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Williams, C. R. (2008).  Compassion, suffering and the self: A moral psychology of social justice. Current Sociology, 56(1), 5-24.

Concerns for social justice have figured prominently in much current sociological and criminological discourse. Often implicated by these critiques is the enduring presence of harm, suffering and injustice in contemporary western society – particularly as these are reinforced and perpetuated by organizational and institutional policies and practices. Less often considered are the moral psychological foundations that give rise to these problems and pathologies. Opposing the struggle for social justice, it could be argued, is a generalized impoverishment of moral sensibilities that would forefront the good of the other, thereby giving rise to relationships, communities and institutional policies and practices conducive to widespread human flourishing. This article suggests that meaningful social transformation in pursuit of social justice requires significant alterations of our collective value framework. More specifically, what seems needed is an overcoming of habitual cognitive and affective obstacles to the embodiment of compassion. Two such impediments to compassion are explored: appraisals of desert and responsibility; and perceptions of likeness and difference. The underlying concern throughout is to affirm the importance of the virtue of compassion as a crucial component of the struggle for social justice and human flourishing.

Questions that apply to this article:

1. According to the author, why might we need to significantly alter our personal and collective “value frameworks?”
2. What are two impediments to compassion that are explored by the author in the article?
3. Is the virtue of compassion as a crucial component of the struggle for social justice and human flourishing?

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Spader, D. J. (2002). The morality of justice and the morality of care: Are there distinct moral orientations for males and females? Criminal Justice Review, 27(1), 66-88.

Do males and females possess different orientations toward ethics?  Carol Gilligan answered this question in the affirmative with the publication of In a Different Voice, in which her empirical research demonstrated different moral orientations between the sexes.  Since her 1982 publication, Gilligan and numerous other researchers have developed the “morality of care” as an alternative to the traditional “morality of justice” approach that has dominated moral and political philosophy for the past two centuries.  Gilligan and others suggest that the morality of care reflects gender differences and highlights critical omissions of traditional ethics.  The purpose of the present article is to provide an overview and analysis of the two moralities.  The following examination includes (a) a review of Gilligan’s early and later research, (b) a summary of the core distinctions with citations for further reading, (c) empirical and theoretical criticisms of the difference theory, and (d) an analysis of four major approaches that may be adopted with criminal justice applications.  The article concludes that the field of criminal justice, and especially criminal justice ethics, might obtain significant benefits by recognizing the adequacy, and in some issues the superiority, of moral theories that can integrate a care orientation.  Criminal justice should join numerous other professions that are using the rich insights and practices emanating from the morality of care.

Questions that apply to this article:

1. In what ways does the author argue that Gilligan’s theory is questionable in many respects?
2. How might a morality of caring be applied to criminal justice?
3. Do males and females possess different orientations toward ethics?  
4. What is the difference between Gilligan’s "morality of care" compared to the traditional "morality of justice" approach that has dominated moral and political philosophy for the past two centuries?

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Miller, Joan G. (1994). Cultural diversity in the morality of caring: Individually oriented versus duty-based interpersonal moral codes.  Cross-Cultural Research, 28(1), 3-39.

This article argues that there exists not one universal morality of caring contrasting with the morality of justice but, rather, alternative types of interpersonal moralities that reflect the meaning systems emphasized in different cultural groups. Both the superogatory view of interpersonal morality held by Lawrence Kohlberg and the morality-of-caring framework developed by Carol Gilligan are shown to be culturally bound. Research conducted among American and Hindu Indian populations supports the claim that an individually oriented interpersonal moral code develops among Americans, stressing personal freedom of choice, individual responsibility, and a dualistic view of individual motivation. In contrast, a duty-based interpersonal moral code develops among Hindu Indians, stressing broad and socially enforceable interpersonal obligations, the importance of contextual sensitivity, and a monistic view of individual motivation. Issues for future research are identified, and implications of these alternative interpersonal moral codes for other domains of interpersonal functioning are suggested.

Questions that apply to this article:

1. According to the author, what is difference between the morality of caring in American culture versus Indian Hindu culture?
2. What does the author argue that culture is critical to the question of whether justice or caring is given moral precedence by persons in any given society?
3. What are the implications of the alternative interpersonal moral codes the author discusses?

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Kim, A. S., DeValve, M., DeValve, E. Q., & Johnson, W. W. (2003). Female wardens: Results from a national survey of state correctional executives. The Prison Journal, 83(4), 406-425.

This study describes the current situation for female wardens by examining their attitudes toward inmate services, programs, and amenities survival; involvement with correctional staff; and identity as a supervisor through their political affiliations and punishment philosophies. Using Noddings’ “caring ethic,” this study sought to determine whether the historical inclusion of women in corrections has carried over to present time and has retained its reformist nature and whether the job of warden has become more gender-neutral. The results indicate that the differences between male and female wardens are few; those that did exist provided some support for the caring ethic and the retention of women’s roles in corrections as reformers.

Questions that apply to this article:

1. How has the increase of females into the corrections field impacted efforts at reform?
2. What is the caring ethic and how does it relate to women in the corrections field?
3. Does the caring ethic impact the views and/or actions of female prison wardens as compared to men?  If so, how and in what areas?