This chapter introduces a strategic perspective model of domestic institutions and foreign policy. Leaders who are intent on retaining power and authority must satisfy core constituents, identified as the winning coalition. The winning coalition is drawn from the selectorate, the set of people with a legitimate say in the selection of the government leadership. Leaders distribute a mix of benefits in the form of public policies that all enjoy and private goods that only members of the winning coalition enjoy.

We have seen that from a leader’s point of view the optimal political arrangement is to have a small winning coalition and a large selectorate, as is common in systems with rigged elections. Under such arrangements, supporters receive valuable private benefits that foster loyalty to their leaders even in the face of policy failure. Furthermore, loyalty is reinforced by the high political risks associated with defection to a political rival. Those risks increase as the size of the selectorate increases and as the size of the winning coalition decreases.

A monarchy or military junta is often the optimal political arrangement from the point of view of members of the winning coalition (i.e., the aristocracy or high ranking military officers). In a monarchy and military government, both of which have a small winning coalition and a small selectorate, the current value of private goods is high. This is true as well in autocracies. However, in monarchies and juntas, winning coalition members benefit from the fact that the risks associated with defection are not as great as they are in autocracies. This follows from the fact that the ratio of the winning coalition size to the selectorate size is larger in monarchies and juntas than it is in autocracies with rigged elections. The weaker loyalty to incumbent kings, queens, or generals means that the leadership must try harder to sustain the backing of their key supporters, spending a larger proportion of revenue on their coalition’s welfare. That, of course, can work to benefit coalition members, almost certainly at the expense of the rest of society.

Democracy is the optimal form of government from the perspective of ordinary citizens. Relatively few private goods are doled out; instead, public policy is the focus of leadership decisions. Because good public policy benefits all people in the polity, even those not in the winning coalition are likely to fare reasonably well. Consequently, the broad mass of the population derives its greatest benefits under democracy. This is in marked contrast to monarchies, juntas, and autocracies in which the logical focus of leaders is to provide private goods—generally at the expense of seeking out successful public policies.

We have seen hints that several principles of international politics follow from the selec¬torate theory. These relate to resource allocations and their impact on foreign policy, trade policy, human rights policy, and even warfare. In the remainder of this book, we explore those principles to see how they can help us better understand and perhaps engineer international affairs.