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Budde, K. (2007). Rawls on Kant: Is Rawls a Kantian or Kant a Rawlsian? European Journal of Political Theory, 6(3), 339-358.

This article will investigate Rawls’s claim that his theory is Kantian in origin. In drawing on the

Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, I will show that Rawls’s claim to be Kantian cannot be conclusively explained and assessed without the Lectures. An investigation of the

Lectures shows that Rawls forces onto Kant’s theory a Rawlsian interpretation which crucially alters Kant’s theory. So far the secondary literature has neglected to subject Rawls’s Lectures

to detailed philosophical scrutiny. This article aims to fill this gap in the literature on Rawls’s Kantianism. I will identify three points in Rawls’s interpretation of Kant (need for CI-procedure, willing condition, true human needs) which are questionable. I argue that the similarities of

Rawls’s theory to Kant are due to these (mis)interpretations, which makes Rawls’s claim to be Kantian ultimately not legitimate.

Questions that apply to this article:

1. How does the author challenges Rawls’ claim that his theory of justice is Kantian in nature?
2. What is the author’s ultimate conclusion, after making a sophisticated argument, as to whether or not Kant is, in fact, Rawlsian?

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Batson, C. D., Lishner, D. A., Carpenter, A., Dulin, L., Harjusola-Webb, S., Stocks, E. L., Gale, S., Hassan, O., & Sampat, B. (2003). "... As you would have them do unto you": Does imagining yourself in the other's place stimulate moral action? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(9), 1190-1201. 

Philosophers, psychologists, and religious teachers have suggested that imagining yourself in another’s place will stimulate moral action. The authors tested this idea in two different situations. In Experiment 1, participants had the opportunity to assign themselves and another research participant to tasks, with one task clearly more desirable than the other. Imagining oneself in the other’s place did little to increase the morality (fairness) of the decision. A different form of perspective taking, imagining the other’s feelings, increased direct assignment of the other to the desirable task, apparently due to increased empathy. In Experiment 2, participants confronted a different decision: either accept an initial task assignment that would give them highly positive consequences and the other participant nothing or change the assignment so they and the other would each receive moderately positive consequences. In this situation, imagining oneself in the other’s place did significantly increase moral action.

Questions that apply to this article:

1. Do people engage in more moral behavior when they are told to imagine themselves in another’s place?
2. Do people engage in more moral behavior when they are told to  imagine what the other person’s feelings are in a given situation?
3. What are the implications of the results of this research?

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Lafont, C. (2003). Procedural justice? Implications of the Rawls-Habermas debate for discourse ethics. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 29(2), 163-181.

This paper focuses on the discussion between Rawls and Habermas on procedural justice. The author uses Rawls’s distinction between pure, perfect, and imperfect procedural justice to distinguish three possible readings of discourse ethics. Then the author argues, against Habermas’s own recent claims, that only an interpretation of discourse ethics as imperfect procedural justice can make compatible its professed cognitivism with its proceduralism. Thus discourse ethics cannot be understood as a purely procedural account of the notion of justice. Finally the author draws the different consequences that follow from this reading.

Questions that apply to this article:

1. What does Rawls mean by “pure procedural justice”?
2. What is the discourse principle?
3. According to the author, what is the impact of legitimacy on the notion of justice?