isolationist-inclined Bush Jr administration to declare a new doctrine that marked a fundamental change in US foreign policy. This so-called Bush Doctrine had three essential strands – to hunt down terrorists wherever they are, including in those rogue states now dubbed an ‘axis of evil’, to wage pre-emptive war to prevent further strikes or to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into terrorist hands, and the aggressive promotion of democracy, US-style (Bush, 2002). Despite NATO’s historic invocation of Article V of its Charter on 12 September, the fear was that the US would pursue these goals unilaterally without recourse to its traditional allies or the United Nations. The problem was that the first two doctrinal strands jeopardized, and perhaps even contradicted, the third.

**Broadcasting Freedom: Al Hurrah Television for Iraq**

When modern nations go to war, propaganda is a normal characteristic of their battle on the ‘information’ front, a fourth arm alongside military, naval and air campaigns. This was evident both in the war in Afghanistan begun a month after 9/11 and with Iraq. In the mid-1980s, the US Special Operations Command specially designed a propaganda and psychological warfare aircraft called Commando Solo that was capable of overriding domestic media broadcasts (radio and television) and substituting outside content of any kind, true or false. In Afghanistan, it was used solely as a radio platform as the Taliban had banned the domestic use of television. In April 2003, Commando Solo was used to rebroadcast US media nightly newscasts featuring Tom Brokaw and Peter Jennings into Iraq in order to demonstrate to the newly liberated Iraqi people what free media broadcasts look like. On 14 February 2004, the US government sent out a broadcast signal version of a Valentine’s Day greeting card to win Arab hearts and minds. Meanwhile, back in Washington, senior spokespersons talked of ‘regime change’ as a legitimate *casus belli* and began to address messages to the Iraqi people via press conferences normally reserved for dealing with the assembled reporters. In other words, every means was taken to address global public opinion in general, and Arab opinion in particular, and in the process the traditional lines between Public Affairs and Psychological Operations became extremely blurred.

Just in case the media chose not to carry the messages that the Iraqi people would soon be free of their dictator, it was also felt necessary to adopt a direct government-to-people international broadcasting service. Radio Sawa (‘Together’) and Al Hurrah Television (‘The Free One’) came about as a free press mandate to challenge what the US administration and the US Broadcasting Board of Governors (which oversees US official international broadcasting) perceive as the hate media in the Arab region. In particular, Radio Sawa and Al Hurrah attempted to offer a US response to the barrage of anti-US and anti-Israel stories and sensationalized imagery coming from the more popular networks of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. Radio Sawa attempted to attract younger Arab audiences by a cocktail of regional...
and western pop music. President Bush said that Al Hurrah would help combat ‘the hateful propaganda that fills the airwaves in the Muslim world and tell people the truth about the values and policies of the United States’. It did so from a very safe distance. Al Hurrah is based not in the Middle East, but in northern Virginia, USA. While the Bush administration hoped that Islamic eyeballs would be glued to the US-declared truthful alternative, so far no one is fully embracing the ‘free one’ version, despite financing of US$62 million in congressional funding for the first year alone. Although the station’s output was to be news-based, the traditional lines between Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs were also becoming blurred.

In a MSNBC online review of some of the global media reaction to Al Hurrah, early Arab newspaper editorials were universally contemptuous of the new broadcast alternative, with the not unexpected negative reaction of ‘it’s all American propaganda, anyway’. The Cairo Times said that many Egyptians remain ‘guarded’ in their reaction and were suspicious of the new station’s propagandistic potential to shape news from a pro-US, pro-Israeli governmental perspective. The most prestigious Arab-language newspaper, Al Ahram, said: ‘It is difficult to understand how the US, with its advanced research centers and clever minds, explains away Arab hatred as a product of a demagogic media and not due to its biased policies and propensity to abuse Arab interests.’ Arab News, the Middle East’s leading English daily, reported a ‘cool reception’ to Al Hurrah, which some viewers saw as ‘short on credibility and long on arrogance’. The former minister of information in Kuwait, Dr Saad Al Ajmi, reported a mixed review. In a special to the Gulf News, he said that:

There is most certainly a vacuum for it [Al Hurrah] to fill. Before Al Hurrah, America had no satellite television voice in the Arab world . . . Al Hurrah is playing catch up, and it remains to be seen if it will be successful.

As we discuss later, this was largely the US government’s own fault. As official public diplomacy initiatives diminished in the 1990s, the field was left to commercialization in the true spirit of Cold War ‘victory’ over Communism. The Cable News Network (CNN) did dominate the Arab airwaves in the early 1990s but this was during the previous war in the Gulf and before Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya came along from the mid-1990s onwards to challenge this English-language global media station that was anyway accessible only to English-speaking elites in the region. What remains to be seen is if those who initially condemned the network will find curiosity getting the better of them and sneak a peek, if nothing else, to see if Al Hurrah offers anything new and different in both content and production value.

Against a backdrop of rising anti-Americanism and an unfinished roadmap to peace in the Middle East, it is however extremely doubtful that many hearts and minds will be won until one aspect of American behavior changes – namely US foreign policy. But another element is the US domestic media acting as a lapdog rather than a watchdog. The US lacks the credibility it needs to project itself successfully to the Middle East. Just calling a network free doesn’t make it so, especially one tied so closely to the US government – and in this regard conceptual mistakes were made right from the start since President Bush was the first guest interviewed.
on Al Hurrah. Al Quds Al Arabi, a newspaper generally critical of the US, said that the Bush interview ‘brought to mind official channels broadcast by regimes mired in dictatorship, just like those of the 1960s and beginning of the 70s’.

The greatest credibility hurdle to overcome seems to be in the naming of the station itself. To many viewers, if Al Hurrah represents ‘the free ones’ then that makes ‘them’ the unfree ones. This magic bullet theory of communication assumes that the sender’s desire for more free speech and more accurate information about itself in a region coincides with the receiver’s needs. But many critics of Al Hurrah maintain that the US still ‘just doesn’t get it’ about what the Arab audience’s true needs are. One magazine writer, Amy Moufai, told an NBC News producer in Cairo that she hadn’t watched the new US network, but was very surprised they would choose a name like that which highlights the fact they don’t know what they are doing in the Middle East. ‘It reeks of the whole notion of a white man’s bread: “Let us teach you our free ways.”’ It is this failure to look at oneself through the eyes of others that is at the heart of the American propaganda problem, especially if the others are also reading the American media as one of many sources of information to reinforce their viewpoints (Snow, 2004a).

Western Public Diplomacy after the End of the Cold War

In time, historians of the future will most likely attribute one of the root causes of 9/11 as being the short-sighted downgrading of western public diplomacy after the end of the Cold War. With that earlier global ideological struggle declared ‘won’ after the fall of the Soviet Union and of the Berlin Wall, western public diplomacy went into severe decline. The Clinton administrations in particular downgraded its significance, culminating in 1999 with the absorption of the United States Information Agency into the State Department. The USIA had been created in 1953 as the principal coordinator of what many termed ‘international information activities’ including the conduct of student exchange schemes, international broadcasting and the work of US cultural attaches. Its principles were based on the ‘Strategy of Truth’ and its ideological momentum was driven by the promotion of the ‘Four Freedoms’ and, together with the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, it helped to disseminate those ideals to an audience in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe who clearly wanted – and needed – them. However, by 1999, USIA was a thoroughly demoralized body and its chief broadcasting arm, the Voice of America, was broadcasting a mere seven hours per day in Arabic.

There were voices arguing that these trends were potentially disastrous for the western image, especially in the developing world. By abrogating itself from self-explanation and self-justification through its state-run international information agencies, a perception or information vacuum was being created that was being filled by two elements, neither of which was particularly beneficial to the world’s surviving superpower. The first of these was home-grown: the rise of multinational corporate advertising led to charges that the US was attempting to ‘McDominate’ the world through ‘coca-colonialism’, to spread western products – and the values that came to be associated with them – through advertising at the expense of
indigenous cultural development. In this respect, CNN, which came to the global fore during the Gulf War of 1991, appeared to exemplify an American attempt to dominate what then Vice-President Al Gore described as the ‘global information infrastructure’. Although CNN employees proclaimed loudly their independence from the US government, its replication of pro-US government themes during the 1991 Gulf War merely served to confirm the impression of a ‘military–media–industrial complex’ at work to the detriment of others. Some of these themes were taken up by the ‘anti-globalization’ movement in the 1990s and were often a thin veil for anti-Americanism.

The second element was the massive amount of information, disinformation and misinformation, which dissenting anti-western voices were now able to input into the global info-sphere via the world wide web (invented in 1989 as the accessible front-page of the internet) and subsequently by new regional media players, the most famous of which was Al Jazeera, founded in 1995 and quickly dubbed ‘the Arab CNN’. This was an unwelcome label for the Al Jazeera correspondents as most of them had been trained in the public service broadcasting tradition by their former employer, the BBC. This provides a foretaste of the trouble ahead for Al Jazeera in US eyes. For the public service tradition maintains that if you cover one side of an argument you must balance it providing differing points of view. When bin Laden identified Al Jazeera as his preferred station for exclusives of his taped messages, the station did balance these with statements from Washington and elsewhere but these went unnoticed by a US administration that saw only ‘enemy propaganda’ and lies being disseminated by a station that was beyond its control or influence.

Although Al Jazeera only came to be noticed by Americans after 9/11, it was symbolic of significant changes that were taking place in the Middle Eastern media landscape since the 1991 Gulf War. The most important of these was the likely inability of western media organizations to dominate that landscape as they once had through syndication, domination of news agency sources and so on. The alarm bells sounded in the head of Joseph Nye in the mid-1990s, when he called for the increased use of ‘soft power’ by the US. He defined this as the means by which a nation projects itself in an attractive manner, where its values and principles are subsequently desired by others because they are perceived to be universal. However, there is a tendency in the US to assume that because of the ‘triumph’ of free-market liberal capitalism in the Cold War, anything can sell if it is marketed properly. That is why Charlotte Beers was hired to oversee US public diplomacy after 9/11. She was recruited from Madison Avenue with a brief to ‘brand America’. She resigned after two years perhaps because she finally realized that her job was impossible if the policies are disliked. Ideally, policy and presentation should go hand in hand, but if one gets ahead of the other, you are headed for trouble. In the Middle East in particular, resentment against American policies had been festering for some time. A clue that things were turning ugly was evident in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, when Saddam Hussein was being celebrated as a hero in some quarters because he had taken on the West – and survived. Then came the attempted assassination of President George Bush Sr while on a trip to Saudi Arabia.
While the West basked in the glow of ‘victory’ in the Cold War and in the liberation of Kuwait, the resentment that was brewing even saw the first attempt to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993. Then came the African embassy bombings, the attack on the *USS Cole* and Operation Desert Fox, all of which should have alerted Washington that the Arab and Muslim world was far from happy with the continued presence of western troops in the Holy Land of Mecca, despite the efforts to help the people of Somalia or the Bosnian Muslims or even the Kosovar Albanians through so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’. And by 2001, in the American media, coverage of international news was also in terminal decline. So neither ‘side’ was getting a balanced view of events and, worse still, media analysis of complex events like foreign policy issues was becoming a rare commodity.

**Censorship and Propaganda in US after September 11**

*Without some form of censorship, propaganda in the strict sense of the word is impossible. In order to conduct propaganda there must be some barrier between the public and the event. (Lippmann, 1941: 43)*

The father of modern American journalism lays out two essential tools in modern media collusion with the state: censorship and propaganda. Censorship ends the free flow of information so essential for democracy and makes dissent less likely. Propaganda can inject false, misleading or slanted information into the media in order to influence the behavior of populations at home and abroad. Censorship and propaganda exist in the news media and come in many flavors – using unnamed sources in national security stories; using the same elite-level sources repeatedly; ‘killing’ a story before it comes to light; and encouraging self-censorship on the part of working reporters. Although they will rarely admit to it, news organizations are often willing colluders with governments and militaries in efforts to censor because major media owners are members of the political elite themselves and therefore share similar goals and outcomes. Making profit would appear to rank higher than telling the truth in the minds of some media owners and many of their employees. There is nothing so sacred about having a media system driven by advertising and the bottom line, but in the US the conventional wisdom is that profit-centered media are as American as apple pie, the Fourth of July and the Founding Fathers. The events of 11 September 2001 have simply intensified this reality, but they also help to explain why the question ‘why do they hate us so much?’ had to be asked in the first place.

A veteran reporter, Peter Arnett, who had covered the 1991 Gulf War for CNN and received a Pulitzer Prize while covering the war in Vietnam for the Associated Press, was fired in late March 2003 for granting an interview to Iraqi TV. In his interview, he said:

> Clearly, the American war planners misjudged the determination of the Iraqi forces. That is why now America is reappraising the battlefield, delaying the war, maybe a week, and re-writing the war plan. The first war plan has failed because of Iraqi resistance now they are trying to write another war plan.
Arnett was at first backed by his network, NBC, which issued a prepared statement, reading:

_Peter Arnett and his crew have risked their lives to bring the American people up-to-date, straightforward information on what is happening in and around Baghdad. Arnett’s impromptu interview with Iraqi TV was done as a professional courtesy and was similar to other interviews he has done with media outlets from around the world. His remarks were analytical in nature and were not intended to be anything more._

However, the controversy did not die down and within days NBC announced that it was axing Arnett:

_It was wrong for Mr. Arnett to grant an interview to state controlled Iraqi TV – especially at a time of war – and it was wrong for him to discuss his personal observations and opinions in that interview. Therefore, Peter Arnett will no longer be reporting for NBC News and MSNBC._ (Kovacs, 2003)

Here we can see how policy and presentation have become so dysfunctional in the global war on terror. The Bush administration wages a ‘war’ on terror as a war for national survival. The often-repeated rational is that ‘we must defeat them over there before they attack us here’. At home, accordingly, dissent is muffled out of fear of appearing unpatriotic, and self-censorship in the media takes place from the sacking of Arnett back to the television networks refusing the repeat the images of falling people from the Twin Towers or even the rebroadcasting of the bin Laden tapes first broadcast on Al Jazeera. When _The New York Times_ apologizes for its uncritical coverage of the 2003 Iraqi conflict, it is a pretty good clue that wartime-like patriotism has won over once cherished democratic norms.

Abroad, American officials talk to foreigners as though they were ‘others’ who merely want to become Americans and to buy into the American dream. It is as if the traditional lines between the ‘national’ and the ‘international’ were still in place despite the globalization of communications. As a result, it is little appreciated that the reduction of democratic norms within the US contradicts the message of the Bush doctrine about the promotion of democracy abroad. Merely insisting that the US enjoys a free press does not necessarily make it so. Indeed, the support of the US media for the war on terror and for the war in Iraq sends the reverse message, even if the problem is that the US media choose to adopt this stance rather than being directly forced to do so. Hence age-old accusations about the US being hypocritical, arrogant and selective find fresh reaffirmation in the events of Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib.

**Global War on Terror: Information, Misinformation and Disinformation**

Beers’s appointment and the rejuvenated debate in the US about public diplomacy was, of course, a direct response to the 9/11 attacks, to bewilderment about how they occurred and a consequence of the question, ‘why do they hate us so much?’ The very fact that such a question needed to be asked suggests a serious failure in
media self-evaluation, or of governmental Public Affairs, or of both. But it is there
that the root failure of what was briefly after 9/11 being called perception manage-
ment lies, in the mistaken assumption that hard power should be left to speak for
itself.

And so now we have a ‘global war on terror’, a Bush Doctrine that encapsu-
lates notions of pre-emptive war to prevent future attacks on rogue states that form
an axis of evil that are to be subject to ‘regime change’ if they continue to harbor
terrorists or relish notions of supplying them at some future date with weapons of
mass destruction. The American dream has become a nightmare for others who wish
the wake-up call had been made far earlier in the morning or had not come at all.
Meanwhile, disruption to world travel, the rise of anti-Americanism and anti-western
sentiment, the creation of a link between Al Qaeda and Iraq when none had most
likely existed before the regime change in Baghdad, with more than 2000 American
soldiers killed in Iraq and rising – have all played into the hands of those who resent
modernity, American mega-power and who accuse the West of hypocrisy, selectiv-
itly, neocolonialism and Zionism. The reduction of public diplomacy initiatives in the
1990s due to short-sighted fiscal retrenchment was so dangerous that the dis-
advantages of short-term economics in what will always be a long-term activity have
made the situation even more difficult, most likely much more expensive, and ulti-
mately harder to reclaim the position the West was in before it all happened.

The rise of anti-Americanism since 2001 is remarkable but is clearly directed
more at the Bush administration than the ‘American way of life’. Of course, fanatics
who fear modernity and who targeted that ultimate symbol of the triumph of free-
market liberal capitalism in New York, were striking a blow against a way of life,
the export of which was deeply resented in certain parts of the Arab and Muslim
world. While the West denies that this is a ‘clash of civilizations’, there are many
adversaries that argue that the global war on terror is precisely that. They point to
the American president’s early use of the word ‘crusade’ or to the labeling of the
war as ‘Operation Infinite Justice’. They argue that between nine and 16 of the
hijackers are still alive, that 9/11 was a CIA–Mossad conspiracy to provide a pretext
for a war against Islam, that 4000 Jews failed to turn up for work at the World
Trade Center that day, that television images of celebrating Palestinians were taken
back in 1991 rather than on 11 September 2001 and a whole host of other
nonsense, which has taken root as ‘facts’ and which is perpetuated to a global
audience on the internet.

We need here to distinguish between misinformation, which could be defined
as wrong or incomplete information, and disinformation, which implies an attempt
deliberately to mislead. Usually associated with the Soviets in the Cold War era, we
now need to ask whether disinformation has become the deliberate policy of demo-
cratic foreign policy as now conducted by the US since 9/11. In a war of national
survival – whether that war is real or imagined – all weapons are considered usable
(except perhaps nuclear weapons) by democracies. The focus of decision-making
shifts away from the diplomats and on to the military, and we know that the military
have long considered one particular weapon – deception – as a legitimate weapon
of war. One definition describes deception as:
... those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Military deception can be employed during all phases of military operations. (Department of Defense, 1996)

The first hint of the deception weapon being deployed in the war on terror came with the press outcry over the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) in the spring of 2002. This was one part of a post-9/11 propaganda machine that was being constructed, including Radio Sawa, Al Hurrah, the Office of Global Communications in the White House and various other elements encapsulated in the military phrase ‘Information Operations’. After its existence was leaked to the press in March 2002, Donald Rumsfeld admitted that the OSI had been created in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and, when pressed on its functions, he admitted that deceiving enemy leaders through the international media was one of its functions. The American media, which receive much of their foreign news through such channels, and were protected constitutionally from such manipulation, were outraged – and, after a huge outcry, the OSI was closed down (Gilmore, 2002).

In a sense, the Pentagon need not have bothered. The American domestic media were fully ‘on message’ with the Bush administration in the war against terrorism, including full support for the war against Iraq (Bennett, 2003). It reproduced virtually uncritically the administration’s agenda, including any misinformation about WMDs and the Al Qaeda–Iraq connection. But was the OSI an example of the ‘at war’ mindset that was prepared to utilize disinformation or deception as a weapon in a conflict that was seen by opponents as a ‘clash of civilizations’ and, as such, as a war of ideas? The US administration is constitutionally forbidden from conducting any form of psychological warfare against the American people. Despite the rise of ‘spin’ that could be argued to be a way of getting around this – i.e. the argument that it is ‘public relations’, not propaganda – and the semantic arguments that this goes with, the globalized world has negated traditional boundaries between the national and the international. In other words, in a global info-sphere, information, misinformation and disinformation recognize no national boundaries, especially as the principal purveyors of it – the global media – are now controlled by a relatively small number of transnational multimedia corporations. These organizations, like Rupert Murdoch’s News International, recognize that local needs attract local audiences – compare Fox News TV coverage in the US to that of Sky News in Britain during the Iraqi war – but they nonetheless utilize much of the same material for their global outlets. Hence, any disinformation is likely to reach a local or national global audience regardless of whether one foreign or international audience was or was not the initial target. The American media understood this when they raised such an outcry over the OSI.

One can only assume that the Pentagon understood this as well, which was why they created the OSI – and why they disbanded it. They had been found out in an aggressive strand to the global war on terror, although Mr Rumsfeld retained the option of keeping deception in his arsenal. He subsequently admitted that he would still practice it, and there is a hint that the work continued through what
was known as the Office of Special Plans (Cass, 2003). The target audience would appear to have been global – including ‘enemy’ and friendly audiences – although the latter are declining in number with every day that passes in the war on terror (Shanker and Schmitt, 2002). It is not only that which excites suspicion, but also because the war on terror is essentially a global struggle for hearts and minds, and the media are the principal channels for winning the argument, any deception activities are bound to be branded as disinformation. In order to avoid such charges, the US government addresses global audiences directly through their public diplomacy channels – the Voice of America and other new initiatives such as Radio Sawa and Al Hurrah TV.

**War First, Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power**

Mr Rumsfeld is also on record as stating that he does not know what ‘soft power’ means. Any American diplomat would tell him that Joseph Nye’s phrase is the means by which a nation projects itself in an attractive manner, where its values and principles are desired by others because they are perceived to be universal (Nye and Owens, 1996). It is a lubricant for the smooth-running of day-to-day diplomacy. However, when a nation goes to war, this public diplomacy tends to be pushed into the background, and if one compares the budget for public diplomacy initiatives like Radio Sawa or Al Hurrah to the Pentagon’s defense budget, it is minute. Yet all experts are agreed that if the war on terror is to be won, due attention needs to be paid to the global struggle for hearts and minds. After all, the president has declared that ‘we are in this for the long haul’ and if the war on terror is to be won it is not just a question of ‘smoking out’ terrorists wherever they hide but also of re-establishing the image of the US as a ‘force for good’ in the world, especially among younger audiences in the Arab and Muslim world. The tragedy of Iraq is that, if there was no connection between Saddam and 9/11 before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the war actually created one in the insurgencies and resistance that followed it.

The Office of Special Plans was a highly secretive body and very little is known about its activities before it was closed down at the end of 2003, its job presumably done. Yet, as the Iraqi insurgency continues, there has been an invigorated debate about public diplomacy that raises some hope for the advocates of ‘soft power’ as being the tool – as distinct from a weapon – that will ultimately prevail in the conflict – as distinct from war – against terrorism and the causes of terrorism. A ‘war’ against terror is in fact a war without end. In the second Bush Jr administration, senior officials started to refer to it as ‘The Long War’, recognizing that it was a conflict that would take at least a generation to ‘win’. Yet the Bush Doctrine is in fact the heart of the problem. It establishes US foreign policy as being a national security strategy that reserves the right to wage pre-emptive war and relegates diplomacy, public diplomacy and soft power to secondary positions. In any war, the diplomats are forced to take a back seat to the warriors and, in the war on terror, the State Department – including its public diplomacy initiatives – is forced
to take a back seat to the Department of Defense, including the Pentagon’s approach to what is now termed ‘Strategic Communications’ (Taylor, 2002). Most scholars of propaganda are agreed, however, that in a struggle for hearts and minds, telling as much of the truth as can be told, warts and all, is the best way forward, that public diplomacy is in the long term more beneficial than any short-term approach to war propaganda.

**Nothing Should be Taken for Granted: Freedom of Speech or Strategic Communications?**

Democratic propaganda has always relied upon credibility and creditable truths for its effectiveness. That is what ‘won’ the Cold War – that other monumental struggle for hearts and minds that took almost 50 years – two generations – for western ideals and values to prevail. But whatever the enemy’s intentions and goals are this time, the Cold War mindset that seems to be driving much of the counter-terrorism offensive confuses the issue, not least because the destruction of western values seems to be driving the motivation of the Islamic fanatics. The attack on the World Trade Center was a symbolic attack on modernity and globalization, not an attack on the US per se. The attack on the Pentagon was a strike against American megapower in the aftermath of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both created the Bush Doctrine. Neither resolved the heart of the problem – which is at core the tactical issue of Palestine and the strategic issue of westernization.

Regardless of the wisdom of the policy response, democratic propaganda will continue to lack credibility while the policy remains incredible. A Bush Doctrine that belies centuries of norms in the international state system, and about which lawyers continue to debate, cannot be sold by skillful public relations. Perhaps Charlotte Beers came to recognize this when she resigned as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy in March 2003 (CNN, 2003). When she was first appointed, Secretary of State Colin Powell joked that her television commercials had sold him Uncle Ben’s Rice. However, you cannot sell Uncle Sam’s policy to people who have no money or even the water to boil any rice handed out on humanitarian grounds (Brown, 2003).

The military–industrial–media complex is likely to remain a formidable force in American politics and foreign policy. It is unlikely to weaken because power once obtained does not voluntarily give up its domination. What should concern us is when commercial and government interests that tend toward secrecy and perception management over traditional democratic ideals of freedom of speech and free press end up on the same team. We need to recall the words of President Eisenhower: ‘We should take nothing for granted.’

Three journalism events illustrate the point. The first concerns the firing of a married couple employed as cargo staff for a US military contractor. The couple violated the Pentagon prohibition of photographing returning war dead by snapping a few photos as both were assisting in loading dead American soldiers at Kuwait International Airport for transport home. The employer, Maytag Aircraft Corp., fired them immediately after the photos were published on the front-page of the *Seattle
The photo depicted 20 US-flag draped coffins being secured for transport to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. This followed a Freedom of Information Act request from an internet entrepreneurial man of 34, who received over 300 images from the Pentagon that he later posted on his website, Memoryhole.com. The Pentagon announced that it would no longer release any additional war dead pictures to protect the privacy of the families concerned, to which the White House concurred.

A second event concerned the censoring of a popular comic strip, *Doonesbury*, after Gary Trudeau dared to show one of his original characters in the comic strip, B.D., missing a leg as a result of being sent to Iraq by his creator. One Colorado paper wrote:

> The Journal Advocate has chosen not to publish this week’s Doonesbury in the paper because of the graphic, violent battlefield depictions of Iraq in this week’s instalment. The Doonesbury comic strip for this week is available to our subscribers at the front counter, or by fax, mail or e-mail, if requested. Call 522-1990. We will resume printing Doonesbury in the paper when the content is deemed suitable for publication in the Journal-Advocate.

Finally, there is the case of US Marine Corps reservist in Iraq, Lance Corporal Ted Boudreaux, whose photo of himself and two Iraqi children smiling widely shows one child holding up a sign that reads: ‘Lcpl Boudreaux killed my Dad th(en) knocked up my sister!’ In early April 2004, the photo that had been circling all over the internet reached the inbox of Ibrahim Hooper, communications director for the American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in Washington, DC. Assuming the photo was real, Nihad Awad, CAIR’s executive director, issued an immediate press release that said: ‘If the United States Army is seeking to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, this is the wrong way to accomplish that goal.’ The CAIR release was picked up and reprinted in a number of global online newspapers, including Paknews.com, with no questioning of whether or not the photo may have been altered. A *Salon* magazine article said that in an age of Photoshop, we must always question the authenticity of any picture circulating the internet. Farhad Manjoo (2004) writes:

> There was a time when photographs were synonymous with truth – when you could be sure that what you saw in a picture actually occurred. In today’s Photoshop world, all that has changed. Pictures are endlessly pliable. Photographs (and even videos) are now merely as good as words – approximations of reality at best, subtle (or outright) distortions of truth at worst. Is that Jane Fonda next to John Kerry at an antiwar rally? No, it isn’t; if you thought so, you’re a fool for trusting your own eyes. Some photographers welcome the new scepticism toward images; it’s good that people are learning not to automatically believe what they see, they say. But many fear that we’re losing an important foothold on reality. Without trustworthy photographs, how will we ever know what in our world is real?

The US military conducted its own internal investigation and Ted Boudreaux, who returned from Iraq in September 2003, denies the authenticity of the photo. Other versions of the photo have now popped up all over the internet with cardboard signs that read ‘We wanna see Jessica Simpson!’ or inject a more positive message that says the soldier ‘saved’ the dad and ‘rescued’ the sister. No one really knows what the truth is, but in an age when we allow our own narrative pictures
in our heads to determine the facts for us, the truth is almost irrelevant to the damage that has already been done. CAIR, for its own part, has no more reason to deny the authenticity of such a photo than anyone else, but the negative version certainly fits the prediction CAIR made before war with Iraq that such an invasion would hurt the Muslim image in the world. This is something that the US and Muslim world have in common, for certainly the US invasion of Iraq hurt the American image in the world.

In the July/August 2003 issue of the *Columbia Journalism Review*, managing editor Brent Cunningham questioned whether the American tradition of objectivity in news (promoting fairness and balance) has turned US journalists into passive recipients of news, particularly from official sources like government and corporation elites. One case cited is the October 2001 memo from then CNN chair, Walter Isaacson, while the war in Afghanistan was under way. Isaacson sent a memo to all CNN foreign correspondents telling them to seek ‘balance’ in all their reports of Afghan casualties by reminding their audience that such hardship or death came in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11. Cunningham reports in his article that an intern called newspaper editors during the war in Iraq to see whether letters to the editor were running for or against the war and was told by the editor of *The Tennessean* that although letters were 70 percent against the war, the editor chose to run more pro-war letters so they wouldn’t be accused of being biased by some of their readers.

Objectivity, or its pursuit, persists in the US, because it separates American journalism from the chaotic partisan journalism of some European allies. Cunningham warns, however, that pursuing objectivity

> ... can trip us up on the way to ‘truth’. Objectivity excuses lazy reporting. If you’re on deadline and all you have is ‘both sides of the story’, that’s often good enough. It’s not that such stories laying out the parameters of the debate have no value for readers, but too often, in our obsession with, as The Washington Post’s Bob Woodward puts it, ‘the latest’, we fail to push the story, incrementally, toward a deeper understanding of what is true and what is false. (Cunningham, 2003)

More troubling, Cunningham notes that objectivity ‘exacerbates our tendency to rely on official sources’. Striking a balance, fundamental to a principle of objectivity, often means getting the ‘he said’ and the ‘she said’ side of the equation. This often leads to phenomenal media dependence on or collusion with the official story. The Tyndall Report by media analyst Andrew Tyndall analyzed 414 stories on Iraq from the Major Three (ABC, CBS and NBC) between September 2002 and February 2003 and found that all but 34 stories originated from three government agencies: the White House, Pentagon and State Department. Why such dependence? Mostly it is a question of time. The non-stop news cycle in major media and the new media threat from the internet and Shout TV on cable has left reporters with less time to dig deeper into stories. This encourages more reliance on official sources of information that can deliver ‘the goods’ quickly and efficiently.

When the US and the world were debating a war with Iraq in the fall of 2002, not one official in the Bush administration had much interest in discussing the aftermath of a war. More important was to mount a full-court press for a pre-emptive
war against an evil cancer. The details of the aftermath would be worked out later, but the public and press attention was to push ABS (Anything But Saddam). The consequence of the ‘he said’ debate was that no ‘she said’ counterbalance debate on the aftermath of war took place, with few exceptions. According to the Tyndall Report, of 574 stories about Iraq on the ABC, CBS and NBC evening news aired between Bush’s address to the United Nations on 12 September 2002 and 7 March 2003, just 12 stories dealt with the aftermath of the war with Iraq. As Cunningham (2003) asks, ‘If something important is being ignored, doesn’t the press have an obligation to force our elected officials to address it?’ Not if that press is of the same mindset and ideology of those with whom it confers for information, and not if the ignored story is going to upend an otherwise good relationship between reporter and source. The New York Times carried a headline on 25 November 2002 that read, ‘CBS Staying Silent in Debate About Women Joining Augusta’, a reference to the network’s coverage of the Masters Golf Championship at Augusta National Country Club, which has a policy of excluding women from playing golf there. There was, as Cunningham noted, never a headline that read ‘Bush Still Mum on Aftermath’. Was the aftermath of war in a foreign country any less important or newsworthy than a domestic disturbance on the golf links in Georgia?

Conclusion

Media omission, like media collusion, is illustrative of a sameness in the American newsroom where there lacks diversity not only in ethnic, racial and gender categories, but perhaps more important, a lack of diversity in upbringing and outlook. You won’t get the working-class Irish coming through the door for an interview as often as the Ivy League-educated pup journalist with upper-class sensibilities. This creates a bias born of class and socioeconomic heritage. Couple this with a media bias toward conflict, the herd mentality and event-driven coverage, and you’ve got the makings of a reinforced passivity in public media consumption. The liberal bias charge is overstated according to Columbia University scholar James Carey, who says that ‘there is a bit of a reformer in anyone who enters journalism. And reformers are always going to make conservatives uncomfortable to an extent because conservatives, by and large, want to preserve the status quo’ (Carey, 1988).

So we must ask ourselves as we often do, ‘What is there to be done?’ A few modest proposals for liberating alternatives in media follow. First, we would reinforce the first proposal from Cunningham (2003) for rethinking objectivity in American journalism: ‘Journalists (and journalism) must acknowledge, humbly and publicly, that what we do is far more subjective and far less detached than the aura of objectivity implies – and the public wants to believe.’ Second, we must recognize and confront the myths we live by. One myth is of a supposed adversarial relationship between government and the media. This is a myth that is convenient for both communities and is sustained for mutual benefit. Another common myth is that overt censorship in news organizations does not exist. It does, and has historical precedent, the result of benefits that reporters receive in their career advancement, but also benefits that the government receives in return for media complicity.
in government efforts to mislead the public through domestic propaganda (e.g. Saddam’s WMDs). We must acknowledge the enormous reliance in corporate media on spin and official versions of the truth. The US government relies on a form of censorship known as ‘censorship at source’, those unnamed official sources of the news that we often see referenced in our newspaper front-pages. This keeps both journalists and the public in the dark. Finally, the trend is toward further consolidation of the media and a less open and democratic government or media. The 24-hour news cycle requires constant feeding, which advertising and publicity prepackaged sources of news are only happy to nourish. In the federal government, the largest public relations division is inside the Pentagon, where government public relations specialists provide Monday through Friday feeds to the national media.

Embedded reporters didn’t just accompany the military to the Middle East, but they also sat regularly for briefings from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Defense Spokesperson Torie Clarke and White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer. In the global media environment today, the best journalist is increasingly the dutiful journalist, who understands that symbiotic relationship between official channels of information sources and the news story product. Where are the independent journalists like George Seldes, who would have gladly been kicked out of his first Washington press briefing in exchange for the neighborhood goings on back home (Snow, 2004b)?

What this media reality means for the rest of us is that media activism and a sustained media reform movement must become a larger part of our being citizens in the world. Given what we know now about media collusion with the centers of power, we have no choice but to create our own independent media while we confront, cajole and analyze the military–industrial–media complex that dominates our mental landscape.

As for the impact of all this on America’s image abroad, Donald Rumsfeld conceded in March 2006 that the closure of the USIA may have been a mistake:

*It wasn’t perfect, but it had libraries around the world, made movies, had various seminars and opportunities for people to learn more about the United States. I don’t know what the 21st century version of that is, but we need it badly and we haven’t got it.*

What an admission, almost five years after 9/11 – a period of time longer than US involvement in the Second World War. Several wartime propaganda initiatives – such as *Hi* magazine for Arab youth or the Office of Global Communications – have come and gone the same way as the Office of Strategic Influence and the Office of Special Plans. Washington struggles to reinvigorate public diplomacy initiatives within the broader recognition that a coordinated strategic communications campaign is long overdue – not least to counter the negative impact caused by false stories in the US media about, for example, the Koran being flushed down a toilet in Guantanamo Bay. People died in a riot in Afghanistan over that mistake. But merely reinventing Cold War-era public diplomacy initiatives will not do the job. The internet was not around during the Cold War and the false Koran toilet flushing story is now a ‘fact’ on that information front. Nor will any official soft power messages about the attractiveness of the American way of life and of doing things.
strike up a desire or a need to emulate American democracy while US foreign policy remains dominated by the Bush Doctrine, or while US soldiers abuse their hard power, or even while the US media remain so compliant.

One suspects a Cold War philosophy behind waging a global hearts and minds campaign remains a key problem, namely that you can ‘Talk the Walk’ rather than ‘Walk the Talk’. That in fact has more in common with the authoritarian approach to propaganda, encapsulated in Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels’ phrase, ‘The Big Lie’. That philosophy says that if you repeat something often enough, whether it is true or not, people will eventually believe it. But, in today’s global communications environment, there are simply too many voices, and too many outlets for those voices, for this to work anymore, or at least not for long. Today, truisms compete with ‘alternative truths’ and, to prevail, your truth has to be more credible than their truth. That credibility ultimately depends on whether you do in fact Walk the Talk. But if you don’t do it at home, how can your message abroad command any credibility? Ultimately, therefore, the real challenge in the global struggle for hearts and minds is that in the process of selling democracy, you do not sell it out.

Notes

1. The US, Britain, Australia and Poland.
2. ‘An attack upon one is an attack upon all’.
3. The reference to Uncle Ben’s Rice is to a product marketed successfully in the US by Charlotte Beers when she headed Madison Avenue advertising firms J. Walter Thompson and Ogilvy & Mather.
4. Remarks by Secretary Rumsfeld at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 27 March 2006.

References


Nancy Snow is associate professor in the College of Communications at California State University, Fullerton, and adjunct professor in the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Southern California. She also serves as senior research fellow in the USC Center on Public Diplomacy. She is the author of The Arrogance of American Power (Rowman and Littlefield, 2006); Propaganda, Inc.: Selling America’s Culture to the World (Seven Stories Press, 2002); Information War: American Propaganda, Free Speech and Opinion Control Since 9/11 (Seven Stories Press, 2004). She is editor with Yahya Kamalipour of War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective (Rowman and Littlefield, 2004).

Address College of Communications, California State University, PO Box 6846, Fullerton, CA, 92834-6846, USA. [email: nsnow@fullerton.edu]

Philip M. Taylor is Professor of International Communications at the University of Leeds. He is the author of numerous works, including Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day (3rd edn, Manchester University Press, 2003), British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy (Edinburgh University Press, 1999) and Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945 (Routledge, 1997). Together with Nancy Snow, he is editing The Handbook of Public Diplomacy due for publication by Routledge in 2008.

Address Institute of Communications Studies, Houldsworth Building, University of Leeds LS2 9JT, UK. [email: p.m.taylor@leeds.ac.uk]