CHAPTER 8
CONSTRUCTING DIFFERENCE: SOCIAL DEVIANCE

Sociologists at Work

Richard Schwartz and Jerome Skolnick
The Criminal Applicant

In the early 1960s, Richard Schwartz and Jerome Skolnick constructed an interesting experiment to see if deviant labels restrict people's life chances. 1 Posing as representatives of an employment agency, they prepared four fictitious employment folders.

In all the folders their "client" was described as a 32-year-old single male with a high school education and a record of successive short-term jobs as a kitchen helper, maintenance worker, and handyman. The folders differed only in the applicant's past record of criminal court involvement.

The first folder indicated that he had been convicted and sentenced for assault.
In the second, he had been tried for assault but found innocent.

The third folder also showed that he had been tried and acquitted but included a supportive letter from the judge certifying the finding of not guilty and reaffirming the legal presumption of innocence.

The fourth made no mention of any criminal record, implying that the "client" had never been involved in the court system.

The researchers contacted a hundred potential employers, who were randomly divided into four groups of 25. Each group received one of the folders. Each employer was asked whether he or she could use the man described in the folder. To ensure the reality of the situation, the employers were not told that they were part of a study.

Of the 25 employers who received folder 4 (no record), nine indicated an interest in hiring the man.

Of those who received folder 3 (acquittal plus the letter from the judge), six showed an interest in hiring him.

Three of the potential employers who read folder 2 (acquittal) showed an interest.

Finally, of the employers who received folder 1 (convicted and sentenced for assault), only one expressed any interest in hiring the man.

The study showed that employment opportunities are severely restricted by the presence of a deviant label.

Why would such apparent discrimination occur? Potential employers have justifiable reasons for refusing to hire ex-convicts: Paying one's debt to society is no guarantee of future legal behavior.

Furthermore, Americans have become increasingly distrustful of our criminal justice system. Many believe that prisons do not rehabilitate but actually make convicts more deviant by teaching them better ways of committing crime and by providing social networks that facilitate criminal activity on the outside. 2

Although stigmatization due to fear of future criminal activity may be understandable or even justifiable, it doesn't account for Schwartz and Skolnick's findings. A mere charge of criminal activity conjured suspicions of tainted character and was often sufficient to prevent an employer from hiring the man.

The labeling process is apparently powerful enough, even in the absence of wrongdoing, to produce a durable loss of status for the individual. This finding challenges our important legal contention that a person is "innocent until proven guilty."

1 Schwartz, R. D., & Skolnick, J. H. 1962. "Two studies of legal stigma." Social Problems, 10, 133-138.
2 Johnson, R. 1987. Hard time: Understanding and reforming the prison. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Frank Tannenbaum
The Dramatization of Evil

Sociologists' concern over the effects of labeling someone as a deviant date back to a book called Crime and Community, written in 1938 by sociologist Frank Tannenbaum.1 He was primarily interested in male juvenile delinquents, although his ideas can be applied to many different deviant groups.

Tannenbaum believed that most acts of delinquency—breaking windows, petty theft, truancy, and so on—are a normal part of adolescent street life. Kids engage in these activities for fun, adventure, and excitement. The community at large, though, is likely to see such activities as annoying or even evil and may demand some sort of control over the situation (that is, punishment).

If delinquent behavior becomes more visible and frequent, the situation gradually becomes redefined. There is a shift from the definition of specific acts as "evil" to a definition of the individual as "evil." All the boy's acts become suspect. His companions, hangouts, speech, clothes, conduct, and everything about him become an object of scrutiny and further "proof" of his delinquent nature. From the community's point of view, the basically "good" individual who used to do mischievous things has been transformed into a bad and useless human being.

Because first impressions are important in determining how others see us and, consequently, how we see ourselves, this "delinquent" label can have a tremendous impact on the young boy's life. What concerned Tannenbaum in particular was the effect the label would have on the boy's self-concept. The boy is likely to be overwhelmed by the community reaction and begin to think of himself as the type of person who would do such things. Over time the label becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The juvenile becomes bad because he is defined as bad by others.

This process, which Tannenbaum called the "dramatization of evil," plays a greater role in the making of a deviant than perhaps any other experience. The reactions of others to deviance, no matter how compassionate the intent, may trap the deviant individual in a role from which he (or she) cannot escape.

The deviant individual, now "tagged,"2 lives in a different world. In the eyes of others, the person who steals is a thief, the person who kills is a murderer.

1 Tannenbaum, F. 1938. Crime and community. New York: Ginn.
2 Tannenbaum, F. 1938. Crime and community. New York: Ginn.

Drug Trade and Global Deviance

As social life becomes more global, certain forms of deviance begin to take on a more international flavor. Recent global trends like the growing diversity of populations, higher immigration rates, realignment of national borders, deteriorating economic conditions, democratization of governments, and improving computerization and communication technology have all helped to create major international organized crime networks. Major crime rings from Colombia, China, Italy, Korea, Jamaica, Russia, Japan, and Southeast Asia do business in the United States today.1

Except for military expenditures, the global illegal drug trade is the largest industry in the world.2 International criminal organizations (ICOs) can threaten the stability of governments, hinder economic development, and even challenge a superpower.3

In the early 1990s, for instance, the Medellin drug cartel launched a full-scale terrorist assault in Colombia. Public facilities and newspaper offices were bombed. Members of leading families were kidnapped. A leading candidate for the presidency was assassinated. Hundreds of police officers were murdered. A national airline flight was blown up in midair. The cartel's aim was to force the government to share power with the drug traffickers.

ICOs don't rely on violence alone to influence governments. The fantastic sums of money generated by illegal activities, especially drug production, give ICOs the ability to employ bribery to achieve their goals. In 1994 the president of Colombia was accused of accepting $6 million from drug dealers to help him win the election. He was eventually acquitted of all charges, but many in Colombia and elsewhere remained highly skeptical of his innocence.

In 1997, Mexican court files revealed a history of collusion between a prominent drug baron and high-ranking military officersóincluding four generalsówho had been enlisted by the Mexican and U.S. governments to lead the fight against drug production and trafficking.4

The global connections established by ICOs allow them to create whole new drug markets. The introduction of "crack" in the United States in the mid-1980s revolutionized the cocaine market here.

International networks also enable ICOs to adapt quickly to law enforcement efforts. When U.S. agencies shut off the flow of heroin from Turkey, new sources quickly developed in Southeast and Southwest Asia. When enforcement efforts were increased in Florida and the Caribbean, cocaine was simply routed through Central America and Mexico. Mexican organized crime was enlisted to run the network of local landing strips, safe houses, and corrupt government officials necessary to sustain the operation. The Colombian cartels have explored similar contacts with the Sicilian Mafia in hopes of expanding the European drug market.5 ICOs even establish connections with terrorist groups, which provide armed protection for landing fields, production facilities, and operations in exchange for cash.

Unlike the more traditional criminal groups, such as the American Mafia or ethnic street gangs, ICOs are massive business enterprises, often with transnational political and financial connections. The Colombian drug cartels, for example, have tens of thousands of specialized employees and associated businesses worldwide. Although the more traditional crime organizations may also develop international ties and suppliers, ICOs are organized for the express purpose of engaging in large-scale criminal activities across international borders.6

The profits earned by ICOs dwarf those of traditional crime organizations:

The Colombian cartels alone probably make more in a week than the American Mafia does in a year. The Colombian cartels now outperform most Fortune 500 companies. A conservative estimate of illegal drug sales at the retail, or user, level in the United States alone is $50 billion. [The] cartels are estimated to make a profit of about $20 billion annually from these revenues. . . . The combined budgets of the governments of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru is only about $9 billion annually.7

Furthermore, although traditional, nationally based criminal organizations may pose a variety of threats to society, they are in no position to challenge the sovereignty and integrity of an entire government. But where governments are unable to deliver needed social services and economies are deteriorating, the appeal of powerful international crime organizations can overwhelm respect for the law. In some areasólike small villages in the Peruvian AndesóICOs are the only form of authority many people have ever known. In fact, in circumstances where government authority is weak, powerful ICOs may see themselves as the legitimate political authority.

In sum, these crime organizations are powerful enough to challenge, destabilize, and perhaps someday completely control small countries. Hence they represent a threat to international security that no single country can control alone.

1 Godson, R., & Olson, W. J. 1995. "International organized crime." Society, 32, 18-29. See also Stephens, G. 1994. "The global crime wave." The Futurist, 28, 22-28.
2 United Nations Research Institute, 1995. States of disarray: The social effects of globalization. London: UNRISD.
3 Godson, R., & Olson, W. J. 1995. "International organized crime." Society, 32, 18-29.
4 Dillon, S., & Pyes, C. 1997. "Court files say drug baron used Mexican military." New York Times, May 24.
5 Godson, R., & Olson, W. J. 1995. "International organized crime." Society, 32, 18-29.
6 Godson, R., & Olson, W. J. 1995. "International organized crime." Society, 32, 18-29.
7 Godson, R., & Olson, W. J. 1995. "International organized crime." Society, 32, 23.