

Box 16.2 (Continued)

Treaty Organization's (NATO) inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999 troubled Moscow, which believed the enlargement to be inconsistent with assurances at the time of Germany's unification that NATO would not move eastward. The Russians were powerless to prevent the move, however, and gradually accepted it. By early 2004, NATO was moving rapidly to incorporate seven additional members, including the former Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and Ukraine was beginning to figure prominently in discussions about a potential third tranche of new members. Russia's relations with the United States—which had warmed following the attacks of 11 September 2001 as Washington sought help against terrorist groups and their supporters in Iraq, Iran, and elsewhere—began once again to sour after Moscow refused to back the Iraq war and Washington celebrated the triumph of pro-NATO nationalists in Georgia's "Rose Revolution" (see Box 16.3). The possibility that the NATO alliance could move into the heartland of Moscow's former empire and assume control of the all-important Ukrainian pipelines prompted deep anxiety in both the security and business establishments in Russia.

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- i. "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation," June 28, 2000, reprinted at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm>.
 - ii. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "Factbox: Russian Gas Export Pipelines, Projects," January 6, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Gas_Export_Pipelines_Projects/1366873.html.