

## CAN PEACE JOURNALISM MAKE PROGRESS?

The Coverage of the 2006 Lebanon War in Canadian and Israeli Media

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**Abstract** / Johan Galtung's criticisms in the 1970s of media representations that glamorize war evolved as the peace journalism alternative approach. Since then, peace journalism has developed into a philosophical framework and an arsenal of framing techniques, but has been criticized for conceptual and practical weaknesses, and the need to strengthen its methodology, conceptual framework and empirical validation. This study of the 2006 Lebanon War press coverage in Canada and Israel aims at contributing to the empirical dimension. Stories published on and during the war by the Canadian *Toronto Sun* and the Israeli *Yediot Aharonot* were content analysed according to criteria adapted from the literature. General findings demonstrate an expected tendency towards 'war journalism'. Comparative findings for each newspaper, however, show that peace journalism is not entirely disregarded. While the study indicates both the salience and the resilience of war journalism, it also concludes that there are opportunities for the advancement of peace journalism and professional practices that could be adopted to achieve this.

**Keywords** / Canadian media / Israeli media / Lebanon War / peace journalism

The concept of peace journalism emerged in the 1970s, pioneered by Norwegian scholar Johan Galtung, in order to criticize the preference given by mainstream journalism around the world to war, violence and propaganda, to causes promoted by elites and establishments and to facile and polarized victory/defeat reality constructions. Advocating a change of attitudes and behaviours in the coverage and framing of war and peace, Galtung's concept developed within some three decades into a philosophical framework and an arsenal of professional techniques (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005). During this period, much of the writings on peace journalism consisted mostly of ideological claims, professional criticism and anecdotal discourse rather than factual knowledge.

The present study of Canadian and Israeli media coverage of the 2006 Lebanon War is part of an ongoing effort to add a scholarly, empirical dimension to the development of peace journalism. The study joins a trend of systematic field research that has emerged in recent years, including the work of Ting Lee and Maslog (2005) and of the peace journalism international research group that has been active under

the auspices of the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research (*Conflict and Communication Online*, 2005, 2006, 2007).

Moreover, the study aims at making a conceptual contribution to adapt Galtung's model to 21st-century scholarly and professional terms. His dichotomous formula (Galtung, 1998) considers traditional war coverage and framing from the perspective of a sports journalism model focused on winning in a zero-sum game, whereas peace journalism is envisioned through the metaphor of health reporting. Unlike the sports-inspired formula, the health reporting metaphor goes beyond the battle against the disease, so as to inform causes, cures and preventive measures. This is shown more clearly in Galtung's famous table (see Table 1).

In addition to their recognized merits, Galtung's concepts have become a topic of academic and professional controversy. Criticisms have been made of the destructive influence of peace journalism on cherished traditions of western journalism, such as objectivity; of Galtung's problematic dichotomy between truth and propaganda; of the premise that every conflict must have a solution; of contradictions between peace journalism and established theories of mass communication; and of the need for a significant empirical basis to support the validity of the model (Hanitzsch, 2004a, 2004b, 2007; Loyn, 2007; Lynch, 2007; McGoldrick, 2006; Peleg, 2007; Shinar, 2003, 2007).

Scholars such as Becker (1982), Hackett and Gruneau (2000), Höjjer et al. (2002), Bläsi (2004) and others have shown that peace journalism has been growing conceptually and professionally. Galtung's dichotomy has developed into a more complex structure of competing types of framing in the coverage of conflict, and into strategies to improve media representations and critical awareness (Kempf, 2003; Knightley, 2000; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005). This has led to reframing the understanding of conflict from terms of a tug-of-war between two parties in which one side's gain is the other's loss, to the terms of relationships between various sides; to consider the context and the need to identify a range of stakeholders beyond the sides directly engaged in a violent confrontation; to understand the distinction between stated demands and underlying objectives; to identify voices working for creative and non-violent solutions and ways to transform and transcend the lines of conflict.

Also, peace journalism has raised the awareness of conflict beyond the direct physical violence typical of war journalism coverage, and of underlying structural and cultural violence. The relevance of peace journalism lies in its contribution to the effective presentation of issues of global significance to media professionals and to the public: through its democratic orientation, peace journalism is expected to enhance public awareness and encourage a change in attitudes and behaviours related to the understanding of global, regional and local governance in all corners of the world.

Experience leads us to think that the adoption of peace journalism can help delineate the potential global impact of conflicts; call public attention and opinion to such threats; indicate and hopefully satisfy demands for more balanced coverage; and stimulate alternative interpretations and critical reflection.

TABLE 1

**Galtung's Concepts of Peace Journalism and War Journalism**

Peace/conflict journalism	War/violence journalism
<i>I. Peace/conflict-oriented</i>	<i>I. War/violence-oriented</i>
Explore conflict formation, x parties, y goals, and z issues. General win–win orientation	Focus on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war general zero-sum orientation
Open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture	Closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone?
Making conflicts transparent	Making wars opaque/secret
Giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding	'Us–them' journalism, propaganda, voice, for 'us'
See conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity	See 'them' as the problem, focus on who prevails in war
Humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapons	Dehumanization of 'them'; more so the worse the weapon
Proactive: prevention before any violence/war occurs	Reactive: waiting for violence before reporting
Focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture)	Focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, wounded and material damage)
<i>II. Truth-oriented</i>	<i>II. Propaganda-oriented</i>
Expose untruths on all sides/uncover all cover-ups	Expose 'their' untruths/help 'our' cover-ups/lies
<i>III. People-oriented</i>	<i>III. Elite-oriented</i>
Focus on suffering all over; on women, aged, children, giving voice to the voiceless	Focus on 'our' suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece
Give name to all evil-doers	Give name of their evil-doer
Focus on people peacemakers	Focus on elite peacemakers
<i>IV. Solution-oriented</i>	<i>IV. Victory-oriented</i>
Peace = non-violence + creativity	Peace = victory + ceasefire
Highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war	Conceal peace initiative, before victory is at hand
Focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society	Focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society
Aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation	Leaving for another war, return if the old conflict flares up

Source: Extracted from a series of lectures given by Johan Galtung at Taplow Court, UK, 1998.

## The War<sup>1</sup>

The 2006 Lebanon War, known in Lebanon as the July War and in Israel as the Second Lebanon War, was a military conflict in Lebanon and northern Israel, fought between Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). The conflict started on 12 July 2006, and continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire came into effect on 14 August 2006, though it formally ended on 8 September 2006 when Israel lifted the naval blockade of Lebanon.

Hostilities began after Hezbollah fired rockets and mortars at Israeli border villages, diverting attention from a Hezbollah unit that crossed the border, kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and killed three others. Israeli efforts to rescue the abducted soldiers were unsuccessful, ending in the loss of five more troops.

Israel responded with massive airstrikes and artillery fire on targets in Lebanon; an air and naval blockade; and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon. Hezbollah then launched more rockets into northern Israel and engaged the IDF in guerrilla warfare. The conflict killed over a thousand people, severely damaged the Lebanese civilian infrastructure, displaced 974,184 Lebanese and 300,000–500,000 Israelis and disrupted normal life in Lebanon and Israel. In an effort to end the hostilities, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1701 on 11 August 2006. The resolution was approved by both the Lebanese and Israeli governments. It called for the disarmament of Hezbollah, for the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon and for the deployment of Lebanese soldiers and an enlarged United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the southern part of the country. The Lebanese army began deploying in southern Lebanon on 17 August 2006. The blockade was lifted, as mentioned, on 8 September 2006.

Prior to the conflict, Lebanon had long failed to control militancy within its borders, and Israel had a history of using force in Lebanon in response to militant attacks. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had engaged in cross-border attacks from southern Lebanon into Israel as far back as 1968, and the area became a significant base following the arrival of the PLO leadership and its Fatah brigade after their 1971 expulsion from Jordan. This situation exacerbated demographic tensions over the Lebanese National Pact, which divided governmental powers among religious groups, leading in part to the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90). Concurrently, Syria began a 29-year military occupation. Israel's 1978 incursions into southern Lebanon failed to stem the Palestinian attacks, and in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Israel's IDF forcibly expelled the PLO leadership.

Israel withdrew to a borderland buffer zone in southern Lebanon, held with the aid of proxy militants in the South Lebanon Army (SLA). In 1985, a Lebanese Shi'a militia calling itself Hezbollah declared an armed struggle to end the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory. When the Lebanese Civil War ended and other warring factions agreed to disarm, Hezbollah and the SLA refused. Combat with Hezbollah led to a collapse of the SLA and an Israeli withdrawal in 2000 to their side of the UN designated border. Hezbollah continued its attacks, and successfully used the tactic of abducting soldiers from Israel as leverage for a prisoner exchange in 2004, while continuing to call for Israel's destruction.

## Casualties

### *Hezbollah*

Hezbollah casualty figures are difficult to ascertain. Hezbollah's leadership claims that 250 of their members were killed in the 2006 conflict, while Israel estimated that its forces had killed 600, and claimed to have the names of 532 of them. A UN official and Lebanese government officials estimated that 500 Hezbollah members had been killed. A Stratfor report cited 'sources in Lebanon' as estimating the Hezbollah death toll at 'more than 700 . . . with many more to go', while British military historian John Keegan estimated the figure could be as many as 1000.

### *Lebanese Civilians*

The Lebanese civilian death toll is difficult to pinpoint as most published figures, including those released by the Lebanese government, do not distinguish between civilians and militants. In addition, Hezbollah members can be difficult to identify as many do not wear military uniforms.

The Lebanese police authority and the Lebanon Ministry of Health, citing hospitals, death certificates, local authorities and eye witnesses, put the death toll at between 1123 and 1137 soldiers and police officers, and 894 identified and 192 unidentified civilian victims.

The Lebanon Higher Relief Council (HRC) put the Lebanese death toll at 1191, citing the Ministry of Health and police, as well as other state agencies. Based on its own investigation, Human Rights Watch estimated the tally of the dead at 1119, including civilians, military personnel and militants, while the Associated Press estimated a figure of 1035. In February 2007, the *Los Angeles Times* reported that at least 800 Lebanese had died, and other articles have estimated the figure to be at least 850. *Encarta* states that 'estimates . . . varied from about 850 to 1200' in its entry on Israel, while giving a figure of 'more than 1200' in its entry on Lebanon. The Lebanon Higher Relief Council estimated the number of Lebanese injured to be 4409.

### *Israel Defence Forces*

Figures for the IDF troops killed range from 116 to 120. The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives two different figures – 117 and 119 – the latter figure including two IDF fatalities that occurred after the ceasefire came into effect.<sup>2</sup>

### *Israeli Civilians*

Hezbollah rockets killed 43 Israeli civilians during the conflict. In addition, 4262 civilians were injured – 33 seriously, 68 moderately, 1388 lightly and 2773 were treated for *shock* and *anxiety*. According to Human Rights Watch, 'These bombs may have killed "only" 43 civilians, but that says more about the availability of warning systems and bomb shelters throughout most of northern Israel and the evacuation of more than 350,000 people than it does about Hezbollah's intentions.'

## ***International Action and Reaction***

The conflict engendered worldwide concerns over infrastructure damage and the risks of escalation of the crisis, as well as mixed support and criticism for both Hezbollah and Israel. The governments of the US, UK, Germany, Australia and Canada asserted Israel's right to self-defence. US President George W. Bush declared the conflict to be a part of the War on Terror. Among neighbouring Middle Eastern nations, Iran, Syria and Yemen voiced strong support for Hezbollah, while the Arab League, Egypt and Jordan issued statements condemning Israel's response and criticizing Hezbollah's action. Saudi Arabia found Hezbollah entirely responsible. Many worldwide protests and demonstrations appealed for an immediate ceasefire and expressed concern at the heavy loss of civilian life on both sides. Other demonstrations were held exclusively in support of Lebanon or Israel. Numerous newspaper advertising campaigns, SMS and email appeals and online petitions were also initiated. Various foreign governments assisted the evacuation of their citizens from Lebanon. On 20 July 2006, the US Congress voted overwhelmingly in support of Israel's right to defend itself.

## **The Questions Explored**

The first question the study seeks to answer is, to what extent does the coverage of the 2006 Lebanon War by Canadian and Israeli media display war journalism and peace journalism framing?

Research on the first Gulf War reveals that the media in countries that share similar political and economic ideologies covered that war in similar, though not necessarily identical terms (Kaid et al., 1993). Notwithstanding differences in size, structure and climate, do the ideological, political and economic similarities between Canada and Israel produce the same or similar framing and patterns of conflict coverage?

Geographical distance might influence coverage, in that 'the more a society is involved in the conflict itself and the closer it is to the conflict region (in historical, political, economic or ideological terms), distortions of the conflict perception will be stronger' (Kempf et al., 2000). The question here is whether the direct involvement of the Israeli media in the conflict makes them much more inclined towards war journalism. By contrast, Canada is geographically far from the conflict area. Even though Canada's international peacemaker/peacekeeper image and policies do not detach it entirely from the conflict, and Canadian Jewish and Arab communities show interest and concern over Middle Eastern affairs, at least in theory Canadian media could be expected to show a stronger tendency towards peace journalism.

## **Coding Protocol and Method**

A content analysis of stories published on and during the 2006 Lebanon War by Canadian and Israeli printed and online popular media served to analyse the coverage. Our sources were two newspapers – both typical tabloids and both available in traditional print form – *Yediot Aharonot* (printed edition) in Israel and the *Toronto Sun* (online edition) in Canada.

The former (YA) enjoys the highest circulation among all Israeli newspapers: according to reliable sources, about 40 percent of the Israeli Jewish population on weekdays (estimated at some 380,000 copies) and more than 50 percent on the weekend (estimated at some 680,000 copies) (Koren-Dinar, 2007). The *Toronto Sun* (TS) also has a considerable circulation, estimated at some 200,000 copies on weekdays and some 400,000 on Sundays.<sup>3</sup>

Coding of all items about the war was conducted for the newspaper issues published between 13 July (the day following the kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers that provoked the eruption of war hostilities) and 17 August 2006 (a few days after the ceasefire). A total of 277 items were coded and analysed, 158 from YA, all of them front-page items, including their continuation in the inner pages; and 119 items from the TS (all items about the war in all parts of the paper, to make up for the fewer references to the war on the front page). Three communication students performed the coding, with a 92 percent intercoder reliability rate.

Galtung's criteria to define both war journalism and peace journalism (Galtung, 1986, 1998) remain the inspiration for analysing conflict coverage to the present day. Ting Lee and Maslog (2005) developed Galtung's typology into 13 indicators of war journalism and 13 indicators of peace journalism. The present study borrowed 10 of these coding criteria:

- *For war journalism:* (1) marked visibility of war effects; (2) emphasis on elite and official sources; (3) conflict outcomes focused on war options; (4) emphasis on 'here and now' events; (5) frequent good/bad tagging; (6) framing preferences for one or two parties; (7) partisanship; (8) zero-sum victory/defeat orientation (sports-coverage approach); (9) victimizing language; (10) military vocabulary.
- *And for peace journalism:* (1) less marked visibility of war effects; (2) emphasis on 'people sources'; (3) conflict outcomes focused on negotiation and agreement; (4) emphasis on longer term processes and wider aspects; (5) absence of good/bad tagging; (6) multi-party framing preference; (7) no partisanship; (8) win-win orientation (health-coverage approach); (9) absence of victimizing language; (10) absence of military vocabulary.

These criteria have served to typify each item analysed according to its war or peace journalism predominant frame, and to code, tabulate, test for chi-square significance levels and index the data: indices were produced to classify a story as oriented towards war journalism or peace journalism, and composite means were calculated for each of these orientations, from grades given to each of these criteria, ranging from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest).

## General Findings: War Journalism is the Prevailing Mood

In order to systematize the analysis and report the comparison of the Israeli and Canadian coverage of the war, Ting Lee's and Maslog's criteria, adapted from Galtung, were organized into four groups: results of the war, professional orientation (visual dimensions of the war), social orientation and political orientation in the coverage.

The raw frequencies computed for all 277 items analysed in the *YA/TS* joint sample display a marked tendency towards war journalism, as summarized in Table 2.

In the professional area, expressed by the volume of visual description and illustration, more than three-quarters of all items show the visible effects of the war, while only 5.1 percent do not display such effects.

The social orientation of the coverage reveals that more than 50 percent of the items rely on elite/official sources, against fewer than one-third that rely on 'people sources'; the use of victimizing and non-victimizing language is almost identical; on the other hand, only about a third of the items display military vocabulary, while 60 percent do not.

The political orientation of the coverage shows that about one-half of items reveal a partisan orientation; about two-thirds display a clear good/bad tagging and three-quarters display a one- or two-sided orientation; about one-fifth of the items do not show a good/bad tagging and only some 5 percent show a multi-party orientation.

In addition, more than two-thirds of the items relate to the 'here and now', while only some 6 percent relate to wider contexts. Insofar as the expected results of the war are concerned, a zero-sum orientation (win/lose) was to be expected, but surprisingly this is not so clear-cut in the coverage: more than one-third of the items display this orientation, but 44 percent do not. On the other hand, the raw frequencies show that options oriented towards war are present in more than half of the items and absent in only 8.3 percent of them.

**TABLE 2**

**War Journalism and Peace Journalism Indicators in the Total *YA/TS* Sample (raw frequencies, percentages)<sup>a</sup>**

War journalism (%)		Peace journalism (%)	
<i>Expected results</i>			
1. Zero-sum orientation	37.5	Win-win orientation	44.0
2. War-oriented	50.9	Agreement-oriented	8.3
<i>Professional orientation: visual presentation</i>			
3. Visible effects of war	67.9	Less visible effects of war	5.1
<i>Social orientation</i>			
4. Elite/official sources	50.2	People-oriented sources	31.4
5. Uses victimizing language	50.1	Less victimizing language	48.4
6. Uses military discourse	36.1	Less military discourse	58.8
<i>Political orientation</i>			
7. Partisan	52.0	Non-partisan	32.1
8. Good/bad tagging	64.3	No good and bad tagging	22.7
9. One/two-party orientation	76.7	Multi-party orientation	5.4
10. Focus 'here and now'	68.2	Wider aspects of conflict	6.1

<sup>a</sup> The percentages do not add up to 100 percent because they do not include categories such as 'other', 'unclear', 'missing data', counted in the original tables.

*N* = 277.



Also this general tendency towards war journalism is confirmed by the composite mean indices computed from the aggregation of the 1–10 grading assigned to each item: *TS* earned a 7.78 mean index while *YA* reached a 6.75 index. The mean indices for peace journalism were 1.46 for *YA*, and 1.82 for the *TS*. Together with the raw frequencies, these mean indices indicate a tendency towards war journalism, which leads us to look at the comparative results for the Canadian and Israeli newspapers.

## Comparative Findings

The 158 items analysed from *YA*, compared with the 119 items analysed from the *TS*, display a stronger variation than the raw frequencies and the composite indices. War journalism framing is considerable in both newspapers, but the differences in the emphases and in the use of peace journalism framing allow us to answer the questions posed earlier in more decisive and specific terms. Like the raw frequencies, the comparative findings are presented in four groups: results of the war, professional orientation (visual dimensions of the war), social orientation and political orientation in the coverage.

### *Expected Results of the War*

This group of indicators refers to the variables that reflect the results of the war expected by the newspapers (see Table 3). The more the coverage displays a sports-like zero-sum game perception, and the more war is the dominant frame of reference the more a newspaper displays a tendency towards war journalism; the more the coverage displays a health-coverage-like win–win perception, and the more negotiations and agreement are the dominant frame of reference, the more a newspaper displays a tendency towards peace journalism. Examples of such texts include:

**TABLE 3**

**War Journalism (WJ) and Peace Journalism (PJ) Indicators: Expected Results of the War (percentages,  $\chi^2$  significance tests)**

	<i>YA</i>	<i>TS</i>	Total % of items on topic	$\chi^2$ sign. level
	<i>N</i> = 158	<i>N</i> = 119		
	% of items in each newspaper			
<i>Zero-sum vs win–win orientation</i>				.000
Zero-sum	44.9	27.7	37.5	
Win–win	24.7	69.7	44.0	
<i>Option-orientation</i>				.000
War-oriented (WJ)	36.7	69.7	50.9	
Agreement-oriented (PJ)	5.1	12.6	8.3	

*The incident is shaping up to be a major international embarrassment for Israeli leaders, who have vehemently denied targeting the post. (TS, 27 July 2006: 7)*

*Olmert: We will win but the price will be awful. (YA, 8 August 2006, 1)*

*UN security council envoys yesterday put the finishing touches on a draft resolution from France and the United States calling for a halt to fighting between Israel and Hezbollah guerrillas and setting terms for a settlement to the conflict. (TS, 7 August 2006: 36)*

YA is more adamant in its zero-sum orientation, while the *TS* win-win orientation is more marked. On the other hand, the *TS* expects war-oriented results (about two-thirds of the items) much more than YA (about one-third).

### ***Professional Orientation: Visual Dimensions of the War***

This group of indicators refers to the volume of visual coverage through the use of written or pictorial language and discourse (see Tables 4a and 4b). Previous research indicates that the more marked the volume of visual material the stronger the tendency towards war journalism.

The following extracts illustrate this indicator:

#### ***Visible Effects of the War***

*A military vehicle crosses a damaged bridge south of Beirut that was attacked by Israeli war-planes during the month long conflict in Lebanon. (TS, 16 August 2006: 9)*

*During many years, Israel's civilian sector has not known such an attack: One hundred Katyousha rockets fell in the North, 115 civilians hurt, 2 killed; frightened families started to abandon their homes; . . .*

*A katyousha rocket hit Haifa, bombing of strategic facilities in Haifa Bay will cause a disaster; IDF attacked hundreds of targets in Lebanon and imposed a blockade on the country, 50 Lebanese killed; Target: Hezbollah neighbourhood south of Beirut. (YA, 14 July 2006: 1)*

#### ***Less Visible Effects of the War***

*One girl in two wars – three times a week Bat-Sheva Nail goes from Kyriat Shmona to Naharia for regular dialysis treatment. . . . Before the war she dreamed of a kidney transplant, now she dreams of a quiet week in Eilat. (YA, 9 August 2006: 15)*

*Oil: long term pain, but prices should drop . . . (TS, 29 July 2006: 33)*

YA's visual treatment of the conflict is more clearly war-oriented than *TS*'s. The volume of visible effects of the war is significantly higher and of less visible effects relatively lower in the Israeli newspaper. Also YA include more photos. Albeit less significant than other findings, this might result from the ability of the Israeli paper to deploy more in-house staff than the Canadian daily: 60.2 percent of the items in YA showed photos shot by local photographers, as compared with 7.6 percent in *TS* (Table 4b).

TABLE 4A

**War Journalism (WJ) and Peace Journalism (PJ) Indicators: Professional Orientation (Visual Presentation) (percentages,  $\chi^2$  significance tests)**

	YA <hr/> N = 158	TS <hr/> N = 119	Total % of items on topic
	<hr/> % of items in each newspaper		
<i>Visibility of effects of war</i>			
Yes (WJ)	73.4	60.5	67.9
No (PJ)	6.3	3.4	5.1

$\chi^2$  significance level = .000.

TABLE 4B

**War Journalism (WJ) and Peace Journalism (PJ) Indicators: Visual Presentation (Photos) (percentages,  $\chi^2$  significance tests)**

	YA <hr/> N = 158	TS <hr/> N = 119	Total % of items on topic	$\chi^2$ sign. level
	<hr/> % of items in each newspaper			
<i>Photos added?</i>				.008
Yes (WJ)	64.6	53.8	59.9	
No (PJ)	31.6	46.2	37.9	
<i>Photographer's identity</i>				.000
Local	60.2	7.6	32.6	
News agency	29.6	27.7	28.6	

## Social Orientation

This group of indicators refers to variables that reflect the self-positioning and the social perception of the newspapers. The more the coverage relies on elite and official sources, the more it displays a tendency towards war journalism; and the more the coverage relies on 'people sources', the more it tends towards peace journalism (see Table 5). Also, war journalism uses victimizing language and military discourse more frequently than peace journalism.

Examples include extracts such as the following:

### **Elite/Official Sources**

*World condemns, leaders denounce Israel over killing 56 civilians. (TS, 31 July 2006: 5)*

*Olmert and Peretz follow military attacks on a Northern front position, PM: the entire world is checking right now if we bend down – and this will not happen; Nassrallah hides in an underground bunker, Hezbollah neighbourhood in Beirut destroyed in IAF bombings. (YA, 16 July 2006: 1)*

TABLE 5

**War Journalism (WJ) and Peace Journalism (PJ) Indicators: Social Orientation  
(percentages,  $\chi^2$  significance tests)**

	YA N = 158 % of items in each newspaper	TS N = 119 % of items in each newspaper	Total % of items on topic	$\chi^2$ sign. level
<i>Source orientation</i>				.000
Elite/official sources (WJ)	56.3	42.0	50.2	
People-oriented sources (PJ)	29.1	34.5	31.4	
<i>Language</i>				.000
Victimizing (WJ)	32.9	73.1	50.1	
Non-victimizing (PJ)	64.6	26.9	48.4	
<i>Who are the victims?</i>				.000
Lebanese	1.9	50.4	22.7	
Israeli	29.7	10.1	21.3	
Both	1.3	12.6	6.1	
Not mentioned	64.6	26.9	48.4	
<i>Military discourse</i>				.000
Yes (WJ)	56.3	9.2	36.1	
No (PJ)	35.4	89.9	58.8	

### **People Sources**

*Wife: Israeli attack on UN site not accidental. (TS, 28 July 2006: 4)*

*Katyousha rocket lands inside living room, five kids hurt, Zion Mor cried bitterly trying to understand how in one moment his wife and five kids were hit last night in Zefat. (YA, 14 July 2006: 1, 5)*

### **Victimizing Language**

*Every day becomes worse in Lebanon. (YA, July 20 2006: 16)*

*There are victims on all sides: those in Israel are obliged to live in shelters, as well as the great multitude of Lebanese, who once more, see their country being destroyed. (TS, 6 August 2006: C6)*

*Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez renewed his criticism of Israel's military offensive in Lebanon, calling it a 'new Holocaust'; Israel has gone mad, Chavez said in his weekly broadcast [on] Sunday. They are massacring children, and no one knows how many are buried. (TS, 8 August 2006: 4)*

Although both newspapers show a clear preference for elite/official sources, this tendency is more marked in YA. The lack of people-oriented sources is also more marked in the Israeli newspaper. In both cases, these percentages are higher than the total distribution and there is a significant chi-square dependency level. Also, military discourse is significantly more characteristic of YA, while victimizing language is significantly more typical of the TS.

## Political Orientation

This group of indicators refers to the variables that reflect or suggest the political position of the newspapers. The more partisan the coverage, the more it uses tagging towards one or more sides, the more it emphasizes one or two parties to the conflict and the more it focuses on 'here and now', the more it displays a tendency towards war journalism; the less partisan, less tagging and the more emphasis on a multi-party orientation and a wider range of aspects in the conflict, the more the coverage tends towards peace journalism (see Table 6).

Examples from our sample are as follows:

### Partisanship

*Israel and the world against Hezbollah criminals . . . Hezbollah is the attacker . . . it is about time to uproot the myth that it is impossible to win over Hezbollah's 'guerilla fighters'. The IDF can and is winning.* (YA, 12 August 2006: 1)

### Good/Bad Tagging

*Bombs continued to drop and Israeli ground forces moved deeper into Lebanon as MacKay insisted that the choice between a democratic state and a terrorist organization was simple. He minced no words in characterizing Hezbollah as a 'cancer' and a 'group of cold blooded killers' while vigorously supporting PM Stephen Harper's view that Israeli response was 'measured'.* (TS, 2 August 2006: 20)

*A large group of the 'Egoz' crack unit entered last Thursday into Marun-a-Ras, determined to cleanse it of its Katyousha missiles launching base. But the battle went wrong and five of them were killed. The troops did not give up and refused to be evacuated until they could find their dead buddy.*

*An IDF official source: the event will be investigated but the troops deserve to be decorated.* (YA, 23 July 2006: 5)

### One or Two Parties

*Israel has said it will not pull out around 10,000 troops in the south until a strengthened international force is deployed. Lebanese health minister Mohammad Kalifeh said the war has killed 925 people, mostly civilians, with 75 missing and presumed dead. The toll did not include yesterday's casualties. About one third of the dead were under the age of 13, he said.* (TS, 8 August 2006: 4)

*'The media [do] not always show the right pictures', [Andy] Ram said. 'What I see, they are showing mostly the Lebanese side and the damage Israel makes there. They don't show the 1.5 million people living underground in the north of Israel right now. We prefer to get news from our families, from the people living inside the situation.'* (TS, 9 August 2006: S2)

*We should remember that there are losses in war, said a senior IDF officer yesterday after an officer and an armoured unit soldier were killed in combat with Hezbollah. Some 15 Hezbollah fighters [were] killed.* (YA, 25 July 2006: 4)

### Multi-Party Orientation

*World condemns, leaders denounce Israel over killing of 56 civilians.* (TS, 31 July 2006: 5)

*While Nassrallah was speaking, and two negotiators – Javier Solana of the EU, and Terye Larsen, UN Secretary General envoy – met in Beirut with Lebanon's PM and with the leader of the Shi'ite movement Amal, Nabi'l Berry, Chairman of Beirut's parliament . . .* (YA, 17 July 2006: 8)

TABLE 6

**War Journalism (WJ) and Peace Journalism (PJ) Indicators: Political Orientation (percentages,  $\chi^2$  significance tests)**

	YA	TS	Total	$\chi^2$ sign. level
	<i>N</i> = 158	<i>N</i> = 119	% of items on topic	
	% of items in each newspaper			
<i>Partisan vs non-partisan attitudes</i>				
Partisan (WJ)	23.4	56.3	37.6	.000
Non-partisan (PJ)	48.7	43.7	47.4	
<i>Tagging</i>				
Good/bad division (WJ)	63.9	64.7	63.4	.000
No tagging (PJ)	14.6	33.6	22.7	
<i>One/two-party vs multi-party orientation</i>				
One/two-party orientation (WJ)	85.4	88.2	86.7	.000
Multi-party orientation (PJ)	4.4	6.7	5.4	
<i>Focus on 'here and now' vs wider aspects of conflict</i>				
'Here and now' (WJ)	79.1	53.8	68.2	.000
Wider aspects (PJ)	8.9	2.5	6.1	

**Reference to the 'Here and Now'**

*Edict defends Hezbollah – A top Egyptian cleric issued an edict yesterday defending Hezbollah fight against Israel, as Arab support for the militant group grows. (TS, 30 July 2006: 10)*

*Out there to capture the terrorists' headquarters, officials in the Northern command: The significant phase of the ground operation started last night. Hezbollah's fighter's bodies will be transferred to Israeli territory to become negotiation chips. Intelligence commander: Hezbollah is hurt but not broken. (YA, 24 July 2006: 1)*

**Reference to the Wider Context and Circumstances**

*Israel's unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000 showed a clear willingness to move toward a genuine, lasting peace. Yet Hezbollah and its sponsors, Iran and Syria instead interpreted it as weakness, to be exploited. (TS, 29 July 2006: 20)*

*During the recent few years, since the IDF withdrawal, the Israeli North and Lebanese South lick their wounds . . . during the last 25 years Hezbollah weighs carefully every step of its way. With no visible explanation, the militia is now leading itself and a large part of the Lebanese people into a suicidal campaign, perhaps the biggest in the history of the conflict in the Middle East. (YA, 17 July 2006: 4)*

TS is more partisan than non-partisan and more so than YA in its coverage. On the other hand, some two-thirds of the items in both papers display a clear good/bad orientation, and more than 80 percent of the items in both newspapers display a one-party or two-party rather than a multi-party orientation. In addition, both

newspapers focus more on immediate aspects, with YA displaying a clearly more marked emphasis.

## Analysing the Findings: Back to the Questions

To what extent does the coverage of the 2006 Lebanon War by Canadian and Israeli media display war journalism and peace journalism framing? This was the first question posed in this study.

The combined analysis of all items in both newspapers (Table 2) indicates a general preference towards war journalism: more than 50 percent of all items show this preference (with some war journalism variables featured in up to two-thirds or three-quarters of all items). There are two exceptions, however: the use of military discourse and a zero-sum orientation, and this serves as an encouraging sign that peace journalism is not totally disregarded. Thus, even though about half of the items indicate an expectation that the war will result in more war, the win-win orientation as opposed to the sports coverage model is present in 44 percent of the items. And some 60 percent of the items do not feature a military discourse.

Together with the considerable percentage of items based on 'people-oriented sources', and displaying 'less victimizing language', this finding is positive, in the sense that it suggests possible directions to strengthen the use of peace journalism in certain areas of conflict coverage.

The deconstruction of the coverage in both newspapers allows us to answer the second and third questions posed. The second question was: regardless of their differences in size, structure and climate, and in accord with their ideological, political and economic similarities, to what extent does Canadian and Israeli press coverage produce the same or similar framing and patterns of conflict coverage?

A tendency towards war journalism is common in the war coverage of both newspapers. Table 7 presents a composite picture of the earlier tables, featuring commonalities in the professional area, where both papers emphasize the tendency to show the visible effects of the war.

The political orientation of the coverage is also similar in the two papers: a majority of the items in both focus on immediate events rather than on wider, processual aspects of the conflict, and show a one- or two-party rather than a multi-party orientation. Also, most items in both newspapers feature the tagging of the parties in terms of good and bad (Table 6).

The extent of partisan attitudes is the only variable that does not show total compatibility: while both newspapers show non-partisan attitudes in general terms, more items in the *TS* show a stronger partisan attitude. Some 'Canadian dimensions' of the war can explain this fact, at least in part. In the context of the large number of Canadian citizens of Arab and particularly Lebanese origin, the evacuation of Canadian citizens from Lebanon at the beginning of the war became a salient Canadian political and human issue.

The *TS* was openly sympathetic towards the Canadian evacuees. This was expressed, first, in items on the human and logistic aspects of evacuation under fire; and on the entrance of Canadian troops into Hezbollah-controlled areas to rescue

TABLE 7

**War Journalism and Peace Journalism Framing: Schematic Summary of Similarities and Differences between YA and TS (N = 277)**

War journalism framing		Peace journalism framing	
<i>Expected results</i>			
1. Zero-sum orientation	YA	Win-win orientation	TS
2. War-oriented	TS	Agreement-oriented	YA
<i>Professional orientation</i>			
3. Visible effects of war	Both	Less visible effects of war	None
<i>Social orientation</i>			
4. Elite/official sources	YA	People-oriented sources	TS
5. Uses victimizing language	TS	Less victimizing language	YA
6. Uses military discourse	YA	Less military discourse	TS
<i>Political orientation</i>			
7. Partisan	TS	Non-partisan	Both
8. Good/bad tagging	Both	No good/bad tagging	None
9. One/two-party orientation	Both	Multi-party orientation	–
10. Focus here and now	Both	Wider aspects of conflict	–

stranded Canadians (TS, 25 July 2006: 3). Also the TS items gave voice to complaints against the performance of the Canadian government in the evacuation: its slow pace, the crowded boats and the danger of keeping Canadian citizens on Lebanese soil. These items and others, including Canadian financial aid to Lebanon and the possible participation of Canadian troops in a UNIFIL contingent (see earlier), raised a clear partisan attitude in favour of a more moderate Canadian involvement in the action, sympathy towards the evacuees and criticism of Israel (TS, 17 July 2006: 8; 19 July 2006: 5; 20 July 2006: 4; 21 July 2006: 2, 24; 22 July 2006: 3, 5).

The partisan tendency in the TS coverage is supported by its social orientation: it used more 'people-oriented sources' and more victimizing language not just towards Lebanese victims but towards victims from both sides of the conflict, while YA used less victimizing language. Items displaying such language in the Israeli paper refer mostly to Israelis (Table 5).

The third question posed in the study was: to what extent does physical proximity to the conflict and direct involvement in it make a paper more inclined towards war journalism, such as in the case of the Israel press? And to what extent does geographical distance from the conflict area produce a stronger tendency towards peace journalism in (as in the present case) the Canadian press?

Some aspects of the coverage indicate differences that probably result from the geographical and social proximity to the conflict as well as from professional constraints. YA displays such proximity in its long-run coverage of the conflict during recent years much more than its Canadian counterpart, and the paper's readers are familiar with this type of war journalism framing due to the almost universal regular



and reserve army conscription that exists in Israel. Also the use of local sources, civilian and military alike, and of Israeli reporters was much more frequent in *YA*, while the *TS* used mostly copy obtained from news agencies.

This might explain to some extent the stronger tendency towards war journalism in the Israeli newspaper (Table 8), together with the expectations of zero-sum results, the use of elite/official sources and of military discourse (Table 7).

## Conclusions

The environment in which war journalism thrives has been explored through various conceptual approaches. The analysis of three such frameworks (Hackett, 2006) indicates that (1) Herman's and Chomsky's propaganda model usefully highlights some ways whereby state and capital influence journalism, but its one-factor ideological bias leads it to artificial reductionism and functionalism; and (2) the deconstructionist approach of Shoemaker and Reese's 'hierarchy of influences' model helps to assess pressures for and against peace journalism, but like the propaganda model, its 'anatomic' nature equally leads it to reductionism, and obscures the coherence of journalism as a cultural practice and form of knowledge-production.

To some extent, both models echo traditional dichotomous approaches that need to be adapted to 21st-century terms.

**TABLE 8**

**Sources of the 2006 Lebanon War Coverage (percentages,  $\chi^2$  significance tests)  
(*N* = 318)<sup>a</sup>**

	<i>YA</i> <i>N</i> = 158	<i>TS</i> <i>N</i> = 119	Total % of items on topic	$\chi^2$ sign. level
	% of items in each newspaper			
<i>General sources</i>				.000
International	13.1	14.5	13.8	
Arab	6.3	11.4	8.8	
Israeli	73.1	17.1	45.2	
Canadian	0.0	41.7	41.7	
Other	7.5	15.2	11.3	
<i>Israeli military sources</i>				.000
Yes	29.2	3.2	16.3	
No	70.8	96.8	83.7	
<i>Reporter's nationality</i>				.000
Local	95.6	31.1	67.9	
News agency	0.0	58.0	24.9	
Other	0.6	10.9	5.1	

<sup>a</sup> *N* is larger than in the other tables because the newspapers used more than one source.

Pointing out the merits of these models – in criticizing war journalism, for example – Hackett suggests that Bourdieu's approach to journalism as a relatively autonomous institutional sphere allows conceptual space for dealing with peace journalism both in terms of the structural influences of and on the news media, as well as the potential agency and creativity of journalists. Supported by Bläsi (2004) and others, this perception of journalism – in multidimensional, less dichotomous and less deterministic institutional terms, and featuring value-charged normative and social, political and professional dimensions – is more compatible with the current 'empiricist' trend in the study of peace journalism: the trend of deconstructing, evaluating and reconstructing practices of journalistic coverage rather than adopting the fragmenting positions induced by the two former models and others like them.

Along similar lines, others criticize the long-standing imprecise ideological focus of conflict studies, peace studies and conflict resolution studies as a sole basis for the development of peace journalism (Dente-Ross, 2006).

The present study supports the call for moving the conceptual foundations of peace journalism from exclusive reliance on conflict-oriented models towards additional bases, such as professional training patterns; dealing with professional constraints that encourage reactive, nationalistic reporting; approaches that transcend the bonds of identity and enmity towards symbolic rapprochement, and more.

On the professional level, the current trend of producing empirical findings for the development of peace journalism indicates a new phase in the research of conflict coverage. This phase takes the scholarly and professional interest in this type of journalism 'beyond square one' – the initial phase characterized by exploratory efforts dominated by ideology, professional discourse and anecdote. In this new phase, field researchers and students dissect peace journalism into factual dimensions and components, looking for ways to implement it. While exploratory efforts have provided conceptual cornerstones for the development of the area, they could greatly benefit from the growing amount and quality of field research typical of this newer phase.

The dissection of war journalism and peace journalism concepts into measurable components allows the examination of some cross-cultural aspects of conflict reporting, as this study demonstrates with regard to the Canadian and Israeli coverage of the 2006 Lebanon War. This helps to identify comparative markers, and indicate topics where efforts to promote peace journalism can be applied.

In the context of these empirical efforts, the present study indicates both the salience and the resistance of war journalism as well as opportunities and challenges for the promotion of peace journalism. This applies to similarities in the presence of embedded professional norms that are more resilient to cross-cultural differences, and therefore more universal than others, such as formats and images (Sabine, 2005). Professional values – such as the tendency to visualize conflict and the expectation of war-oriented conflict results – are variables that stimulate the adherence to war journalism.

In this regard, the findings on such values resemble findings by Bläsi (2004), Hanitzsch (2004a, 2004b) and Dimitrova and Strömback (2005), and indicate possible areas of intervention on behalf of peace journalism. Also, such similarities apply to

various political aspects found in the present study, and supported by Ting Lee and Maslog (2005) – such as partisanship, one/two-party terminology and ‘here and now’ attitudes – which are salient and resistant components of the adherence to war journalism.

The present study adds to this list the geographical and human proximity to areas of conflict as variables that might also enhance war journalism and challenge efforts to promote peace journalism. On the other hand, the relatively similar political orientation of the newspapers in the present study does not confirm findings that political variables, such as war motives, evaluation of political leaders and discursive stereotypes are more culture-bound and less universal (Sabine, 2005). In addition, the study indicates the existence of some significant cross-cultural differences, such as access to the conflict scene and the larger photographic output that is usually enjoyed by local newspapers; they can draw on the work of local staff rather than rely on copy supplied by news agencies. This is supported by similar findings in Dimitrova and Strömback’s (2005) study on the framing of the Iraq War in the elite newspapers in Sweden and the US.

Possible tendencies towards peace journalism appear in the social variables, and in the expectations for conflict resolution or transformation: the newspapers analysed in this study, for instance, show that people-oriented sources, less use of victimizing language and military discourse and a win–win orientation can be promoted more easily than other dimensions as viable professional practices to advance peace journalism.

Like other components of conflict coverage, these findings might serve to steer efforts at promoting peace journalism in the world’s media.

## Notes

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1. This section is adapted from Wikipedia, and Kalb (2007).
2. After the Israel–Hezbollah exchange of POWs in July 2008, the bodies of the two soldiers kidnapped on 12 July 2006 were returned to Israel, bringing up to 121 the number of Israeli troops killed in action.
3. At: [www.torontosun.com](http://www.torontosun.com)

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