This chapter examined nonstrategic decision making regarding North Korea’s nuclear policy. We have seen that the distribution of power and preferences can shape policy outcomes and that security can be conceived of in terms of proximity to the median voter position. This gives us a way to think about security-maximizing neorealist outlooks in a rigorous way that does not ignore the possibility that states have preferences about outcomes beyond their national security or power.

The median voter theorem provides a powerful tool for examining prospective foreign policy decisions when issues are one-dimensional. It is not an appropriate tool, however, when two or more issues are inextricably linked together. In such cases, win-set models provide a way to think about how issues might be resolved through coalition formation. Win sets are a way to model the proximity of policy preferences among contending decision makers across dimensions. We have seen that the median voter position on each dimension need not be in a win set, that is, be part of a winning coalition. A range of outcomes is possible. Thus, we have devised a way to predict the likely policy outcome when issues are treated separately and when they are linked together.

Finally, this chapter introduces expected utility calculations. By comparing the expected utility associated with alternative courses of action, we can predict which path a decision maker is likely to take. As we have seen, this depends not only on the value of this or that approach to a problem but also on the probability of various outcomes arising and on their costs and benefits. These are the fundamental building blocks of a strategic approach to international affairs.