

## Policy Makers and Intelligence Collection

In several instances, policy makers have intervened in intelligence collection for political reasons.

In Cuba, at the onset of the missile crisis in 1962, Secretary of State Dean Rusk opposed sending U-2s over the island because a Chinese Nationalist U-2 had recently been shot down over China and an Air Force U-2 had accidentally violated Soviet air space in Siberia. The need for imagery of possible Soviet missile sites in Cuba was great, but Rusk had other—also legitimate—concerns about avoiding further provocation.

In Iran, several successive U.S. administrations imposed limits on intelligence collection. Basically, intelligence officers were not allowed to have contact with those in the souks (markets and bazaars) who were opposed to the shah, because the shah's regime would be offended. Instead, U.S. intelligence had to rely on the shah's secret police, Savak, which had an institutional interest in denying that any opposition existed. Thus, as the shah's regime unraveled in 1978–1979, policy makers denied U.S. intelligence the sources and contacts it needed to better analyze the situation or to influence the opposition.

Again, regarding Cuba, President Jimmy Carter unilaterally suspended U-2 flights as a gesture to improve bilateral relations. Carter came to regret his decision in 1980, when he faced the possibility that a Soviet combat brigade was in Cuba and he required better intelligence on the issue.